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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AT THE WARNER 
ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
The author identified 101 management practices which 
evolved from the labor-management relationship at Robins 
Air Force Base. These practices were a major outcome of 
management-labor relations. Further analysis of the prac­
tices produced additional inferences.
One of the consequences of collective bargaining was 
the necessity for managers to consider union and employee 
reactions before acting. Otherwise the union would charge 
management with a contract violation or unfair labor practice. 
Another outcome was a decline in the unilateral authority of 
management. The most significant curb to management's auth­
ority was the requirement to consult with the union at least 
four weeks before changing the hours of work or tours of duty. 
The negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure was the 
most significant management practice, primarily because of its 
potential effect on the labor movement. In an attempt to 
regain unilateral authority, management became "reluctantly 
cooperative" in consultations. It sought to gain the initia­
tive in contract negotiations and daily relations with the 
union.
Management practices improved although the union was 
credited as being the cause of the improvement. Management 
was considered effective, but the disparity in manager and 
worker perceptions indicated that management needed to improve 
further. Suggestions for improvement included instruction in 
leadership and participative management theory for managers, 
an information program to improve management's image, and an 
examination of management practices to insure that managers 
adhere to desired practices.
The high cost of labor relations would probably lead 
to a reduction of expenditures for the labor-management pro­
gram. Paradoxically, this could result in decreased produc­
tion, increased turnover and absenteeism, and increased 
operating costs.
Ill
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Study
Executive Order 10988 authorized federal employees to 
organize and bargain collectively over working conditions and 
personnel policies and practices. Federal employees could join 
unions prior to 1962, but Executive Order 10988 gave them the 
right to choose an exclusive representative. This representa­
tive had rights of consultation and negotiation which had been 
denied to employees prior to 1962. The succeeding Orders, 11491 
in 1969 and 11616 in 1971, strengthened employee bargaining 
power.
Although the 1962 Order gave unions the immediate right 
of exclusive representation, union power increased slowly.
Unions had made only modest gains in membership by the mid­
sixties. However, by 1973, 56 percent of all federal employees 
(exclusive of postal employees) and 76 percent of federal workers 
employed by the Air Force were in exclusive bargaining units.^ 
Many of the initial bargaining agreements lacked substantive 
content, but unions gained additional power each time they went 
to the negotiating table.
Through the power of negotiations and procedures for 
enforcing contracts and fair labor practices, unions can actually
^US Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management 
Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government (Washing­
ton: Govt. Printing office, November l473), pp. ^6 and 44.
2force management to comply with its own policies. Management 
is especially vulnerable when it makes mistakes in negotiations. 
For example, employee rights are often reinforced by impartial 
third parties who lack management experience and who have no 
allegiance to management. Since arbitrators act merely on the 
facts and evidence presented, a poorly negotiated contract can 
result in "poor" decisions for a long time. Air Force managers 
are thus challenged to improve their managerial skills and to 
include in their management repertory the knowledge and art of 
collective bargaining.
Undoubtedly, the policies and practices of Air Force 
managers have affected the evolving labor-management relation­
ship.^ Similarly, management practices have evolved from labor- 
management relations. To what extent has collective bargaining 
affected management practices? This research attempts to answer 
the question through an examination of the labor-management 
relationship at an Air Force installation.
Other Authoritative Studies 
Literature about American labor relations contains 
excellent works which attempt to explain the position of labor 
and management on virtually every issue. However, research 
concerning public sector labor relations is relatively limited. 
Nevertheless, a few investigations have contributed to this field 
of knowledge and deserve mention.
The principal writers before 1962 were Spero,
Godine, and Hart. Two of the older works on public unionism are
iThe terms "labor-management relationship," "collective 
bargaining," and "labor-management relations" are used inter­
changeably in this study.
sterling D. Spare's The Labor Movement in A Government Industry^
2
and Government as Employer. The former concerns the development 
of unions in the Post Office Department. In the second work, he 
considers the historical background and political impact of the 
movement. Another classic is The Labor Problem in the Public
3
Service by Morton Godine. It is a political analysis of employee 
representation and collective negotiation. In another work,
Wilson R. Hart outlines similarities between labor relations in
4
the private and public sectors.
In an unpublished master's thesis, Chantee Lewis 
attempted to assess the impact of Executive Order 10988 by sur­
veying Department of Defense activities. The study indicated
5
the Executive Order was slowly meeting its objective.
In a case study at Tinker Air Force Base in 1966,
Ronald Durand Merrell depicted the collective bargaining pro­
cess in its early stage of development in the Air Force. He 
observed very little collective bargaining taking place. This 
was attributed to general union weakness in the area, ineptness
^Sterling D. Spero, ----. (New York: George H. Doran
Company, 1924).
2
Sterling D. Spero, ---- . (New York: Remsen Press,
1948).
^Morton R. Godine,  . (Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1951).
^Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining ir the Federal 
Civil Service (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961).
^Chantee Lewis, "The Impact of the Executive Order 10988 
on Labor Relations in the Defense Department" (unpublished 
master's thesis. Naval Post Graduate School, 1964).
4of the local lodge of the International Association of Machin­
ists, effective management at Tinker, and a cautious approach 
by the Air Force.^
Another early study of the impact and ramifications of 
the executive order was William B. Vosloo’s Collective Bargaining 
in the United States Civil S e r v i c e .  ^ it was written originally 
as a dissertation. In the study, Vosloo describes and analyzes 
the federal lajx>r relations program under Executive Order 10988. 
He concludes that modified bargaining rights can be granted to 
federal workers since the difference in public and private sector 
management is one of degree.
In a more recent work, Gerald Perselay examined Air 
Force experience under Executive Order 10988 to determine what 
was necessary to develop a more workable federal labor relations 
program. He found that the content of written agreements was 
not substantive. Air Force managers viewed the new relation­
ship with unions as a threat to their authority and preroga­
tives. Different problems were perceived. Government agencies 
felt that unit determinations, conflicts of interest, and 
inexperienced personnel were paramount. Unions believed that 
major problems were scope of negotiations, lack of a central 
authority, need for binding arbitration, and enforcement policy 
for rulings.^
^Ronald Durand Merrell, "Collective Bargaining at Tinker 
Air Force Base, Oklahoma (unpublished master's thesis. Univer­
sity of Oklahoma, 1966).
^William B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United
States Civil Service (ChicagSI Public Pefsbnnei association, 
-----------------
^Gerald Perselay, "A Study of United States Air Force 
Experience Under the Federal Employee-Management Cooperation 
Program" (unpublished dissertation, George Washington Univer­
sity, 1970).
5In a study in 1971 Louis V. Imundo, Jr., found that psy-
cological and economic factors were the primary reasons federal
employees joined unions. Social factors had little effect.
There were no appreciable differences in the reasons why white-
collar and blue-collar workers joined unions.^
In 1972, Martin W. Marquardt compared 120 collective
bargaining agreements in effect from 1962-1971 in the Air Force.
He found that each successive negotiation at a particular
installation yielded an average increase of four substantive
clauses in the contract. The average number of substantive
clauses for current contracts was ten. Marquardt concluded that
a restrictive interpretation by agency management concerning the
retained rights of management limited consultation and the scope 
2
of bargaining.
In 1974, William V. Rice, Jr., compared industrial 
relations in the federal and private sectors. He concluded that 
federal employees had only nominal power since private sector 
collective bargaining had not been thoroughly transplanted into
3
the federal service.
^Louis V. Imundo, "Why Government Employees Join Unions: 
A Study of AFGE Local 916" (unpublished dissertation. University 
of Oklahoma, 1972).
^Martin W. Marquardt, "The Scope of Bargaining at United 
States Air Force Installations Within the Forty-eight Counter- 
minous States Under Executive Order 11491: An Analysis and Pro­
jection" (unpublished dissertation. University of Alabama.
^William V. Rice, Jr., "An Inquiry into the Evolving 
Federal Labor-Relations System" (unpublished dissertation, 
Louisiana State University, 1974).
6Justification For The Research
It has been stated that management must improve in res-
II
ponse to the growing power of federal employees. It follows that 
sound management practices can help the manager meet this chal­
lenge. If the research can identify management practices, it 
may also be able to determine whether the practices were an out­
growth of the labor-management relationship. This may lead to 
a conclusion that a subset of management practices is having a 
negative effect, particularly when viewed with respect to 
employee dissatisfaction. If so, it should be possible to iden­
tify weaknesses in policies or programs which are unpopular or 
not working well. This, in turn, should lead to new programs 
and procedures which satisfy employee needs and desires. Of 
course, examination may indicate positive effects, and thus 
support the current situation. If so, similar programs and pro­
cedures which further satisfy employee needs and desires can be 
developed.
If the research can determine areas of agreement and 
disagreement between management and labor, it should provide 
the basis for a better understanding. For example, if manage­
ment believes a particular management practice (see definition, 
p. 12) is in effect but labor disagrees, closer examination is 
warranted. Management may find that the practice is not being 
followed by managers at all. If it is, then better communica­
tions are needed to inform the employees.
The overall result may be general management improve­
ment or confirmation that management is proceeding on the proper
7course. Finally, some of the results may have application 
throughout the Air Force or other federal agencies.
Overview
The study is composed of nine chapters. In Chapter II, 
the author presents the research model for determining the impact 
of collective bargaining on management practices at the Warner 
Robins Air Logistics Center.
Chapters III through V contain background information 
which is essential to the development of the research. In 
Chapter III, "A Historical Perspective of Labor Relations 
in the Federal Service," the author provides a framework for the 
rest of the study. In Chapter IV the author describes Executive 
Order 10988 and the changes resulting from Executive Order 11491 
and Executive Order 11616. These orders form the legal basis 
for collective bargaining in the Air Force and are vital to an 
understanding of the labor-managemenc relationship. Final back­
ground information is provided in Chapter V, "Participants in 
the Collective Bargaining Process." This chapter begins with 
the description of Robins Air Force Base, the mission, organiza­
tional structure, and work processes. Similar information is 
provided about the American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE) and AFGE Local 987.
In the next three chapters, the author presents the 
basic research. In Chapter VI the author describes and examines 
the labor-management relationship between the Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center and AFGE Local 987. In Chapter VII three
8generations of base-wide agreements are described and analyzed.
In Chapter VIII the author analyzes manager and worker attitudes 
concerning the effect of collective bargaining on management 
practices at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. This 
entails presentation and analysis of data from a questionnaire 
submitted to managers and workers at the Center. These chapters 
form the basis for the summary and conclusions in the final 
chapter, "The Past Decade and the Future."
In the final section of Chapter I, a few specialized 
terms are defined for the convenience of the reader.
Definitions
Generally, the author uses terminology consistent with 
commonly accepted definitions. However, a few terms are special­
ized and require a brief explanation;^
1. Activity - an organizational entity within the Air 
Force to which responsibility for civilian personnel administra­
tion has been delegated to the commander by the Secretary of the 
Air Force
2. Adverse Action - a discharge, suspension for more 
than thirty days, or reduction in rank or compensation; adverse 
action does not include personnel actions taken under reduction- 
in-force procedures, but does include resignation and retirements
The following definitions are quoted, paraphrased, or 
derived from Air Force Regulation 40-702 unless indicated 
otherwise.
which were allegedly secured by duress, intimidations, or decep­
tion^
3. Agency - an executive department, a government organ­
ization, and an independent establishment
4. Agency Management - the agency head of all manage­
ment officials, supervisors, and other representatives empowered 
to act for the agency on labor-management activities
5. Amendment - a clause or section of a written nego­
tiated agreement which is intended to clarify the content of the 
agreement without substantive change
6. Arbitration - a process whereby an impartial third 
party rules on a dispute between management and the union; the 
arbitrator's decision is binding on both parties
7. Available Employees - employees are considered avail­
able to vote if on duty at the work site, or if they vote in 
person; if the election is conducted by mail, employees are con­
sidered available if they have been provided with a mail ballot
8. Classified Employees - these civil service employees 
are commonly referred to as white-collar workers
9. Collective Bargaining (in the Federal Service) - a 
process by which management and a union negotiate over working 
conditions, personnel policies or practices, written agreements, 
and grievance and arbitration procedures
 ^Air Force Regulation 40-717 .
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10. Commander - refers to commanders of organizations 
to which central civilian personnel offices are assigned^
11. Commuting Area - refers to employees in an area 
serviced by a central civilian personnel office
12. Conflict of Interest - this occurs when the activity 
of an individual as a member, representative, or officer of a 
union conflicts with or is incompatible with the official res­
ponsibilities of his job
13. Consultation - verbal or written interchange of 
facts and opinions between the employer and the union on matters 
of mutual interest within the jurisdiction of the participants
of two or more unions empowered to represent member organizations 
in dealing with Air Force officials
15. Detail - a temporary assignment, usually to a posi­
tion of greater or lesser responsibility than normally required 
by an individual's grade and classification
16. Dues Check-Off - a procedure whereby an employee 
authorizes his employer to withhold union dues from his pay and 
remit them to the union
17. Eligible Employees - employees who are included in 
the count to determine the size of a unit
^Although this normally refers to the commander of an 
air base group (housekeeping and support units), the terms 
"commander," or "activity commander," as used in this paper, 
refer to the Air Materiel Commander, which is one echelon 
higher.
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18. Employee - an employee of an agency and an employee 
of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the United States; 
for the purpose of recognition, supervisors are excluded
19. Exclusive Recognition - may be granted to a union 
if the majority of the employees choose an organization; this 
carries the right to negotiate written agreements on matters 
authorized by Executive Orders 11491 and 11616, including 
grievances, personnel policies and practices, or other matters 
affecting general working conditions of employees in the unit
20. Formal Recognition - under Executive Order 10988, 
granted to unions if at least 10 percent of the unit employees 
were members and exclusive recognition had not been granted to 
another union; this recognition carried the right to be con­
sulted and to express views on matters authorized by the order 
which were of interest to the organization; these matters 
included formulation and implementation of personnel policies 
and practices, and working conditions
21. General Schedule - see Classified Employees
22. Guard - an employee who enforces rules and pro­
tects agency property or persons on agency property, or main­
tains law and order in areas or facilities under government 
control
23. Grievance - employee dissatisfaction with specific 
aspects of his employment such as working conditions and environ­
ment, relationships with his supervisors, other employees and 
officials, suspension of 30 days or less, and official repri­
mands
12
24. Impasse - the inability of the employer and the
union to agree on an issue through negotiation
25. Informal Recognition - under Executive Order 10988, 
granted to unions that did not qualify for formal or exclusive 
recognition; the organization could express its views on any 
subject but could not claim a right to be consulted
26. Journeyman - a worker who has learned a handicraft
or trade— distinguished from an apprentice, supervisor, or 
master^
27. Labor-Management Relationship - see Collective 
Bargaining
28. Labor Organization - a labor union of employee 
members, but excluding management officials or supervisors
29. Leader Level - the top level of journeyman posi­
tion classification
30. Management Practice - any usual method or act by 
management relating to personnel policies, working conditions, 
employee-raanagement cooperation, the mission, budget, organi­
zation, employees, or technology of performing the work
31. Manager or Managerial Executive - a person who 
makes or recommends management policy, or directs or manages 
a program activity or major function of the Air Force
^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (2d ed.; Spring­
field, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1954). Note: An
Apprentice is a beginner. A master is a skilled workman or 
craftsman qualified to follow his trade independently.
13
32. Mediation - a process by which an impartial third 
party helps management and a union reach a close enough agree­
ment to sign a contract; the mediator usually renders no decis­
ion; he hears each side of a dispute privately; by learning the 
true resistance point of each, he may be able to provide the 
disputants a key to the solution of their impasse
33. Negotiation - a discussion between management and
a union which has been granted exclusive recognition with intent 
to agree over some bargainable matter
34. Regular Working Hours - the hours an employee is 
required to be at his work place; lunch periods are excluded
35. Supervisor - one who has authority to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, 
discipline employees, direct them, evaluate their performance, 
adjust their grievances, or effectively recommend such action
36. Supplement - an addition of new material not 
previously included or a change in a written negotiated agree­
ment
37. Union or Employee Organization - an organization 
of workers which represents the rights of workers to manage­
ment
38. Union Representative or Employee Representative - 
a union official or person authorized by the union to represent 
it in dealing with management; the representative need not be 
an employee of the federal government
14
39. Unit (Bargaining Unit) - a grouping of Air Force 
employees found to be appropriate for purposes of exclusive 
recognition
40. Wage-Board Employees - employees commonly referred 
to as blue-collar, production and maintenance, and non-classi- 
fied employees; their wages are established by wage boards 
rather than Congress^
41. Worker Rights - includes participation in and 
consultation on formulating and implementing policies and prac­
tices concerning working conditions such as safety, training, 
labor-management cooperation, employee services, methods of 
adjusting grievances, granting of leave, promotion plans, 
demotion practices, and hours of work
In the next chapter the author describes the research 
model used to determine the impact of collective bargaining on 
management practices.
^The Army-Air Force Wage Board sets community-wide rates 
based on industry wages paid in the local area.
CHAPTER II
THE RESEARCH MODEL TO DETERMINE IP COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
HAS AFFECTED MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AT THE 
WARNER ROBINS AIR LOGISTICS CENTER
Research Statement 
The purpose of this research is to determine the impact 
of collective bargaining on management practices at the Warner 
Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, Georgia. The terms 
collective bargaining, labor-management relations, and labor 
relations are used synonomously in this paper and refer to 
to collective bargaining in the federal service. For the 
purpose of this research the management practice may exist 
as a formally stated practice in the labor contract or regu­
lation, or it may exist only in the imagination of managers 
and workers; that is, it exists if people perceive that it 
exists. Since people tend to respond to reality as they 
perceive it, perceived existence or nonexistence will take 
precedence over formally stated existence or nonexistence.1
Clifford T. Morgan and Richard A. King, Introduction 
to Psychology (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, third ed., 
1966), Ch. 10. Also see Jerome S. Bruner, "Social Psychology 
and Perception," from Readings in Social Psychology, ed. E. E.
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As an exception to a practice being a usual method or having 
been performed frequently enough to be regarded as a practice, 
the author will also consider management's stated intention 
to act under certain circumstances as a management practice; 
that is, the act management says it will perform is considered 
a practice. Having defined the terms which are an integral 
part of the research, the fundamental questions may be stated 
as:
1. What management practices have been adopted since 
1962 at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center because of 
the labor-management relationship
2. Do managers and workers believe that management 
practices have improved since 1962 as a result of the labor- 
management relationship
3. Are managers and workers opposed to certain manage­
ment practices
Stated as hypotheses, the research questions are:
1. Certain management practices have evolved from the 
labor-management relationship since 1962
2. Managers and workers believe management practices 
have improved since 1962 as a result of the labor-management 
relationship
Maccoley, T. M. Newman, and E. L. Hartley (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1958), pp. 85-94. Also see 
Albert H. Hastort and Hadley Cantri, "They Saw a Game: A 
Case Study" (A Case Study of Differential Perception), 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 49 (1954), 
pp. 129-134.
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3. Managers and workers are opposed to certain manage­
ment practices
No attempt is made to conclude that management practices 
at every Air Force installation have been affected in the same 
way as those at Robins. However, it should be possible to make 
certain generalizations that have application throughout the 
Air Force, Department of Defense (DOD), or other federal agen­
cies.
Methodology 
Selection of Population 
When the research actually began in August, 1974, 
a number of Air Force bases provided a population which would 
have permitted an examination of the impact of collective bar­
gaining on management practices. The critical factor in the 
selection of the population was to insure that the collective
bargaining process was operative. In the author's judgment a
large civilian work force with exclusive representation and 
coverage by a labor contract satisfied this requirement. Robins 
Air Force Base met these criteria. It had a military and 
civilian population of 22,000. Most of the 16,000 civilians 
were assigned to the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, more 
commonly referred to as the Warner Robins Air Material Area
(WRAMA).  ^ WRAMA was one of the eight air materiel areas in
^The names WRAMA and Robins Air Force Base are used 
interchangeably in this paper, although it is more precise to 
think of Robins as including WRAMA and several tenant organi­
zations .
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the United States. The American Federation of Government 
,Employees (AFGE) represented WRAMA employees through the Base- 
Wide Bargaining Unit. AFGE Lodge 987 was the exclusive rep­
resentative and a labor contract was in effect. Of the 11,500 
employees in the WRAMA who were eligible for union membership, 
5,800^ were dues paying members. Although five other units
had exclusive representation, they accounted for only 3.9 per-
2
cent of the union members at Robins. The AFGE also represented 
the Security Police, Professional Nurses, Base Exchange and 
Motion Picture Service employees, and Non-appropriated Fund 
employees. The Security Police Unit and the Professional 
Nurses Unit were also included in the base-wide bargaining con­
tract. They represented less than eight-tenths of one percent 
of the employees covered by the agreement. Firemen were rep­
resented by the International Association of Firefighters.
Based on this information, the WRAMA population was selected 
for the research.
Procedures and Method of Gathering Data 
In order to determine the impact of collective bargain­
ing on management practices, it was necessary to identify the 
practices which evolved from the collective bargaining relation­
ship. Certainly these practices represented the impact of 
collective bargaining. Yet, analysis of the effect of these 
practices permitted further conclusions about the impact of 
collective bargaining on management practices. (See Appendix 
5, p. 323 for diagram of research model.)
^Interview, Edward Maddox, President of AFGE Local 987, 
September 23, 1974.
2
More than one exclusive bargaining unit is possible if 
there are other units with clear and identifiable community of 
interests.
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Initially, the author considered a research project 
which entailed identification of management practices by a 
questionnaire. Obviously, the research would have been incom­
plete without some insight into the perceptions of managers and 
workers concerning the impact of collective bargaining on 
management practices. However, respondent understanding was 
a major limiting factor to the size of the survey instrument. 
Preliminary research indicated that a relatively large number 
of management practices had evolved as a result of labor-manage­
ment relations. It was intuitively obvious that a question­
naire would be invalidated by the complexity resulting from an 
exhaustive list of management practices. Moreover, constraints 
of time, economics, cooperation of the respondents, and the 
approval and cooperation of management and union officials 
required that the size of the questionnaire be limited. Thus, 
the author concluded that it would not be feasible to confine 
the research to a questionnaire.^
Therefore, the author elected to examine the labor- 
management relationship, examine the collective bargaining 
agreements, interview key management and union officials, and 
examine the perceptions of managers and workers concerning 
selected management practices. An examination of official 
bargaining agreements, and interviews provided information 
concerning labor-management relations. Knowledge of the labor- 
management relationship and the labor contracts was useful in
^These same constraints affected the length of the 
interview.
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analyzing manager and worker perceptions. An analysis of mana­
ger and worker perceptions permitted greater understanding of 
the labor-management relationship and the labor contracts.
Each aspect of the research was undertaken separately, yet none 
could be understood completely without knowledge of the rest. 
Certainly a full understanding of the total impact of collec­
tive bargaining on management practices was dependent upon an 
examination of each of these factors.
In order to delimit the research, the author inter­
viewed key management and union officials and surveyed a sample 
of workers and managers. Officials were interviewed during 
duty hours at their work location or at union offices. Workers 
and managers completed the questionnaire (See Appendix 1, p. 292) 
on official time in facilities near their work location. Union 
stewards assisted in disseminating and collecting the questionnaire.
The answers of the respondents concerning questions about 
management practices were a major consideration in determining 
the existence and cause of the management practices listed on 
the questionnaire. Obviously, their perceptions were not 
always conclusive. In those instances where the responses 
were divided so that the results were indecisive or incon­
clusive, analysis of the labor-management relationship, base- 
wide contracts, and other information enabled the author to 
reach conclusions. Use of the chi square statistic permitted 
a more thorough evaluation of manager and worker responses.
For example, if the agreement or disagreement between managers 
and workers was significant, a potential problem usually
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existed. An examination of the reasons for the differences often 
led to suggested changes in procedures. As a result of the total 
research effort, the author determined the impact of collective 
bargaining on management practices at the Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center.
If officials had rejected the primary plan of surveying 
personnel during the work day, the author planned to mail the 
questionnaire to workers and managers. In this case, approxi­
mately twice as many personnel would have been surveyed due to 
the lower response rate to mail surveys.
Before proceeding with the research plan, it was neces­
sary to obtain approval from the Department of Defense (DOD),
Air Force, AFLC, WRAMA, and AFGE Local 987 to survey and inter­
view WRAMA personnel.
The author requested Air Force and DOD approval under 
paragraph 18a, Air Force Regulation 178-9. DOD and Headquarters 
Air Force conditionally approved the research plan and survey 
provided the other interested agencies agreed. Other conditions 
to approval of the questionnaire were deletion of the word 
"race" from the identification data, deletion of the manage­
ment practice concerning the accounting of employee time, clear­
ance by the Air Force Management Engineering Team that similar 
research was not contemplated within six months, and insertion 
of a statement that all responses were completely voluntary.
The labor relations officers at AFLC and WRAMA agreed to the 
research without conditions. The union objected to the item 
identifying the respondent as a union member. The survey was
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revised to accommodate these provisions. It was difficult to 
understand union objections to identification data concerning 
union membership since the respondent could remain anonymous. 
Moreover, if management wanted to identify union members, it 
could identify most of them through dues withholding deductions.
The Survey Sample
The major consideration in selecting management prac­
tices to list on the questionnaire was to insure that they rep­
resented a cross section of the various practices governing the 
collective bargaining relationship such as consultation, notifi­
cation, equitable treatment, working conditions, personnel 
policies, employee welfare, negotiation, and grievances.
Another consideration was the opportunity to identify practices 
which were not formalized in an agreement such as management 
reluctance to fire or lay off an employee. As mentioned earlier, 
the final list of practices on the questionnaire had to be kept 
within reasonable limits.
The author identified a cross section of eighteen 
management practices which possibly evolved from the labor- 
management relationship. He hoped that preliminary interviews 
would enable him to decrease the number of management practices 
to be examined by survey. However, seven management practices 
were deleted and ten were added for a total of twenty-one. The 
author was still faced with delimiting the research. The question­
naire was designed to answer the basic questions in the research 
statement (See page 16). The first question in the research
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statement required a maximum of two arithmetical comparisons 
and the testing of a maximum of two null hypotheses for each of 
the twenty-one management practices, depending on the outcome 
of the first arithmetical comparison.^ The second basic ques­
tion required a maximum of two arithmetical comparisons and 
the testing of a maximum of two null hypotheses.^ The third 
question required a tabular comparison? By restricting sample 
stratification to the general group of manager-supervisors 
(military and civilian) and the general group of civilian 
workers, it was possible to limit the tests to a maximum of 
forty-four arithmetical comparisons and forty-four null hypoth­
eses, in addition to a tabular comparison involving matrices 
of possible size 21 x 41 (managers) and 21 x 347 (workers).
It would be interesting to determine if the various 
groups at Robins have different perceptions about management 
practices. For example, additional comparisons could be made 
between managers and blue-collar workers, managers and white- 
collar workers, military managers and civilian managers, blue- 
collar workers, and white collar workers, workers under 30 and 
workers over 29, and female workers and male workers. Compari­
sons between union and non-union workers, different racial groups 
and many more combinations were possible. However, since each 
comparison could result in the testing of forty-four arithmetical 
comparisons and forty-four null hypotheses, one can see that 
such analysis rapidly approaches unmanageable proportions.
Isee pp. 40-46. ^See pp. 47-51. ^See pp. 51-52.
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The variance of attitudes among the management groups 
or among the worker groups is unknown. However, it is usually 
assumed that blue-collar and white-collar characteristics are 
different in some respects, such as identification with manage­
ment, attitudes toward unions, and promotion expectations. A 
similar assumption can be made about differences in military, 
white-collar, and blue-collar managerial employees. To the 
extent that these assumptions are true, the research is biased 
because the study is limited to the collective perceptions of 
managerial employees and the collective perceptions of workers.
The Sample Size
According to Yamane, the samples required in practical 
research problems must be large enough so that a normal approxi­
mation can be used. It is possible to determine a proper sample 
size by use of a confidence interval, where the required pre­
cision is interpreted to mean the length of the confidence 
interval.^
At the 95 percent confidence interval a formula can be 
derived, using 1.96 normal deviates. However, Yamane uses two 
normal deviates instead of 1.96 normal deviates to provide 
further simplification. This results in a 95.44 percent con­
fidence interval instead of a 95 percent confidence interval. 
This slight difference has little, if any, effect in practical 
applications. Using this procedure, Yamane derived a simple 
formula for a finite population:
^Taro Yaunane, Statistics, An Introductory Analysis 
(2d ed.. Harper & Row, New York, 1967), p. 579.
^Ibid. P. 581. See pp. 580-583 for derivation of 
the formula.
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N
= Î+Ni^  ^
where n = sangle size 
N = population
e = percentage point error of 
estimation
Since 12,800 managerial and non-managerial workers were 
assigned to WRAMA, the sample size for employees became:
n = 12800 ,
1+12800 (.05)^ = 388
About 1353 managerial personnel were assigned to WRAMA
so the proportion of managerial employees to non-managerial
employees was: 1353 or .1057
12800
Accordingly, the stratified sample consisted of 41 mana­
gerial employees and 347 non-managerial employees. Further 
stratification of the two major groups was necessary to insure 
that the sample was representative of the population. Of the 
41 managerial employees, five were military, 22 were white- 
collar, and 14 were blue-collar. Of the 347 non-managerial 
employees, 167 were white-collar and 180 were blue-collar.^
All of the questionnaires were returned and usable, 
primarily because the author supervised completion of the ques­
tionnaire. Even if the mail survey had been utilized, a rela­
tively high response rate was anticipated because the survey 
was authorized and approved by DOD, WRAMA, and AFGE Local 987.
Based on 1974 personnel strength ratios: .12 military
managers, .54 white-collar managers, .34 blue-collar managers, 
.48 white-collar workers and .52 blue-collar workers. For 
simplification, managerial employees will be referred to as 
managers and non-managerial employees will be referred to as 
workers.
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Nevertheless, it would have been necessary to increase the 
number surveyed. As an estimate of the size of a mail survey, 
the author used the response rate determined by Louis V. Imundo, 
Jr., in a study at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma.^ Although the survey 
instruments were different, the populations were similar.
Another similarity was that the exclusive bargaining agent was 
an AFGE local.
The blue-collar response rate at Tinker was 34.2 per­
cent and the white-collar response rate was 62.9 percent. The 
combined rate was 42.7 percent. Based on these rates and the 
stratification desired the author could have determined the 
size of a mail survey to insure that 41 managers and 347 wor­
kers responded.
The Sample Design
Systematic sampling is the process of taking observa­
tions at equal intervals in a list. For example, every kth 
item is selected. When nearby parts of a population are alike, 
systematic sampling with a random start is superior to simple
random sampling in spacing the sampling units more evenly over 
2
the population.
A stratified random Scunple is one in which the popula­
tion is divided into fairly uniform groups or strata. Then
^"Unionism at Tinker Air Force Base," Oklahoma Business 
Bulletin, July, 1972.
2John E. Freund and Frank J. Williams, Elementary 
Business Statistics (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, 1964), pp. 375-377.
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a random sample is drawn from each selected stratum. If the 
various strata can be made more homogeneous than the population 
as a whole, a stratified sample will yield more precise results 
than a random sample of the same size.^
Since managers and workers comprised the WRAMA popula­
tion, the author incorporated systematic and stratified sampling 
into the sample design. Using a table of random numbers to 
determine the starting point in each stratum, the author selec­
ted the neune of every 32d military manager and every 33d white-
collar manager, blue-collar manager, white-collar worker, and blue- 
2
collar worker.
The Interview Sample 
The author conducted a structured interview with top 
management and union representatives of WRAMA (See p. 34). Interview 
periods ranged from thirty minutes to three hours. Management 
officials interviewed were the Commander of WRAMA, Deputy Direc­
tor of Materiel Management, Deputy Director of Distribution,
Deputy Director of Procurement and Production, Deputy Director 
of Maintenance, Base Commander, and the Labor Relations Officer 
and assistants. Civilian deputies were interviewed instead of 
military directors. As civilians, the deputies had been more
llbid.
^The following procedure was used in calculating the 
selection of each kth name. 1353 = manager sample size. .12 
= military managers. .12 x 1353 = 162 number of military 
managers. .12 x 41 = 5 = number of military in manager sample. 
162 4 5 =  32d military manager.
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involved in labor relations at WRAMA than their military supe­
riors since military personnel were reassigned more frequently 
than civilians. Union representatives (AFGE Local 987) inter­
viewed were the union president, executive officer, secretary 
treasurer, and the chief steward of each directorate.
The Research Instruments
The research instruments were designed to answer the 
basic questions in the research statement. While each instru­
ment provided specificity, the interview offered the advantage 
of exploring each subject in depth with the respondent.
The Survey
In the introductory statement of the questionnaire, the 
author stated the purpose of the survey and assured the res­
pondents that their identities would remain confidential. He 
also attempted to eliminate or decrease respondent objections 
to revealing age and sex by explaining that such information 
was related to equal employment opportunities.
The questionnaire was composed of two basic parts.
Part I requested demographic information and Part II requested 
information concerning manager and worker perceptions about 
management practices. Each respondent was asked to state yes
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or no as to whether a specific management practice currently
existed at Robins. He then stated’"yes” or "no" as to whether he
thought the union caused the result.^ There were no right or
wrong answers so a forced response was required. The important
thing was what managers and workers believed to be true. The
final question was designed to learn if a specific management
practice was opposed by workers or managers.
Part II of the survey was based on preliminary research
which indicated that, generally, the following management prac-
2tices existed at Robins at the time of the survey:
1. Management considers employee or union reactions 
when acting on working conditions or personnel policies or 
practices
2. Management is reluctant to fire an employee
3. Management is reluctant to lay off an employee
4. Management talks willingly with employees or their 
representatives about working conditions or personnel policies 
or practices
5. Management talks willingly with employees or their 
representatives about grievances
6. Management converts positions from civilian to mili­
tary to avoid dealing with unions
Although it is more precise to think of "labor-manage­
ment relationship" as broader in scope than "union," the author 
used these terms synonomously in the questionnaire for the 
purpose of simplicity.
2
Although one might argue that results should not be 
stated at this point, preliminary research was necessary to 
design the questionnaire. Moreover, as shown in Chapter VIII, 
the final results differ from the preliminary results.
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7. Downgrading, reclassification of job level, change 
of job description, or reorganization is discussed with the 
union prior to the effective date of change
8. Management considers employee needs and desires 
when acting on working conditions or personnel policies or 
practices
9. When a reduction-in-force occurs, management selects 
employees for release in the fairest way possible
10. Management downgrades only those positions which 
should be at a lower skill level
11. Management takes employees' needs and desires into 
account when granting leave
12. Employees are not detailed to menial tasks such as 
clean-up details
13. When negotiating an agreement with the union, 
management makes several proposals and counter proposals on 
each article before stating its real position
14. Employees are provided special tools and clothing 
if such items are required on the job
15. Management considers employees' desires when assign­
ing overtime to qualified employees and attempts to assign 
overtime equitability
16. Upon request, employees are advised if they were 
considered for promotion and, if so, their rank order on the 
register
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17. An employee is not required to furnish a doctor's 
statement as proof of illness unless the employee is suspected 
of abusing the privilege
18. Management advises employees in writing at least 
two weeks in advance of changes in hours of work and tours of 
duty
19. When negotiating, management does not give up any­
thing to employees if it can be avoided
20. Managers and supervisors are trained in labor- 
management relations
21. Management sponsors training in labor-management 
relations for union stewards ....
As an exception, statement 6 is supposition. Although 
a completely negative response is anticipated from management, 
it will be interesting to learn if workers believe it is a 
management practice.
Simple language was used. The author attempted to avoid 
vagueness, ambiguity, leading questions, predictable response 
questions, and long statements or questions in the construction 
of the survey. Nevertheless, some bias was introduced because 
of the relatively positive phrasing of the management practice 
statements. However, the opportunity to identify negative 
practices during the interviews tended to offset this bias.
It was difficult to avoid predictable response ques­
tions. As an example, in management practice 4, "management 
consults with employees . . . "  was changed to "management 
talks willingly with employees . . . ." Since the executive
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order required management to consult, the response by manage­
ment was predictable. However, managers were less likely to 
agree that management "talks willingly" with employees.
The terms "personnel policies and practices" and "work­
ing conditions" were vague. Nevertheless, these terms were 
included because all employee rights were manifest in them.
All of the management practices could have been grouped 
under management practices 1, 4, or 8. Practices 2 and 3 were 
subsets of 1, practices 5-7 were subsets of 4, and practices 
9-21 were subsets of 8. Thus, the 21 management practices 
could have been reduced to three. This would have made it 
possible to expand testing beyond "management" and "workers" 
by comparing subsets of the population. However, the results 
would have been meaningless because of the loss of specificity. 
Specificity was required to answer the central question: What
management practices have evolved as a result of the labor- 
management relationship?
The author attempted to avoid the "response set" bias 
by alternating the answers in columns 1 and 2 of the survey 
(see Appendix 1). The "response set bias" refers to the ten­
dency of some people to choose the first answer while others 
choose the last answer to a two-way response.
One disadvantage which could not be overcome in the 
two-way response questions was the inability to distinguish 
between well thought out answers and those that received no 
thought at all.
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Statement 22 addressed the question of whether manage­
ment practices had improved. Statement 23 enabled respondents 
to identify management practices which they currently opposed.
The Interview
The interview provided the opportunity to obtain nearly 
complete returns from the desired sample. Generally, the 
interviewer obtained accurate replies by explaining ques­
tions, persuading the informant to provide the desired infor­
mation, and judging the validity of the response. If the res­
pondent appeared facetious^ for example, the interviewer 
discounted his reply.
The author combined the techniques of the "patterned" 
and "non-directive" type of interview. A specific, detailed 
checklist of items is followed in the "patterned" interview.
In the "non-directive" interview the interviewer follows the 
lead of the respondent, focusing entirely on the feeling being
expressed. The interviewer seldom if ever asks questions or
1
gives information.
The author used prepared questions but probed those 
subjects where the individual appeared to have the greatest 
knowledge. Additional questions were asked if necessary to 
provide more thorough analysis of a topic or statement by the 
respondent. The basic interview was structured as follows:
Wendell French, The Persomiel Management Process 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin do., 1462), Chapter 9, F , J,
Rothlisberger & William J. Dickson, Management and the Worker 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), Chapter 13,
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1. In general, have management practices at WRAMA 
changed as a result of management's dealing with unions; the 
following subjects were used to determine specific management 
practices that may have developed:
(a) Hours of work and tours of duty
(b) Overtime
(c) Holidays
(d) Leave— annual, sick, misc.
(e) Federal Wage Surveys
(f) Environmental Differential Pay
(g) TDY
(h) Job classification
(i) Job description 
(j) Training
(k) Tests
(1) Employee performance standards
(m) Employee appraisal
(n) Incentive Awards
(o) Reduction-in-force
(p) Promotion
(g) Details
(r) Health and safety
2. Are you opposed to any management practice (Rank 
in order of opposition)
3. What has been the impact of succeeding executive
orders
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4. Are there any trends in management-labor relations
S.. Has the attitude of workers changed (How is this 
different now versus 1961)
6. What changes has management been forced to adopt
7. What does the future hold, in terms of management- 
union relations (practices)
8. What are the critical relationships (for example, 
reduction-in-force on mind; what are procedures for handling)
9. Why are they critical
10. What is management's attitude on contract negotia­
tions (for example, tough or liberal)
11. What is management's attitude at renegotiation time
12. What is management's attitude on enforcing contracts
13. Are you a member of the negotiating teeim (or con­
sulted on negotiations or present during negotiations)
14. What kind of contract changes occurred
15. What was rebargained
16. What was finally agreed to
17. Do you wish to add anything
Pretest of the Questionnaire
Even the most careful screening does not eliminate 
every problem with all questions. Thus, pretesting is important 
to find those problems which reduce the validity of the test.
The author randomly selected five workers from the 
WRAMA population. Each respondent was tested separately. The 
instructions to the questionnaire amd each question were
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discussed with the respondent to insure understanding. The 
respondents were asked to give a reason for each choice. 
Although no revisions to the survey were necessary as a result 
of the pretest, it was discovered that verbal explanations were 
necessary for several questions.
The author randomly selected five additional workers 
for a second pretest. After general instructions, the respon­
dents completed their questionnaires simultaneously. Again 
explanations were necessary. Although a revision of the test 
was considered unnecessary, the author was further convinced 
that the size of the questionnaire could not be increased with­
out increasing its overall complexity and thereby decreasing 
its validity because of a lack of understanding and cooperation 
by the respondents.
Data Collection 
The author reviewed each questionnaire to insure that 
the requested information had been recorded. The author 
planned to put the information on IBM cards for computer 
analysis, using the format and field location listed below.
Due to the unavilability of key punch equipment or computer 
time, the author tabulated and summarized the data manually. 
Fortunately, computer time was available for the chi square 
analysis.
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Statistical Methodology 
The Chi Square Test 
According to Freund and Williams the chi square (X ) 
test is appropriate when dealing with count data.^ Since the 
number of yes and no responses were counted for management and 
workers, the statistical model satisfied this first requirement. 
Although the responses fell into discrete categories, the 
author assumed that underlying such a dichotomy there was a 
continuum of possible results. That is, some individuals who 
responded "yes" were closer to saying "no" than others who 
said "yes." Similarly, some said "no" emphatically while 
others said "no" with minimal conviction. Siegel states that 
when the data of research consist of frequencies in discrete 
categories the chi square test may be used to determine the
2significance of differences between two independent groups.
Since the hypotheses in this case involve tests of agreement 
or disagreement between two independent groups, management 
and workers, the chi square statistic was selected.
The null hypothesis. Ho can be tested by
Ipreund and Williams, p. 278.
^Sidney Siegel, Non Par^etric Statistics (McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., New York, 1^56), p. 104.
^The following remarks concerning the chi square formula 
are based on Siegel, pp. 104-111.
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= S & (1)
Eij
i=l j=l
where Oij = observed number of cases categorized in 
ith row of jth column
Eij = number of cases expected under Ho to be 
categorized in ith row of jth column
r  k
S S = directs one to sum overall (r) rows and 
(k) columns
i = 1 j = 1
The values of X yielded by this formula are distribu­
ted approximately as chi square with df = (4-1) (k-1) where 
r = the number of rows and k = the number of columns in the 
contingency table, and df = degrees of freedom.
The expected frequency for each cell (Eij) is determined 
by multiplying the two marginal totals common to a particular 
cell, then dividing this product by the total number of cases,
N. For example, the expected frequency for cell A in Table 1 
is (A+B)(A+C)/N,
One of the most common uses of the chi square test is 
the test of whether an obaerVed breakdown of frequencies in a 
2 x 2  contingency table could have occurred under Ho In this 
particular case people are classified according to their res­
ponses :
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TABLE 2.1 
2 x 2  CONTINGENCY TABLE 
Number
Group Yes No Total
Group I A B A+B
Group II C D  C+D
Total A+C B+D N
The null hypothesis is as follows:
Ho: There is no difference between the two groups
in the proportion with which they give yes and 
no answers
HI: One group gives a greater proportion of yes
answers than the other group
X values are small if the observed and expected 
frequencies are in close agreement. Thus, the larger the 
X , the more likely it is that there is disagreement between 
the two groups and that the null hypothesis will be rejected. 
In Table 2.1 there is 1 degree of freedom, and for a signifi­
cance level of a=5 percent (Using a table of critical values
2 2 
for X ) we find P(3.84< X <")" 0.05 and the rejection region
2 2 
is X 1 3.84. Hence, if the computed X is 6.25, we reject
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the re­
sponses of the two groups.
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When applying the chi square test to data where both r
and k equal 2, the following formula is preferred:
( N \ 2
y2 = N I (AD-BC) - 2 )_______  (2) df = 1
^ (A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D)
Formula (2) is easier to apply than formula (1) inas­
much as only one division is necessary in the computation. 
Moreover, it lends itself to machine computation. It also 
incorporates a correction for continuity which markedly 
improves the approximation of the distribution of the computed 
X by the chi square distribution. Accordingly, this formula 
is used by the author.
Test of General Hypothesis 1 
The reader will recall that General Hypothesis 1 is: 
Certain management practices have evolved from the labor-manage- 
ment relationship since 1962. In order to prove or disprove 
the hypothesis, the author compared the responses of managers 
and workers regarding the twenty-one management practices 
described earlier. This required two comparisons for each 
practice; that is, does the practice exist and, if so, did it 
evolve as a result of the labor-management relationship? A 
simple majority of 51 percent was the decision rule used in 
determining the existence and cause of the^management practice.
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Naturally, a large concensus was considered more meaningful than 
a simple majority. A small concensus concerning existence or 
cause of a practice required an examination into the reasons for 
the manager and worker responses.
If a majority of managers and workers said that a prac­
tice was nonexistent, the author made no further inquiry con­
cerning cause. Although it would be interesting to learn if 
the labor-management relationship prevented a management prac­
tice, such analysis is beyond the scope of this study.
If a majority of one or both groups said a practice 
currently existed, additional calculations were made. However, 
the responses of those who said the practice was nonexistent 
were disregarded in the comparison of answers to the second 
question.1 These responses were not relevant in the second 
comparison because the study was limited to identifying the 
practices which evolved as a result of the labor-management 
relationship. This reasoning becomes apparent upon referring 
to Table 1 in Appendix 4. Note that the "yes" responses of 
managers in column 6, line 2, who responded "no" to "Manage­
ment Practice Exists" and "yes" (column 6, line 2) to "Result 
of Union" (the union has prevented the management practice) 
cannot be added to the "yes” responses of managers in column 6, 
line 1, who responded "yes" (column 2, line 1) to "Result of 
Union" (the union caused management to adopt this practice) 
because they are mutually exclusive categories. Therefore, 
for those who said the practice currently existed and that
^Is the Practice a result of the Union?
4 2
it evolved as a result of the labor-management relationship, 
calculations wère made to determine if their responses were 
sufficient to represent a majority of all managers or all 
workers, as applicable. If so, it was concluded that the 
management practice did or did not evolve from the labor- 
management relationship, as appropriate. If the responses 
were indecisive or inconclusive, the conclusion as to the 
cause of the practice was based on an analysis of the labor- 
management relationship, the labor contract, or other relevant 
information. Additional calculations were made concerning the 
responses of this subset of managers and workers. That is, 
did a majority of those in the managerial subset and a majority 
of those in the worker subset believe the practice evolved as 
a result of the union? This made it possible to gain additional 
insight into the attitudes of managers or workers and thus 
additional insight into the practice.
The proof of General Hypothesis 1 depended on proof of 
the existence of one or more management practices which evolved 
from the labor-management relationship.
In order to determine if there was a significant dif­
ference concerning manager and worker perceptions about the 
existence and cause of a management practice, two chi square 
tests were conducted. The first test determined if the mana­
gers and workers agreed concerning the existence of the prac­
tice. The null hypothesis was:
Ho: There is no difference between managers and
workers in the proportion with which they give
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yes and no answers that management practice 1 
exists.
The alternative hypothesis was:
HI: One group gives a greater proportion of yes ans­
wers than the other group that management practice 1 exists.
A contingency table was constructed for each manage­
ment practice, and the responses or managers and workers about 
the existence of each practice were summarized:
TABLE 2.2 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 1 EXISTS 
Number
Group Yes No Total
Managers A B A+B
Workers C D C+D
Total A+C B+D N
The data were inserted into formula (2), or equivalently 
into the chi square computer program^ and results tabulated at 
a = .05 df = 1. Since critical value = n. Ho was accepted 
if the results of the tabulated n, and rejected if - n, 
for a one-tail test.
It is emphasized that the statistical test did not 
determine if a given management practice was in existence. The 
test merely stated whether the proportion of agreement or dis­
agreement between the groups was statistically significant.
^The chi square computer program is described in 
Appendix 2.
' f 4
If Ho was accepted, the following conclusions were 
possible;
1. If the majority of each group responded "yes," 
managers and workers agreed that management practice 1 was in 
existence; if the consensus of opinion was based on a slight 
majority, further examination of this practice was considered 
appropriate
2. If the majority of one group said "yes" while the 
other said "no," the existence of the practice was considered 
possible; greater understanding of this situation was required, 
particularly if management considered the practice to be 
desirable
3. If the majority of each group said "no," managers 
and workers agreed that management practice 1 was nonexistent
If Ho was rejected, the following conclusions were . 
possiblef
1. If the majority of each group said "yes," the 
management practice was in existence; nevertheless, the pro­
portion of those agreeing was significantly different and a 
potential problem existed; better communications were needed
2. If the majority of one group said "yes" while the 
other said "no," the difference of opinion was significant; 
although existence of the management practice was possible, 
greater understanding of this situation was required, particu­
larly if management considered the practice to be desirable
3. If the majority said "no," the management practice 
was nonexistent; although the proportion of those agreeing was
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significantly different, the degree of difference in this 
instance was not necessarily important
The second chi square test was restricted to those who 
perceived that the practice currently existed since the study 
was limited to identifying practices which evolved as a result 
of the labor-management relationship. The second test was not 
performed if the majority of workers and managers agreed that 
the management practice was nonexistent. Considering managers 
and workers who believed the practice currently existed, the 
null hypothesis was stated as:
Ho: There is no difference between the managerial
subset group and the worker subset group in the 
proportion with which they give yes and no 
answers that management practice 1 is the 
result of the labor-management relationship.
The alternative hypothesis was:
HI: One subset,group gives a greater proportion of
yes answers than the other subset group that 
management practice 1 is the result of the 
labor-management relationship.
A contingency table was constructed for each manage­
ment practice, and the responses of the managers and workers 
in the subsets concerning the cause of each practice was 
summarized:
m -
TABLE 2.3
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 1 EXISTS AND IT 
EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF LABOR- 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Number
Group Yes No Total
Managers A B A+B
Workers C D C+D
Total A+C B+D N
The data were inserted into the chi square computer pro­
gram, Ho was accepted if and rejected if where
a = .05 and df = 1, for a one-tail test.
If Ho was accepted, it was possible to conclude that 
the perceptions of those in the memagerial subset were not 
significantly different from the perceptions of those in the 
worker subset concerning the cause of management practice 1.
If Ho was rejected, it was possible to conclude that 
the perceptions of those in the managerial subset were sig­
nificantly different from those in the worker subset regarding 
the cause of management practice 1. Further evaluation con­
cerning the difference of opinion was suggested in order to 
determine if a potential problem existed.
The same tests of management practice existence and 
union effects were performed on each of the twenty-one manage­
ment practices.
m ■m:
Test of General Hypothesis 2
General Hypothesis 2 has been stated as: Managers and
workers believe that management practices have improved as a 
result of the labor-managienent relationship. The test of this 
hypothesis also required analysis of the responses to a two- 
part question: (1) Have management practices improved? and
(2) (Did this occur as a) Result of the Union? A conclusion 
that General Hypothesis 2 was true was contingent upon a majority 
of both groups responding "yes" to the first part and their 
"yes" responses to the second part representing a majority of 
all managers and all workers. However, if the responses were 
indecisive or inconclusive, analysis of the labor-management 
relationship, the labor contract, and other pertinent informa­
tion also provided a means of forming a conclusion about 
whether management had improved. Additional calculations were 
made concerning the responses of the subset of managers and 
subset of workers. That is, did a majority of those in the 
managerial subset and a majority of those in the worker subset 
believe management practices improved as a result of the union? 
This provided an opportunity to gain further insight into the 
attitudes of the groups.
In order to determine If there was a significant dif­
ference •concerning manager and worker perceptions about the 
improvement of management practice# and the cause, two chi 
square tests were performed. The first test determined if 
managers and workers agreed concerning the improvement of 
management practices.
A%
The null hypothesis was;
Ho: There is no difference between managers and
workers in the proportion with which they give 
yes and no answers that management practices 
have improved.
The alternate hypothesis was:
HI: One gropp gives a greater proportion of yes
answers than the other group that management 
practices have improved.
A contingency table was constructed and the responses 
of the groups concerning the improvement of management prac­
tices was summarized:
TABLE 2.4
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES HAVE IMPROVED 
Number
Group Yes No Total
Managers A B A+B
Workers C D C+D
Total A+C B+D N
The results were calculated using the chi square com­
puter program.
If Ho was accepted, the following conclusions were 
possible:
1. If the majority of each group responded "yes," 
managers and workers agreed that management practices had
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improved; if the concensus of opinion was based on a slight 
majority, further evaluation concerning the improvement of 
practices would be appropriate
2. If the majority of one group responded "yes," while 
the other said "no," it was possible that management practices 
had improved; the disagreement was not significant; in such a 
case, it would be appropriate to evaluate why management prac­
tices were not more acceptable
3. If the majority of each group said "no," managers 
and workers agreed that management practices had not improved; 
thus, it would be appropriate for management to determine why 
management practices had not improved
If the Ho was rejected, the following conclusions were 
possible:
1. Management practices had improved if the majority 
of each group said "yes ;" nevertheless, the proportion of those 
agreeing was significantly different; further evaluation con­
cerning why one group had a lower opinion of the improvement 
than the other group would be appropriate
2. If the majority of one group said "yes" while the 
other said "no," the difference of opinion was significant; 
although management practices had improved, further evaluation 
concerning the cause of the disagreement, and the reason why 
there was not greater concensus that practices had improved 
would be appropriate
3. Management practices had not improved if the 
majority of workers and managers responded "no"; although
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the proportion of agreement was significantly different, the 
outcome was important in this instance and not the degree of 
difference; hence, a determination by management of why manage­
ment practices had not improved would be appropriate
The second test was restricted to those who perceived 
that management practices had improved. The test was unneces­
sary unless management practices had improved. The null hypoth­
esis was:
Ho: There is no difference between the subset group
and the worker subset group in the proportion 
with which they give "yes" and "no" answers 
that management practices have improved as a 
result of the labor-management relationship.
The alternate hypothesis was:
HI; One subset group gives a greater proportion of 
"yes" answers than the other subset group that 
management practices have improved as a result 
of the labor-management relationship.
A contingency table was constructed and the responses 
of those in the subsets were summarized:
TABLE 2.5
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES HAVE IMPROVED BECAUSE OF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
Number
Group Yes No Total
Managers A B A-hB
Workers C D C+D
Total A+C B+D N
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The results were calculated using the chi square com­
puter program.
If Ho was accepted, it was possible to conclude that 
the perceptions of those in the managerial subset were not sig­
nificantly different from those in the worker subset concerning 
the effect of labor relations on management practices.
If Ho was rejected, it was possible to conclude that 
the perceptions of those in the managerial subset were signifi­
cantly different from those in the worker subset regarding the 
effect of labor relations on management practices.
Test of General Hypothesis 3
The final test concerned General Hypothesis 3 : Mana­
gers and workers are opposed to certain management practices. 
Conclusions about the validity of this statement were based on 
a comparative analysis of responses indicating opposition to 
the management practices listed in the survey. The author 
weighted practices according to the degree of opposition. That 
is, 21 points were assigned to a management practice each time 
a worker listed it as the one to which he was most opposed, 20 
points were assigned to the practice he ranked as "next most 
opposed" and so on until all opposition was recorded. The 
results were then tabulated and an opposition matrix constructed. 
Similarly, an opposition matrix for managers was constructed.
The size of the initial matrix depended upon the number of 
people in the group who listed a management practice and the 
number of management practices listed. That is, the largest
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matrix possible for workers was 21 x 347. The size of subse­
quent matrices depended upon the number of practices listed 
and the opposition ranking.
Limitations
The chi square test has certain limitations. The expec­
ted frequencies (Eij) in each cell should not be too small.
When they are smaller than minimal, they may not be properly or 
meaningfully used.^ H. Cramer states that when the expected 
frequencies are larger than 10, we have a good approximation. 
Snedecor states that when the observed frequencies are less than 
5 in any cell, the approximation to the chi square distrib­
ution becomes poor.^ Taro Yamane uses the rule that expected 
frequencies should be at least 5.^ Siegel notes that adjacent 
classifications may be combined when observed frequencies do 
not meet minimal requirements, providing such combining does 
not rob the data of their meaning.^ However, he does not 
properly define minimal requirements. In any case, combining 
the categories in this research would render the data useless 
for testing purposes. Therefore, the author applied the rule 
that the test was not meaningful if the Eij in each cell was less 
than 5. Other limitations of the survey were discussed under 
the section: The Research Instruments.
The author conducted no statistical tests on interview 
responses. Nevertheless, the interview permitted conclusions 
which supported the statistical data in the survey. The
^Siegel, p. 110. ^Yamane, p. 631. ^Ibid. 
Ibid. ^Siegel, p. 109.
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interview also provided a means of clarifying certain issues 
which were not explained by the survey. For example, if the 
survey was inconclusive that a management practice currently 
existed, the interviews often provided enough positive or 
negative indicators to reach a conclusion regarding existence 
of the practice.
The degree of reliability of the interview is the extent 
to which the interviewer or an interviewing technique is con­
sistent in obtaining objectivity. He may minimize hostility 
or nervousness by the respondent by establishing rapport and 
ease at the outset of the interview. The interviewer must 
provide for spontaneity as he asks the prepared questions so 
that he may follow or listen to important matters mentioned by 
the respondent. To the extent that the author achieved these 
objectives, the interviews were reliable.
The validity of the interview is judged by the extent 
to which management practices which have evolved as a result 
of the labor-management relationship at Robins are actually 
identified or other questions in the interview are answered 
accurately. To the extent that the author was able to explain 
the questions to permit ccnnmon understanding, persuade the 
respondent to provide the desired information, and judge the 
validity of the response, the interviews were valid.
CHAPTER III
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF LABOR RELATIONS 
IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
Early Developments 
Unions and strikes existed prior to the Revolutionary 
War. These labor organizations were short-lived» and the 
1790s marked the beginning of unions that were to survive for 
any prolonged period.^ Early unions were composed of skilled 
workers like carpenters and bricklayers. Attempts at bar­
gaining were characterized by unilateral demands and compro­
mises were uncommon. The stronger side prevailed.
The first recorded instance of collective federal 
employee dissatisfaction occurred in 1807 when the Secretary 
of the Navy dismissed blacksmiths who complained of low wages 
at the Portland Navy Yard. Additional disputes occurred in 
other Navy yards during the next fifty years. These were 
concerned primarily with length of the work day.
^Neil W. Chamberlain and James W. Kuhn, Collective 
Bargaining, (2d Ed.; New York: McGraw Hill, 1965) Chapter 1.
2
Chantee Lewis, "The Changing Climate in Federal Labor 
Relations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91 
(March 1965), p. 61. Note: The US Navy has traditionally been
a key agency in federal labor relations. This was attributed 
to the fact that they employed substantially more blue-collar 
workers than other departments until the 1930s (Joseph P. 
Goldberg, "The Government's Industrial Employees") Monthly 
Labor Review LXXVII (Jan, 1954), pp. 1-2.
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The only other recorded unionist activity in the fed­
eral sector was in the Government Printing Office. Prior to 
its purchase by the government in 1861, it was a private firm 
employing only union members. Under government management 
the closed shop concept was continued, supported by strong 
printing unions and cooperative government administrators who 
stifled any attempts by employees to withdraw from the unions.^
Recognition of the unions representing the printers
was established in 1924 by congressional passage of the Kiess
Act which provided for collective bargaining. The inherent
strength of the printing unions, initial establishment of this
facility as a private enterprise, and eventual government
recognition of the unions as representative of the employees
were primary factors responsible for collective bargaining in
2
the Government Printing Office.
With the exception of federal workers in the Navy and 
the Government Printing Office, there was little union activity 
among public employees in the 1800s. Although the labor move­
ment in the private sector became organized during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, similar growth among 
organizations of government workers was slower and generally 
confined to a few isolated departments.
^Frederich, et al, p. 200.
^Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil 
Service (White Plains, NY: Row, Peterson and Co., 1958),
p. 1ÔÔ.
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The Fight for Recognition 
Unions in the Post Office Department started as local 
movements in the early 1860s. Letter carriers formed mutual 
benefit associations to seek improvement in working conditions, 
pay, and management decisions. These associations also 
became a means of informing legislators of employee problems.^ 
The National Association of Letter Carriers became the 
first national union of postal workers in 1890. In 1890 a 
group of local organizations in the large eastern cities formed 
the National Association of Post Office Clerks. A rival group 
formed the United Association of Post Office Clerks after the 
National Association failed to obtain legislative relief for 
its membership. The Postmasters controlled the United Associa­
tion by loading it with management-oriented supervisors who 
dominated the membership. In 1899 the two organizations merged 
to form the United National Association of Post Office Clerks. 
They did not affiliate with the American Federation of Labor 
since postal workers had not identified themselves with 
the trade union movement. The Railway Mail Association 
(originally known as the National Association of Railway Postal 
Clerks) was founded in 1891 as a social organization. It 
developed as a mutual benefit association for insurance pur­
poses because of the high casualty rate sustained by its mem-
2
bers in the line of duty.
^Spero, The Labor Movement in a Government Industry 
(George H. Doren Co., New York, 1924), pp. 26 and 60-61.
Zibid., pp. 80-129.
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The carriers for the rural free delivery service formed the 
National Rural Letter Carriers Association in 1903. A dissi­
dent faction of the United National Association of Post Office 
Clerks affiliated with the AFL and formed the National Federa­
tion of Post Office Clerks in 1906.^ The Brotherhood of Rail­
way Postal Clerks was formed in 1911. Their purpose was to
advise Congress of their grievances and reduce reprisals against 
2
the workers.
From 1895 to 1912, Post Office Department employees 
were ordered not to influence congressional opinion. These 
orders, known as gag rules, and anti-union activity by the Post 
Office Department did not prevent the development of more 
unions of postal workers. Nevertheless, union organization 
was inhibited and some weak locals were disbanded. Finally 
the unions gained the support of Congress. Although President 
Taft amended the gag rule and the removal procedure to make 
it more palatable, it was too late. The Lloyd-LaFollette Bill 
became law on August 24, 1912.^
The act represented an end to the gag rule and the 
unions' long campaign of protest. Essentially, it was nega­
tive in character. It prevented postal employees from being 
removed or reduced in rank because of union membership, as
llbid., pp. 85-110 ^Ibid., pp. 140-147.
^Ibid., p. 170. The President amended the gag rule by 
instructing all departments to forward expeditiously any com­
munications addressed to Congress. Additionally, he reinstituted 
a requirement to substantiate removal actions in writing; written 
defenses were also permitted.
58
long as the union did not require them to strike. The act 
granted employees the right to petition Congress without inter­
ference. By extension other federal employees have been 
authorized the right to join any organization which does not 
assert the right to strike or advocate the overthrow of the 
government.1 In effect it provided the charter under which 
the unions operated, and the relationship between the unions 
and the government was formulated.
Postal workers were unable to benefit from this legis­
lation until much later. Postmaster General Burleson, who 
assumed office in 1913 and remained until 1920, refused to 
recognize any of the unions and worked against them. The 
Burleson administration's attitude tended to consolidate and 
strengthen the cause of postal unionism. The militant faction 
of the unions used this opportunity to rally employees to its 
cause. Many of the organizations beccune affiliated with the 
AFL.2
The labor-management relationship changed drastically 
when Hays became Postmaster General in 1920. He believed in 
the value of unions and formulated his policies to be consis­
tent with their existence and growth.
While postal unions were winning their struggle for 
recognition,labor relations continued to develop in other areas
^Merrell, p. 8. Also, see 37 Stat 555.
^Carl J. Friedrich, et al, Problems of the American 
Public Service (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1935)
pp. 229-243.
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of the federal government. Federal employees comprised most of 
the work force at navy yards and arsenals while management was 
composed of army and naval officers. These military managers 
were authoritarian, deeply instilled in military tradition, 
and grossly lacking in any understanding of unions and collec­
tive bargaining or labor relations. They considered their 
positions to be supreme, and the most appropriate procedure 
was to command, not to negotiate. Any organization of employees 
that sought changes in working conditions was viewed as a 
threat to their authority. Rotation of the officers and 
replacement with inexperienced personnel every two to three 
years tended to impede improvement of relations.^
Early disputes at Army arsenals centered around better 
wages and fewer hours. In 1893 workers walked off their jobs 
at Watervliet Arsenal, Troy (New York). A similar incident
2occurred at the Springfield (Massachusetts) Arsenal in 1904.
Of greater concern was the introduction of scientific 
management by its pioneer, Frederick Taylor. He thought that 
government facilities would be ideal for introducing scientific 
management methods because he saw no danger of production
3
stoppages or strikes caused by employee resistance.
Taylor initiated the system at the Watertown Arsenal 
in 1909. It did not arouse any reaction from the workers or
^Sterling D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: 
Remsen Press, 1948), p. 94.
^David Ziskind, One Thousand Strikes of Government 
Employees (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940),
pp. 31-32.
3spero, Government as Employer, p. 449.
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their unions, and within the ensuing period Taylor was able to 
observe the success of his idea. But two years later when he 
attempted to institute a premium payment plan for the workers, 
the moulders rebelled. Unions supported the moulders, con­
tending that inducing employees to work faster and exceed the 
standard was degrading, injurious to health, and deliberately 
subverting the purposes of labor organizations. Finally a 
strike ensued.^
The strike at the Watertown Arsenal, although of limited 
local consequence, had a widespread reaction nationally. It
provided an opportunity for the AFL to adopt a strong position
2
against all worker efficiency systems.
Scientific management tripled production at the Water­
town Arsenal by the end of 1913 with only a third of the pro­
duction workers operating under the premier system. Taylor 
disciples refused to attempt to obtain union support because 
they opposed union policies of restricted output and collec­
tive bargaining.3 In 1916 Congress enacted a statute prohibit­
ing the use of the time study on all government jobs. The 
opposition to scientific management became so strong that the 
prohibition was incorporated in federal appropriation acts
Jean T. McKelvey, AFL Attitudes Toward Production, 
1900-1912 (Ithaca, N.Y.: New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, 1952), pp. 16-17.
^Spero, Government as Employer, p. 454.
^Milton J. Nadworny, Scientific Management and the 
Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1955), pp. 69-77.
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for almost thirty-five years. It was not until 1949 that the
restriction was finally removed and engineered standards 
1
adopted.
The Emergence of Federal Employee Unions
In 1915 the Federal Employees Union was organized in
San Francisco. It quickly affiliated with the AFL and within
a year had fifty locals. In 1917 the union became known as
2
the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE). The 
NFFE accepted federal employees as members regardless of their 
trade or craft. The charter given the union by the AFL con­
tained a broad grant of jurisdiction which included all fed­
eral employees except those having the right to hire and fire, 
postal employees, and workers who were exclusively eligible
3
for membership in another AFL union.
The United States entry into World War I had an 
accelerating effect on federal employment. In less than two 
and a half years, federal employment more than doubled to over
900,000 people. The greatest impact was felt in the District 
of Columbia where the number of federal employees tripled.
The unions and the government cooperated during World 
War I for the sake of the war effort. Samuel Gompers
^Ibid., pp. 82-103.
2
The Civil Service Throughout the Country, Good 
Government, XXXIV (November 1917), p. 80.
^The Federal Employee, I (Aug., 1916), pp. 89-90. 
in Edwards, Geniena A.,"Organized Federal Workers" (unpub­
lished master's thesis), p. 20.
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marshalled the unions into a Council of National Defense with
assurance that they would maintain production in return for
the maintenance of labor standards. The Army and the Navy
extended de facto recognition to all unions and specifically
prohibited discrimination of union members in an effort to
sustain uninterrupted production in the arsenals and shipyards.^
The favorable attitude by government during the war
2
and organizing assistance by the AFL helped the NFFE grow from
3
10,000 members in 1917 to 50,000 by 1919. It became the 
largest single union of government employees outside the Post 
Office Department. The objectives of the NFFE were designed 
to benefit the worker and protect the public. The union refuted 
the right to strike and supported legislation in the 1920s to
4
improve the Civil Service.
The jurisdictional quarrels among craft and industrial 
unions reached the stage of open hostility in the AFL con­
vention of 1931. The break occurred when the NFFE withdrew 
from the AFL after the defeat of its resolution to extend 
civil service classification to all federal employees. By 
breaking ties cemented by fourteen years of cooperation, the
^Spero, Government as Employer, p. 100.
^Edwards, pp. 22-23.
^Van Riper, p. 276.
^Luther C. Steward, "Objectives of an Employee Union—  
NFFE," Personnel Administration, I (Feb., 1939), pp. 6-7.
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NFFE withdrawal established a system of dual unionism which
still exists.^ It is ironic that at the federation's next
convention a resolution on classification was adopted that
2
probably would have been acceptable to the NFFE.
The NFFE reconsolidated its membership into thirty- 
nine locals after separating from the AFL. Those NFFE members 
who disagreed with this action formed their own union and 
attempted to affiliate with the AFL. This group of twenty- 
six locals was chartered on August 15# 1932, as the American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). Starting with about
2,000 members the union grew to over 38,000 by 1936. At least 
a third of this number were state, county, and municipal 
employees who had been encouraged to join with the federal
3
workers.
A hostile rivalry existed between the AFGE and NFFE 
for several years. The federal employee was the loser in this 
struggle as unions failed to counter the government's economy 
moves during the depression years of the thirties. The AFGE 
had the additional problem of curbing the more militant 
workers who had gravitated to its ranks and advocated the use
4
of economic sanctions to satisfy their demands.
Labor relations became highly developed in one of the 
new agencies, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). A major
^Rice, pp. 21-22. The withdrawal referendum was close 
with 16,335 in favor and 11,405 against withdrawal.
2 3
Edwards, pp. 63-64. Rice, pp. 21-22.
4lbid., pp. 21-32.
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factor in this development was that TVA encouraged workers to
join unions.^ Even today union membership is considered a
positive factor in personnel actions of promotions, selections,
and transfers. Neither the closed nor the union shop prevails.
Representation and bargaining are performed by many unions, all
of which are represented in combined organizations. The
Tennesse Valley Trades and Labor Council represents the craft
unions and the Salary Policy Panel represents the professional
2
and clerical groups.
The progressive labor relations policy of the TVA has 
been successful. A general agreement negotiated in 1940 
covered working conditions, grievances, and other matters of 
mutual interest. It is revised and updated periodically. The 
unions have responsibilities for wage survey assistance, 
handling of grievances, and the settlement of jurisdictional 
problems. Economies of operation have been achieved through 
a system of cooperation committees emanating from the Council 
and Panel. There have been no major work stoppages since the
3
inception of the policy over thirty years ago.
The development of unions within government facilities 
was more successful when the work was comparable to that in 
the private sector. This usually meant that the more exper­
ienced workers within the facility had worked in private
^Presumption by author.
^Harry L. Case, Personnel Policy in a Public Agency 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956),pp. 44-51,
3%bid.
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industry and had been union members. Many of these agencies
were autonomous and had greater latitude in formulating
employee-management relations. Nevertheless, effective labor
policy was lacking in most agencies.^
The unsettled atmosphere with the AFGE continued. In
1936, in a sweeping move to rid itself of the recalcitrant
faction within the organization, the AFGE revoked thirty-five
local charters for enrolling Communist members, committing
acts embarrassing to the government, failure to cooperate, and
2
overlapping jurisdiction. In 1937, seven others were sus­
pended for acting against government economy moves.
John L. Lewis, Chairman of the Committee for Industrial 
Organization (CIO), seized this opportunity to include govern­
ment workers in his group. In June, 1937, the CIO provisionally 
chartered the United Federal Workers of America (UFWA). A 
nucleus of twelve suspended AFGE lodges formed the organization 
initially, but a rapid growth followed. Within fifteen months 
the UFWA had 14,000 members in 131 locals.^ The UFWA followed
4
CIO guidelines and except for a few exclusions, membership 
requirements were unrestricted. Ironically, the UFWA prohibited 
strikes and picketing.^
^Harry Seligson, "A New Look at Employee Relations in 
Public and Private Service," 15, Labor Law Journal, 1964, p. 294
^Rice, p. 24. ^Ibid., p. 36.
^Elected officials, officers having responsibility for 
hiring and firing, contractors' employees, and postal employees.
5
Edwards, p. 31.
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After World War II state, county, and municipal employ­
ees merged with the UFWA to form the 50,000 member United Pub­
lic Workers of America (UPWA). Two actions during the UPWA's 
national convention in 1946 eventually spelled its downfall. 
Despite the prohibition against strikes in its national con­
stitution, the UPWA adopted a resolution requiring a local 
to obtain national headquarters' approval before it could call 
a strike. This prompted strong congressional reaction, for 
the legislators abhorred the thought of strikes by federal 
employees. As a result Congress enacted legislation to pre­
clude the payment of wages to any federal employee participating 
in a strike against the government or belonging to an organi­
zation that asserted this right. The prohibition was still in 
effect in 1974, with federal workers required to sign an affi­
davit repudiating the right to strike.^
A second resolution passed by the convention was the 
support of a pro-Soviet policy by the government. Such activity 
was not unusual for the UPWA. It did not hesitate to give
2
opinions on political as well as economic problems of the day. 
The demise of the UPWA occurred in 1950, when it was expelled 
from the CIO for Communist elements within its leadership.^
Frederick Mosher and Edith Mosher, "Distinguishing 
Marks of the Federal Government Service," in The Federal 
Government Service; Its Character, Prestige and Problems 
(New York; The American Assembly, 1954), p. 141.
2
Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 124-126.
^Van Riper, p. 350.
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Passage of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) in 1935 was an important event for labor. The Act made
collective bargaining a matter of national policy for private
sector employees. However, public employees were excluded.^
Some attributed the exclusion to benevolent government policies
which made it unnecessary to help federal workers get improved
2
working conditions.
Union membership among government employees continued 
to grow during the 1930s. By 1939 the 313,000 union members 
accounted for 34 percent of the total federal work force (com­
pared with 23 percent of all workers in the private sector). 
Excluding the postal workers, only 19 percent of the federal
3
workers were union members.
The increase in union membership of federal workers 
was accompanied by an increase in affiliation with the AFL or 
the CIO. About 58 percent of all government service unions were 
affiliated by 1939. Affiliation offered bigger and better 
services to the unions, a more influential platform on which 
to approach congressmen, and a commonality of purpose in
l"The term 'employer' . . . shall not include the United 
States, or any state or political subdivision thereof" (Sec 2(2), 
49 Stat 449).
^Ida Klaus, "The Emerging Relationship," an address 
before the Conference on Public Employment and Collective 
Bargaining at the University of Chicago, February 5, 1965.
3Inclusion of the highly unionized postal employees dis­
torts the figures somewhat. Of the 190,000 postal workers, 66 
percent were union members. Gordon (Chicagq: Civil Service 
Association, 1942), p. 15.
68
determining wage scales that were comparable to those in the 
private economy.^
The three federal employee unions which existed in 1940 
(NFFE, AFGE, and UFWA) disclosed uniform attitudes and objec­
tives. Each stressed employee interests and the efficiency of 
government operations. The unions rejected the paternalistic 
philosophy of government that the workers would be served best 
by an "all wise, benevolent and extraordinarily solicitous 
employer." Instead they advocated employee action because 
they believed that the government generosity depended on per­
suasion by the governed. In order to improve the status of 
the civil servants, unions advocated a minimum wage of $1500
per year, full application of the merit system, more liberal
2
retirement, improved promotions, and retirement pay.
The advent of World War II led to a general expansion 
of governmental activity with increasing employment at all 
levels. Blue-collar workers accounted for most of the increase. 
Most of these joined the unions, just as they had done in the 
private sector.^ As was the case in World War I, the War and 
Navy Departments recognized the workers' right to join unions 
and accorded them de facto recognition.
Post-war sentiment toward unions was not as favorable 
as it had been after WWI. The Labor-Management Relations
llbid., pp. 99-105 ^Ibid.
^Otto S. Beyer, "Employee Relations in the Public Ser­
vice— Present and Future," Public Personnel Review, VII (Jan., 
1946), pp. 19-21. "
69
(Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 reaffirmed the public's commitment
to collective bargaining but its provisions were considered
more restrictive on labor than the Wagner Act.^ Congressional
furor over UPWA strikes against city governments resulted in
a provision making it unlawful to strike against the federal 
2
government.
Moreover, government employees were specifically 
excluded from coverage. The Act had little immediate effect 
upon the unions of government employees because anti-strike 
measures had already been imposed as riders to appropriation 
acts, and the Wagner Act excluded federal employees.
The Need for a Formal Labor Relations Program 
The government averaged slightly over two million fed­
eral employees in the post-war period. Most were blue-collar 
workers. The majority of the craftsmen and skilled workers 
were employed in the installations of the armed forces, the 
Government Printing Office, the Bureau of Printing and Engrav­
ing, the TVA, and various other industrial operations.
^Merrell, p. 6.
^United States Civil Service Commission, Employee 
Management Relations in the Federal Service (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office), 1962, p. 2. “it shall be unlawful for 
any individual employed by the United States or any agency 
thereof including wholly owned government corporations to 
participate in any strike. Any individual employed by the 
United States or by any such agency who strikes shall be dis­
charged immediately from his employment, and shall forfeit his 
civil service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for re­
employment for three years by the United States or any such 
agency." 61 Stat 160 (1947).
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The Federal Personnel Council, under the direction of 
the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, was organized in 
1947 to study and discuss the interpretation and development 
of personnel policies and practices within the federal govern­
ment. In 1949 the Council recommended recognition of the right 
to organize, an open shop, recognition of consultation with 
employee organizations, and publication of agreements and 
notices of labor-management meetings.^
The Council's recommendations were a departure from
2
the neutral policy advocated by the Commission. Although 
initial reaction by administrators and unions was favorable, 
application of the proposals was relatively limited.^
Some observers described Federal labor relations dur­
ing the 1950s as "chaotic." Most administrators lacked con­
sulting and negotiating skills, and union ineptness was 
apparent, with broken campaign promises and leadership tactics 
which confused the issues. Consequently, the labor-management
relationship was characterized as complex, wasteful, and 
4unnecessary.
^Marshall E. Dimock, Gladys 0. Dimock and Louis W.
Koenig, Public Administration (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rine­
hart, and Winston, 1958), p. 463.
2
U.S. Civil Service Commission, Federal Personnel Manual, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), Chapter E2(10).
^Mosher, p. 146.
*Eli Rock, "Practical Labor Relations in the Public Ser­
vice," Public Personnel Review, XVIII (April, 1957), 71-74.
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Perhaps this characterization pointed to the need for 
a uniform federal labor relations policy. In any case, unions 
continued to support legislation which would have achieved this 
goal. From 1949 to 1961 approximately 80 bills were intro­
duced into Congress concerning federal employee recognition.
The most important of these were bills submitted periodically 
by Representative George M. Rhodes and Senator Olin D. Johnson. 
Important features of the bills were representation of members 
in grievance procedures, prescribed punishment for violations 
of the act by government administrators, consultation on work­
ing conditions and certain personnel policies and practices, 
and third-party artibration to settle disputes.^
With few exceptions the Truman and Eisenhower adminis­
trations did not support the bills. Opposition centered in 
several areas. First, the measure would impose constraints 
on federal managers and remove the flexibility of decentralized 
operations. Employees had protection under existing federal 
directives. Third, transfer of power from the commission to 
the Department of Labor would attack the center of the Civil 
Service System.^ Finally an executive order could accomplish 
the same thing.as a law.^
^Wallace S . Sayre, ed.. The Federal Government Service 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 196.
^Ibid., p. 196.
^Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal 
Service (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1&61).
^US Congress, Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service Union Recognition, Hearings on S3593, 84th Congress,
2d session, 1956, pp. 270-271.
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According to the news media a draft of an executive 
order was circulated through several agencies. Although Secre­
tary of Labor Mitchell supported the order, it was blocked by 
Postmaster General Summerfield who wanted the status quo.^
A letter written and disseminated by the President's 
Special Assistant for Personnel Management in raid-1958 indi­
cated that the grievance procedures of some agencies were 
inadequate. He inferred that the government's labor relations 
program was not functioning smoothly because working relation­
ships between agencies and employee groups needed improvement. 
Each department and agency head was asked to review policies 
and activities pertaining to employee-management relations in 
accordance with the Federal Personnel Manual and to report 
periodically on utilization and effectiveness.^ Although the 
letter may have suggested that there were advantages to manage­
ment and employee cooperation, it did not signal a change in 
official policy towards unions.
The attitude of the Eisenhower Administration was 
reaffirmed when he vetoed a federal pay raise bill in 1960.
He considered it irresponsible that a few federal employees 
would set their welfare above the national good by forcing 
Congress to grant them a pay raise.3
^Hart, pp. 6-8.
2
Letter from Rocco C. Siciliano to Executive Depart­
ment and Agency Heads on Employee-Management Cooperation as 
quoted in the Federal Employee, XLIII (July, 1958), pp. 14, 24
^Hart, pp. 58-59.
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1960 was an election year and a democratic Congress 
passed the bill over Eisenhower's veto. Although unionization 
of federal employees was not a campaign issue Senator John F. 
Kennedy wrote a letter to a postal union official supporting 
federal unionism.^
By 1959 there were 16 national unions composed entirely 
of Federal employees, with a combined membership of over 
550,000. Of these, thirteen were postal unions, one was a 
Navy organization, and two were general unions accepting mem­
bership of all Federal workers. Half of the unions were 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO.^ About 27 percent of the work 
force was unionized. Excluding postal workers, 8 percent were 
members of unions.^
Postal unions were outspoken in their belief that they 
were responsible for much of the beneficial legislation that 
had been enacted. At the same time they disdained the lack 
of interest shown by other employees in improving their lot
^Letter from John F. Kennedy to John Ames as quoted in 
"The Federal Spotlight," The Evening Star (Washington), Nov.
20, 1960, p. 2.
^These figures do not include private sector unions, 
such as the IAM/AW which have government employee members or 
locals.
^U.S. Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 1267, Directory 
of National and International Labor Unions in the U.S. (Wash­
ington : Government Printing Office, 195Ô), pp. 34-4Ï. Rates
were computed using Federal employment figures contained in 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States; 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967),
Tables 564 and 565, pp. 408-409. Note: 72 percent of postal
workers were union members.
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through unions of their own choosing. In commenting on the 
apathetic attitude of this group and referring to the passage 
of a pay raise that affected all federal workers, one postal 
union president said:
Classified employees should get down on their 
knees and thank God for the National Association of 
Letter Carriers. Otherwise they would have received 
no pay raise. I earnestly suggest to classified 
employees that they join a union. Frankly, we are 
sick and tired of carrying classified employees on 
our coattails.1
Early in 1961 the Civil Service Commission drafted an 
executive order concerning employee relations. It was based 
on drafts prepared for discussion in 1954. Although limited 
in scope, it was intended as a national policy on union-manage­
ment relations in government. Consultation, standards for 
recognition, and grievance procedures were major features of 
the order. Some feared that a more specific, all-inclusive 
policy would lead to an "administrative morass in the agen­
cies."^ Apparently the draft was never published or coordina­
ted with other government departments for comment. However, 
it may have served to bring the whole matter to a decision.
In 130 years of the government's labor relations with 
its employees the following issues were at least partially 
settled:
^Statement by William C. Doherty, President, NALC, as 
quoted in the Weekly Federal Employees' News Digest (Washington), 
July 11, 1960, p. 1.
2
Memorandum from 0. Glenn Stahl to the U.S. Civil Ser­
vice Commission, "Proposed Executive Order-Union-Management 
Relations," February 28, 1961.
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1. Recognition of the right of employees to join unions 
without fear of reprisal
2. Right of employees to be represented by unions in 
the presentation of grievances
3. Right of employees to affiliate with national 
federations and unions in the private sector
4. Prohibition against the affiliation of federal 
employees with organizations that assert the right to strike 
against the government
The major unresolved issues included:
1. The representation issue— should the government 
agency recognize all unions who claim members in their organi­
zation and negotiate with them
2. The definition of "supervisor"— should supervisors
be permitted to join employee unions
3. The grievance procedure— should grievances.lead to
an arbitration process
4. The resolution of differences over policy— should 
there be a conciliation procedure to resolve impasses
5. The policy on collection of union dues— should
there be a checkoff of union dues
In 1961 President John F. Kennedy appointed a task 
force to study these unresolved issues. In the next chapter the 
author discusses the results of the study group, Executive 
Order 10988, and the orders that followed.
CHAPTER IV 
THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
The Task Force on Employee-Management Relations
After the election of President Kennedy, there came a 
growing demand by Congress and labor leaders for a federal 
program of labor relations. The unions contended that the 
government had promoted labor relations in the private sectors 
but had prevented unionization of federal employees.^
On June 22, 1961, President John P. Kennedy appointed 
a task force to study a broad range of issues concerning fed­
eral employee-management relations. The purpose was to assure 
the rights and obligations of employees, unions, and the 
Executive branch in pursuing labor-management cooperation in 
the federal service.%
The study group was composed of the Secretary of Labor, 
the Secretary of Defense, the Postmaster General, the Director 
of the Bureau of Budget, the Chairman of the Civil Service 
Commission, and the Special Counsel to the President. The
^Rice, p. 37.
^Memorandum from President (John F. Kennedy) addressed 
to heads of departments and agencies on the subject of Employee- 
Management Relations in the Federal Service, June 22, 1961.
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task force held public hearings in cities throughout the coun­
try and consulted with heads of federal departments and agencies 
On November 30, 1961, the task force submitted its findings.
The recommendations incorporated the best of the labor-manage­
ment policies from the various federal agencies. The study 
group did not propose uniform government-wide practices.
Rather it recognized the great variations among agencies by
laying down general policies to guide development of labor-
1
management relations.
Executive Order 10988, Employee-Management 
Cooperation in the Federal Service
On January 17, 1962, the President signed Executive
Order 10988, "Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal
Service." The President noted that the date was the 79th
anniversary of the Civil Service Act (Pendleton Act). The
Order was heralded as the Magna Carta of federal employee
unionism.
It recognized that worker effectiveness and well-being 
were dependent upon orderly and constructive relationships 
between unions and management. Moreover, greater participation 
by employees in developing policies and procedures affecting 
their employment should improve employee-management relations 
in the federal service. Of course the public interest would
"A Policy for Employee-Management Cooperation in the 
Federal Service," A Report of the President's Task Force on 
Employee and Management Relations in the Federal Service. 
(United States Government Printing office, Washington, DC, 
November 30, 1961) .
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remain the paramount consideration. Thus, policies governing 
the rights and obligations of federal employees, unions, and 
management in pursuing the obligations of employee-management 
cooperation were set forth in the Order. Employees could join 
unions. Once they had organized and been granted recognition, 
employees could negotiate a written contract . . .  or bargain 
collectively.
Note, however, the absence of the term "collective bar­
gaining" in the title and text of the Order. This may be 
definitive because a bargainer must have something he can 
withhold or offer. Public employees may not withhold their 
labor services.
Nevertheless the workers did not find themselves 
defenseless at the bargaining table. Although strikes were 
prohibited, they derived negotiating power from access to news 
media, lobbying in Congress, and third party involvement in 
arbitration cases and impasses resulting from contract inter­
pretations. Thus, many unilateral decisions by management 
became subject to the bilateral terms of a signed contract.
With consultation required by the Order, management's 
paternalistic attitude of always making the right decision 
for its employees was expected to become unpopular. Further 
change was required by management because of significant res­
ponsibilities imposed on individual managers and supervisors.
^Thomas C. Enright and Harold W. Adams Jr., "Collective 
Bargaining in State Employment— Oregon's Experience" (A 
report presented to the annual meeting of the Assembly of 
Government Employees, Washington, D.C. Oct. 23-24, 1966), p. 1.
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In order to administer the program managers had to develop 
skills and knowledge in contract negotiations, interpreting 
contracts, and handling grievances under terms of the agree­
ment.
Generally the Order provided for;
Right to organize: Federal employees could join or
refrain from joining employee organizations.^ However, con­
flicts of interest were prohibited. For example, a conflict 
of interest would have occurred if a management official or 
personnel officer held office in an employee organization.
Recognition of unions: Informal recognition could be
granted to any union. Although the union had no rights of 
consultation with management, it had the right to be heard on 
matters of interest to its members. This was simply an exten­
sion of the right of any government employee to be heard.
Formal recognition was granted if at least 10 percent 
of the unit employees were members and exclusive recognition 
had not been granted to another organization. This recognition 
carried the right to be consulted on matters of interest to 
its members.
Exclusive recognition was granted if the majority of 
the employees chose a union. Professionals were excluded from 
non-professional organizations unless a majority of profes­
sionals voted for inclusion. Managerial and supervisory
^The term "employee organization" is synonymous with 
the term "union."
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personnel were excluded. Only unions with exclusive recogni­
tion could negotiate agreements on behalf of the employees.
Organizations which discriminated because of race, 
color, creed, national origin, or which were subject to corrupt 
or non-democratic influences were not recognized.
Restrictions on the conduct of business; Meetings 
between management and union officials could be conducted on 
official time but solicitation of memberships, dues, or other 
internal union business was conducted during non-duty hours.
Restrictions to consultations and negotiations with 
unions; The appropriate union could consult or negotiate on 
such matters as grievances, personnel policies or practices, 
and working conditions. Working conditions included, but 
were not limited to, such items as promotion standards, safety, 
transfers, demotions, reductions-in-force, granting of leave, 
and training; these items concerned policy determinations, 
not day-to-day operations.
Management retained the right to assign work and direct 
employees; to hire, promote, transfer, assign, retain employees 
in positions; suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disci­
plinary action; to maintain the efficiency of government 
operations; to determine the methods, means, and personnel by 
which operations were to be conducted; and to take whatever 
actions necessary to carry out the mission in an emergency.
All agreements were to be governed by existing or 
future laws and regulations.
81
Grievances : Grievances were a central part of the
employee-management relations program. Methods for handling 
grievances could be negotiated, were individual in nature, and 
related only to implementation of policy— not to change in 
agreement or policy.
Arbitration; Grievances and disagreements concerning 
exclusive recognition and related matters such as unit deter­
mination could be referred to advisory arbitration. This 
extended only to the interpretation or application of agree­
ments or agency policy and not to changes in or proposed 
changes in agreements or agency policies.
The task force recommended that each agency work out 
its own procedures for resolving deadlocks. The task force 
believed that arbitration to resolve impasses would escalate 
the number of third party settlements instead of encouraging 
a working out of differences by hard serious negotiation.^
Code of Fair Labor Practices: The Code of Fair Labor
Practices was developed jointly by the Civil Service Commis­
sion and the Department of Labor and was added after the Order 
was issued.
Exempt Agencies: Any installation was exempt from the
Order if the agency head believed the national security was 
threatened— especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and those organizations performing 
primarily intelligence, investigative, or security functions.
^Task Force Report, p. 19
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Impact of the Executive Order 
The reaction by the government agencies and unions to 
the Executive Order was "mixed." While it might have been 
anticipated that the Order would be extolled by the parties, 
unions were somewhat less than enthusiastic because it did not 
require management to encourage union membership. Management 
was dissatisfied because the Order implied that the govern­
ment lagged behind industrial labor relations and was paterna­
listic in discouraging unionism.^
Generally, the congressmen who had supported the fed­
eral labor legislation hailed the Order as monumental; however, 
there was some concern that the edict might result in rampant 
unionism. Senators Johnson and Humphrey viewed it as a step 
that had really been initiated by Congress. Senator Russell 
voiced his opposition stating that the government would be 
hard pressed to stop such a movement once it was started.
There was some evidence of congressional opposition to the 
Order when the Senate refused to appropriate additional funds
for the operation of the program within the Department of 
2
Labor.
The attitude of military officers was one of disagree­
ment with the Order, although there was no disobedience or 
deliberate subversion of its provisions. One Air Force author 
stated that the most frequently encountered reaction from
^Vosloo, pp. 80-81 ^Ibid.
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military officers was anger and dismay. They found it diffi­
cult to understand the infringement caused by the Order on 
the commander's prerogatives and freedom of action.1
The Department of Labor opened the office of Federal 
Employee-Management Relations to cope with unit and majority 
status determinations under Section II of the Order. The 
duties of the new office established in 1963 included the 
nomination of arbitrators, administrative decisions concerning 
unit determinations, and consultative assistance to federal 
agencies concerning advisory arbitration. In late 1966 the 
Civil Service Commission established the Labor-Management 
Relations Office to handle its part in the program.%
A study made of the employee-management cooperation 
program within DOD three years after implementation indicated 
that union membership had risen from 160,000 to over 300,000. 
The Navy had the largest share, with 200,000 union members. 
Some of the more general conclusions of the analysis disclosed 
that there had been an increase in employee job satisfaction, 
better communications had evolved, and union locals of over 
1,000 members were more frequently involved in exclusive
Arthur W. Augustine, Jr., "Negotiate to Preserve Flexi­
bility and National Objectives Under Executive Order 10988," 
(unpublished student thesis. Air War College, Air University, 
1966), p. 6.
2
Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessy, Public Manage­
ment at the Bargaining Table (Chicago: Public Personnel
Association, 1967), p. 8 4 . Previously the Program was handled 
by the Employee-Management Relations Section, Program Planning 
Division, Bureau of Programs and Standards within the Civil 
Service Commission.
84
recognition than smaller ones. It was also determined that 
the quality of union and management leadership had improved.^ 
Just prior to Executive Order 10988, the twenty-six 
exclusive units in the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Department of Interior covered about 19,000 employees. During 
the first two years of the Order, the pace of recognition was 
relatively slow, but then it began to accelerate (See Table 4.1)
TABLE 4.1
GROVITH IN THE NUMBER OF EXCLUSIVE 
BARGAINING UNITS IN THE FEDERAL 
SERVICE, 1962-1972
Year
1962
1964
1966
Number of 
Exclusive Units
26
535
1174
1968
1970
1972
2395
3010
3390
SOURCE; William V. Rice, p. 88, as found in
Civil Service Commission publica­
tions .
NOTE: Postal workers are excluded.
By November 1968, 2395 exclusive units represented 
almost 2 million employees— 40 percent of the federal employees 
subject to the Order, exclusive of postal workers. Many
iLewis, "The Changing Climate in Federal Labor Rela­
tions," p. 69.
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thousands more had formal or informal recognition. Federal 
agencies dealt with 130 organizations holding exclusive or 
formal recognition. Negotiated agreements covered 557,000 
employees or 28 percent of the work force.^ (See Table 4.2)
TABLE 4.2
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING UNITS 
AND COVERED BY AGREEMENTS, 1963-1973
Year
Employees
in
Exclusive
Units Percent
Percent
Gain
Employees
Employees
Covered
by
Agreements Percent
1963 180,000 — — — — — —
1964 231,000 12 28 111,000 6
1965 320,000 16 39 42,000 12
1966 435,000 21 36 292,000 14
1967 630,000 29 45 423,000 20
1968 798,000 40 27 557,000 28
1969 843,000 42 6 559,000 28
1970 916,000 48 9 602,000 31
1971 1,038,288 53 13 707,000 36
1972 1 ,082,587 55 4 753,000 39
1973 1,086,361 56 .4 837,000 43
SOURCE: Union Recognition, pp. 26-27.
11963-1966 data are based on figures as of mid-year; 
1967-1973 data, as of November.
NOTE: Postal workers are excluded.
lunion Recognition, p. 26.
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Executive Order 11491/ Labor-Management 
Cooperation in the Federal Service
With the large growth of union representation, manage­
ment and union officials agreed that significant changes were 
needed if the employee-management program was to continue on 
a constructive course. The size and scope of labor-management 
activity in 1968 had produced conditions which could not be 
dealt with adequately under Executive Order 10988. There were 
difficulties in maintaining appropriate distinctions in the 
rights accorded under exclusive, formal, and informal recog­
nition; in dealing fairly with disputes concerning unit determi­
nations, negotiations, and administration of the agreements; 
and in resolving issues that arose because of various agency 
policies.! The need for a program change appeared to center 
in six major areas: a central authority, recognition, super­
visory status, scope of negotiation, third party resolution, 
and financial disclosure.%
In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson had appointed a 
committee to examine the past five years of experience under 
Executive Order 10988. The committee was composed of the 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Labor, Postmaster General, 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the 
Civil Service Commission.^
Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service, 
Report and Recommendations (Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, DC, October 29, 1969).
2Ibid. 2Ibid.
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The committee held extensive hearings and submitted a 
draft of its report before President Nixon assumed office.
After the Nixon Administration took office in January, 1969, 
new committee members revised and finalized the report. Based 
upon this revision President Nixon issued Executive Order 11491, 
October 29, 1969.^
Highlights of the Order included changing the name of 
"Employee Organization" to "Labor Organization," exclusion of 
supervisors from union membership, abolition of informal and 
formal recognition, sex and age as non-discrimination require­
ments, deletion of policy on official time for meetings between 
management and union officials, prohibition of official time 
for negotiations, and the granting of exclusive recognition 
by election only. Under negotiable issues, "assignment of 
personnel" was replaced by the "number of employees," "internal 
security practices" was excluded, and "arrangements for dis­
placed personnel" was included. Employees could be restricted 
to the negotiated grievance procedure, with cost sharing by 
the union and agency. Grievances could be filed over inter­
pretation and application of the agreement.
Perhaps the principal changes were the provisions for 
binding arbitration and a central authority to administer the 
labor relations program. The Federal Labor Relations Council 
(FLRC), consisting of the Secretary of Labor, Chairman of the 
Civil Service Commission, and an official of the Executive
llbid.
88
Office of the President was to oversee the program, settle 
policy issues, and rule on labor-management disputes except 
negotiation impasses on substantive issues. The Federal Media­
tion and Conciliation Service (FMS) was to assist parties in 
resolving negotiation disputes. If mediation failed, the 
Federal Services Impasses Panel (FSIP), organizationally located 
within the Council, could resolve negotiation impasses.
The post of Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- 
Management Relations was created to administer the program. 
Authority to decide administrative disputes was transferred 
from agency heads to the Assistant Secretary. These disputes 
concerned unit determinations, elections, national consulta­
tion eligibility, unfair labor practice complaints, and stan­
dards of conduct. The Assistant Secretary also had authority 
to disqualify organizations from recognition because of corrupt 
or undemocratic influences.
Other improvements included Landrum-Griffin type finan­
cial disclosure; prohibition of the union shop, agency shop, 
or involuntary dues withholding; requirement of the union to 
hear, consult, confer, or negotiate as required by the Order; 
and clarification of certain provisions.
The Assistant Secretary rendered his first decision 
on November 3, 1970. During the next three years, he ruled 
on 326 cases. Decisions covered the range of his responsi­
bilities, from unit determination decisions to those involving 
fair labor practices.
Ipice, p. 68.
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The FSIP recommended solutions to fourteen impasses 
which occurred during the first three years of Executive Order 
11491. Of the 120 requests for assistance, 106 were resolved 
locally. The FSIP exercised restraint in using its authority. 
The mere presence of the panel, with the authority to impose 
a settlement seemed to motivate the parties to resolve the 
problem.1 Thus, the fears of the "10988” task force concern­
ing the escalation of third party settlements did not material­
ize.
Executive Orders 10988 and 11491 did not have a major 
effect on union activity in the postal service. Although 
postal employees gained from the formalized system established 
by Executive Order 10988, they had developed a strong congres­
sional lobbying activity earlier. Thus, it was no surprise 
that about 84 percent of the 600,000 postal workers were 
already union members in 1961.  ^ in 1970 these employees were 
excluded from the purview of Executive Order 11491 by the 
Postal Reorganization Act.
A significant development in public labor relations 
has been the use of strikes to settle disputes. The same 
factors which cause strikes in the private sector, wages, 
hours, and working conditions,3 may be attributed as the cause
^Ibid.
^Personnel Methods Series 15, Employee Management Coop­
eration in the Federal Service (Washington: Government Print­
ing Office, August, 1962), p. 302.
^Gordon F . Bloom and Herbert R. Ilorthrup, Economics of 
Labor Relations (6th ed., Homewood IL: Richard D. Irvin, Inc.,
1969), p. 214.
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of public strikes. The incidence of strikes is increasing, 
especially at the state and local level. School teachers, in 
particular, have become more militant and have resorted to 
strikes to gain higher wages. Pennsylvania, Hawaii, and 
Alaska enacted legislation in the early 1970s permitting 
employees a limited right to strike.^
A Bureau of Labor Statistics study in 1970 revealed 
that 132,000 employees were idle for 1.25 million man days in 
1967. In 1968, 202,000 employees were idle for 2.5 million 
man days. In 1962 and 1968 the Tennessee Valley Authority 
construction workers were involved in two strikes. The long­
est was eleven davs and involved 2,500 employees.^  Strikes, 
of course, are illegal in the federal sector as they are in 
most states. Apparently, illegality is not sufficient to 
deter a strike.
In March, 1970, 208,000 postal employees were idle 
because of a strike. None of the strikers were punished and 
the workers obtained an immediate pay raise when they resumed 
work. The federal government got what it wanted, a postal 
corporation.^
In March and April of 1970, air traffic controllers of 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) engaged in a "sickout"
^Government Employees Relations Report Reference File 2 
(Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, April, 1973), Section
15; 501)
^United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labpr 
Statistics, Work Stoppages in Government, 1958-1968 (Washington: 
Government Printing oztice, x9V0) , p. /.
^Postal Reorganization Act, 1970, For a summary of the 
strikes, see GERR No 341-343 (March 23-April 16, 1970).
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to protest the transfer of three employees. About 13 percent 
of the employees were idle on March 20, 1970. A federal judge 
ordered the leaders of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization to get the employees back to work or furnish 
proof of the workers' illnesses.^ The FAA charged the union 
with an unfair labor practice as a result of the "sickout."
The Assistant Secretary of Labor-Management Relations sus- 
pended the union from any activity for sixty days.
The government did not enforce the law in either case.
It did not even invoke the Executive Order in the postal strike. 
This seems to indicate that additional strikes will occur 
without the imposition of penalties by the federal govern­
ment.
Executive Order 11616 Amending Executive Order 
11491, Labor-Management Relations in the 
Federal Service
Although unions gained the long sought right to binding 
third party intervention, and membership increased in 1970 
and 1971, unions were still critical of certain provisions of 
Executive Order 11491. One of these was the stipulation which 
prohibited federal employees who represented the union from 
negotiating on official time.^ Another was the clause which 
denied union membership in the bargaining unit to supervisors 
and managers. Unions believed these provisions were unfair.
llbid. 2Ibid.
^Union officials at Robins were unanimous in their 
belief that union power decreased as a result of this provision.
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They argued that union members should be allowed to negotiate 
on official time as long as management officials had such a 
right. Management believed that some restrictions were neces­
sary to provide the union with the incentive to complete nego­
tiations as quickly as possible.^ However, the union argued 
that this one-sided restriction gave management an advantage 
since management could prolong the negotiations at great per­
sonal expense to the union members. Some union officials have 
offered to negotiate during their off hours if management will 
do the same.
When President Nixon signed Executive Order 11491, he 
directed that operations under the Order be evaluated after 
one year. The Federal Labor Relations Council initiated a 
review with public hearings in October, 1970. All interested 
parties could present their views. It was clear from the 
proceedings that Executive Order 11491 had enhanced collective 
bargaining in the Federal Service. The Council accepted some 
proposals by making adjustments within its authority under the 
Order, rejected others as inappropriate at that time, and 
recommended an amendment to Executive Order 11491 to incorpor­
ate desired changes. On August 26, 1971, President Nixon 
signed Executive Order 11616.
In comparison to the changes of Executive 11491 to the 
original edict, the modifications required by Executive Order
^Interview, McLean.
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11616 were relatively minor. The Director of the Office of 
Manpower and Budget was designated a member of the Federal 
Labor Relations Council. The Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Labor-Management Relations was to decide whether a grievance 
was subject to a negotiated grievance procedure and to arbi­
tration under an agreement. Employees afforded exclusive 
recognition regained the right to file grievances under the 
agency or negotiated procedures; however, the agency procedure 
could not be utilized if the negotiated procedure was appli­
cable. Issues raised under appeals or grievance procedures 
could not be raised as unfair labor practice complaints. 
Parties could negotiate on official time up to 40 hours or up 
to one-half the total time of negotiations. See Figure 1 for 
a graphic depiction of labor relations activities under 
Executive Order 11491, as amended.
In 1971, approximately one million federal employees 
were in exclusive units.^ This was a significant increase 
over the 94,000 workers who were in exclusive units ten years 
eariler.
Union membership in DOD continued to increase also and 
in 1972 it reached a peak of 570,000 workers. The Air Force 
had the greatest percentage of union members in relation to 
agency employment— 76 percent (See Table 4.3).
Although membership declined by 26,000, the percent of 
union members employed by the agency remained constant. The
^Personnel Methods Series 15, p. 305.
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postal service also reported more union members with 91 percent 
of its 665,000 classified as members.
TABLE 4.3
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING UNITS 
BY AGENCY, 1972-1973
1972 1973
Agency Number
Percent 
of Agency 
Employment Number
Percent 
of Agency 
Employment
Army 195,000 58 185,000 58
Navy 193,000 60 180,000 60
Air
Force 182,000 76 179,000 76
Veterans
Adminis­
tration 120,000 63 126,000 64
Treasury 64,000 61 70,000 65
Health
Education
and
Welfare 60,000 52 69,000 53
All Other 269,000 41 277,000 43
SOURCE; Union Recognition, p. 24. 
NOTE: Postal workers are excluded.
The executive orders placed significant responsibilities 
on managers and supervisors. Skills and knowledge in negotia­
ting agreements with unions, interpreting contract provisions, 
and handling grievances under the terms of the agreement are 
some of the things the manager has had to learn.
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It follows that the manager has had to develop or modify 
management procedures in order to adapt to his new environment. 
It is precisely this impact that the author is concerned with 
in this study.
In the next chapter the author provides the final 
background information which is necessary to analyze the effect 
of collective bargaining on management practices.
CHAPTER V
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING PROCESS
Robins Air Force Base 
Robins AFB was activated March 1, 1942, as a mainten­
ance and supply depot for the Army Air Corps. Originally the 
depot was named Wellston to coincide with the name of the 
nearby town. In September, 1943, the town was renamed Warner 
Robins in memory of Brigadier General Augustine Warner Robins. 
Shortly thereafter the Air Corps redesignated the depot as 
Warner Robins Air Depot and the base itself as Robins Field.^
As World War II progressed, personnel employed at the 
base increased from 350 military and 2,800 civilians to 2,500 
military and 14,000 civilians. Civilian strength dropped 
below 4,000 after the war but in 1949 a second period of growth 
began. By 1954 expansion began anew with the location at 
Robins of a wing of Strategic Air Command B-52 and KC-135 
aircraft.2
Existing within the base confines of 8,000 acres are 
70 miles of paved roads, 13 miles of railroad, 10 million
iThis information is based on a brochure which was 
provided by the Civilian Personnel Office, Robins AFB.
2lbid.
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square feet of enclosed administrative and industrial space, 
1,400 family housing units, quarters for 1,700 military person­
nel, and a telephone system of over 3,500 main lines.^
A total of 6,000 military and 15,000 civilian personnel 
are employed at Robins. Excluding managers, 92 percent of 
the workers are southerners; 45 percent are from rural areas 
of population less than 2,500. Approximately 70 percent are 
from Georgia; of those from Georgia, 53 percent are from rural 
areas. Only 17 percent are less than age 30; 53 percent are 
age 30-49; and 36 percent are age 50 or older. Most of the 
workers have been employed at Robins for some time, with 43 
percent employed before 1962, 58 percent before 1965, and 84 
percent before 1970. Females account for 29 percent and racial 
minorities 16 percent of the total work force. Blue-collar 
and white-collar workers account for 52 percent and 48 percent 
of the workers, respectively.^
Considering only managers, 32 percent are southerners; 
37 percent are from rural areas. Approximately 54 percent are 
from Georgia; of those from Georgia, 68 percent are from rural 
areas. None of the managers are less than age 30 and only 10 
percent are less than 40; 56 percent are age 40-49, and 34 
percent are age 50 or older. All of the managers have been 
employed since 1968 or longer, with 63 percent employed before 
1962, and 15 percent before 1950. Females account for 10
^Ibid.
^Data furnished by Civilian Personnel Office, Robins
AFB.
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percent of the managers. Blue-collar employees account for 34 
percent of the managers, white-collar 54 percent, and military 
12 percent.
Of the 16,000 civilians, most are assigned to the 
Warner Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA). WRAMA is one of the 
eight Air Materiel Areas (AMAs) or Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) 
of the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). The mission of 
AFLC, which employs 117,000 persons, is to provide logistics 
support; that is, materiel and services for Air Force organi­
zations, other military services, government agencies, contrac­
tors, and military assistance programs. This includes deter­
mining needs and procuring, storing, distributing, engineering, 
modifying, repairing and disposing of items.^ See Figure 
5.1, AFLC organization chart.
Robins has logistics responsibility for the F-15, 
cargo aircraft, helicopters, missiles, fire control systems, 
vehicles, industrial production equipment, and weapons-guns 
and launchers. The mission is accomplished through an organi­
zational structure composed of four directorates. These are 
Materiel Management, Maintenance, Distribution, and Procure­
ment and Production.2 Figure 5,2 depicts the organizational 
structure of WRAMA.
Maintenance is the largest directorate. It provides 
the major repair and overhaul of equipment which is beyond the
^1974 USAF Basic Data Handbook, Chapter VI, "Air Force 
Logistics and the Air Force Logistics Command," 1974.
^Ibid.
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capabilities of the using commands. The directorate is organ­
ized on the basis of technology. See Figure 5.3. Each ALC 
is designated as a Technology Repair Center (TRC) for a partic­
ular kind of workload; for example, airborne electronics at 
Warner Robins, electrical components at Sacramento, and oxygen 
components at Oklahoma City. Under this concept depot main­
tenance technical resources are brought into discrete tech­
nology bands that provide the optimum cost-effective arrange­
ment of skills, equipment, and facilities. TRC provides the 
basis for optimizing the design, development, acquisition and 
retention of discrete depot maintenance capabilities. Other 
TRCs at Robins include aircraft, industrial products and life 
support systems, and gyros.
The Directorate of Distribution is responsible for the 
physical processes of receiving, item identification and con­
dition, storage, quality assurance of items while in storage, 
preservation and packaging of material, and providing trans­
portation services for worldwide movement of Air Force cargo.
It also provides supply items to all specialized repair 
activities, base, and tenant organizations on the complex.^ 
Figure 5.4 depicts the organization of the directorate.
Materiel Management responsibilities include the 
development of logistics programs and plans, computation of 
materiel requirements, control of the distribution of supplies, 
and operation and management of the assigned portion of the 
Air Force and Federal Cataloging and Defense Standardization
llbid.
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SOURCE: ALC-RAFBUA 23-1, April 23, 1974
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Programs. This requires engineering management, direction, 
development, and control over the design, performance and 
reliability of assigned systems and equipment. Technical 
maintenance support of Air Force, Air National Guard, and 
Military Assistance Program activities; and control over pro­
duction and repair contracts and Air Force specialized repair 
activities.1 Figure 5.5 shows the organization of the direc­
torate .
The Directorate of Procurement and Production is the 
negotiating and contracting agent for all purchases of equip­
ment, supplies, and services assigned to the ALC for manage­
ment purposes. In order to provide worldwide support of 
various weapon systems, efforts are concentrated on timely 
acquisition, quality assurance, and effective production 
management.2 See Figure 5.6 for the organizational structure 
of the directorate.
AFGE
The AFGE was chartered August 15, 1932, after breaking 
away from the NFFE.3 Starting with about 2,000 members and 
twenty-six locals, the AFGE grew to 325,000 members and 1,600 
locals by 1973. The union is composed of non-postal blue- 
collar and white-collar federal employees and municipal
llbid.
2%bid.
^See Chapter III, "A Historical Perspective of Labor 
Relations in the Federal Service," for historical development
of the AFGE.
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Figure 5.5 Directorate of Materiel Management Organization 
SOURCE; ALC-RAFBUA 23-1, April 23, 1974
107
Data Sys Br 
Mgt Services Br
MANAGEMENT & SYS DIV
PRICING DIVISION
PROCUREMENT COMMITTEE
Armt s Spt Items Br 
Fire Control/Bomb Nav Br 
Communications Br
COMMODITIES PROCUREMENT DIV
PRODUCTION & OPR DIV
Contract Support Br 
Pdn Mgt Br 
Pdn Opr Br
WPN SYS & MAJOR EQUIP 
PROCUREMENT DIV
Cargo Aircraft Br 
Msl, Heli & Util Acft 
Aircraft & Vehicle Br
BASE PROCUREMENT DIV
Support Br 
Commodity Proc Br 
Contract Maintenance Br 
Services Proc Br
DIRECTORATE OF PROCUREMENT 
AND PRODUCTION
Figure 5.6 Directorate of Procurement and Production Organization
SOURCE; ALC-RAFBUA 23-1, April 23, 1974
108
government employees of the District of Columbia. It is 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO.^
The AFGE is divided into fifteen geographical districts, 
Each district elects a National Vice President. The elected 
National President, the National Vice President, the Executive 
Vice President, and National Secretary constitute the National 
Executive Council of the AFGE. Policies are determined at 
national conventions which are held every two years. Locals 
are represented on the basis of their membership.
A headquarters and field staff of over 300 supplement 
the national officers. A legislative, research, insurance, 
contract negotiation, wage system, fair practices, service, 
labor-management, and a legal department comprise the 
headquarters organization. The headquarters staff pub­
lishes a bi-weekly newspaper which is mailed to each member.
A bi-weekly legislative letter is sent to local officials. 
National representatives comprise the 200-member field staff. 
They assist in organizing new locals and in negotiating con­
tracts.
In November, 1973, the AFGE represented 624,322
employees in 1,587 exclusive bargaining units. The 469,371
employees who were covered by 987 labor agreements comprised
2
24 percent of the 1,940,648 non-postal government workers.
See Table 4.1 for AFGE gains from 1969-1973.
^The information in this section is based on undated 
information pamphlets published by the AFGE unless indicated 
otherwise.
U^nion Recognition in the Federal Government, US Civil 
Service Commission,Utrice or Labéf-managemenr Relations, 
November, 1973, p. 25.
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TABLE 5.1
EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED EXCLUSIVELY 
BY AFGE, 1969-1973
Percent
Year Number Gain
1969 482,357
1970 530,550 10.0
1971 606,391 14.3
1972 620,744 2.4
1973 624,322 .6
The AFGE takes credit for almost every benefit gained 
by federal workers in the past forty years. This includes 
pay increases of 142 percent, the Classified Pay Act of 1971, 
the wage grade system, early retirement, overtime, executive 
orders, retirement annuity increases, and many more.^
The current AFGE program is more of the same. A 
major objective is increased wage and fringe benefits, includ­
ing bargaining authority over wages similar to that of postal 
workers. A law to regulate labor relations and provide an 
indenmndent appeal board with union representation is another 
major goal. Also, the AFGE is campaigning to prevent job 
losses to private contractors and military personnel. These 
programs have taken on increased importance in view of the 
AFGE's declining membership gain. Most likely the union will
Imundo finds no conclusive evidence to suggest that 
all or even a majority of pertinent legislation originated 
as a result of union efforts, p. 141.
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continue to search for recruiting appeals which will prevent a
decline in its exclusive representation which seems to be 
stabilizing at 625,000.
AFGE Local 987
AFGE Local 987 is the exclusive representative of all 
eligible employees at Robins AFB, except for seventy-three 
fire fighters who are represented by the International Associa­
tion of Fire Fighters. AFGE bargaining units include the Base- 
Wide Unit, Security Police Unit, Professional Nurses Unit,
Non-Appropriated Funds Unit, and the Base Exchange and Motion 
Picture Services Unit.
The paid employees consist of the President and three 
secretaries. Other officials are the Executive Vice President, 
a Treasurer, three Trustees, a Sergeant-at-Arms, and eight 
Vice Presidents. Vice Presidents are from the Directorate of 
Maintenance, Materiel Management, Distribution, and Procure­
ment and Production, and the Security Police Unit, Base Exchange 
Unit, Non-Appropriated Funds Unit, and the Professional Nurses 
Unit. The Vice President of Production and Procurement and the 
Executive Vice President serve as Vice Presidents at Large.
All officials are elected by popular vote, including over 200 
union stewards whose primary function is employee representa­
tion.
Local 987 was chartered in 1948. Union involvement in 
base activities from 1948-1962 was minimal. Primarily this 
consisted of attendance of monthly meetings by Local 987
I l l
officials. Occasionally the union acted as a "sounding board" 
for management policy. More often it served as another means 
of information flow between management and employees, both 
upward and downward.^
In 1962, membership was estimated at 1,200. Significant 
gains were made in 1965 and 1966, the periods in which formal and 
exclusive recognition were awarded. Membership increased to 
2,000 in 1965 and to 5,800 in 1966. See Table 5.2 for membership 
estimates. Blue-collar workers comprised 98 percent of the 
membership. The gain was precipitated by an intensive member­
ship drive led by six National Representatives. The campaign 
lasted several months.
John Brooks was elected President in 1968. He was 
re-elected in 1970 and 1972. In 1973, he became State President 
of the AFGE and Edward Maddox was elected president.
Summary
The author has presented a brief background of the 
base, mission, organization, management, and labor force. In 
similar fashion the organization, membership success, and 
benefit claims of the AFGE were reviewed. The organization 
and membership of Local 987 were also examined briefly. In 
the next chapter the relationship between the union and the 
base is examined.
^Local 987 activity is examined in greater detail in
the next chapter.
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TABLE 5.2
AFGE UNION MEMBERSHIP 1948-1974
Union Management
Year Estimates Estimates
1948 N.A.* N.A.*
1962 N.A. 1200
1963 N.A. N.A.
1964 3000+ N.A.
1965 N.A. 2000
1966 4500-4800 4900^-5800“
1967 N.A. 5700-5500
1968 N.A. 6100-6000
1969 N.A. 5900-6000
1970 5000 6600-7000
1971 N.A. 7100-6900
1972 N.A. 6800-6700
1973 6000 6600-5600
1974 5800 5600-5000
*Not Available
®This column represents March estimate. 
^This column represents September estimate.
NOTE: March and September are significant since members can
stop dues withholding only in those months.
CHAPTER VI
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP AT ROBINS APB
Early Developments
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and examine 
the labor-management relationship at WRAMA. This effort con­
stitutes a major part of the research to identify management 
practices which have evolved at Robins as a result of labor- 
management relations.
Labor management relations at Robins AFB began soon 
after the Army Air Corps established the supply and main­
tenance depot in 1942. Early records are non-existent but 
management officials assert that civilian personnel employees 
attempted to meet with union leaders who were interested in
the welfare of the 2,800 civilian workers. As World War II 
progressed, civilian employment rose to 14,000. Following 
several years of reduced activity after the war, civilian 
strength dropped below 4,000. A second period of growth began 
in 1949 and by 1954 over 15,000 civilians were employed at 
Robins.^
The newly created Department of the Air Force encour­
aged civilian personnel offices to deal with unions in order
^Brochure from Civilian Personnel Office.
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to foster good employee relations. These unions were afforded 
the equivalent of formal recognition; that is, they were con­
sulted. on new regulations and policies and were allowed to pre­
sent their views. Management officials met with union leaders 
monthly. In a sense unions became a "sounding board" for new 
policies or practices. In addition, management obtained union 
assistance in analyzing employment trends, determining the 
impact of adjustments in the work force, and dealing with 
employee problems. Finally, the unions provided another means 
of communicating with employees.
Immediate Effect of Executive Order 10988
Although President Kennedy issued Executive Order
10988 in January, 1962, the Air Force did not publish impie-
2
menting directives until September, 1962. Early unions rep­
resented at Robins were the National Association of Govern­
ment Employees (NAGE), National Federation of Federal Employ­
ees (NFFE), International Association of Machinists and Aero­
space Workers (IAM/AW), Electronic Technicians Association 
(ETA), International Association of Fire Fighters (lAFF), and 
the AFGE.
Among the six unions on base, the lAFF displayed the 
most initiative. It sought and was granted informal recognition
Interview, October 1, 1974, with Dan Bullard, Labor 
Relations Officer of WRAMA from 1962 to 1973. The material 
in the first three sections is based on the interview unless 
stipulated otherwise. Note: The Air Force was established
as a separate service in 1947.
^See Merrell, ppl 28-49, for a review of these direc­
tives .
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in September, 1962. By December Robins had also granted 
informal recognition to the other unions. However, this 
equality in status was not long-lived. The president of the 
NFFE was opposed to Executive Order 10988 so the union made 
little effort to organize WRAMA workers. Members of the NAGE 
were predominately black. The inability to attract a cross 
section of the working population led to disbandment of the 
local. The lAM/AW was also unsuccessful. Its "Yankee" organ­
izers with private sector recruiting tactics had little appeal 
for the predominately southern workers from central Georgia. 
The ETA was a small independent union. It retained only a 
nominal membership and was out-maneuvered quickly by the AFGE. 
By 1965 the lAFF and AFGE remained as the only important 
unions in terms of the labor-management relationship. By 1966 
the AFGE accounted for 95 percent of the union membership.
Labor relations became more formalized with the crea­
tion of an official employee-management cooperation program.
A' civilian personnel official was designated as the labor 
relations officer and he represented management at the monthly 
meetings. Primarily, the meetings became a forum for the pre­
sentation of union views on matters of interest to its members. 
The frequency of consultation declined since, technically, 
management was not obligated to consult with unions granted 
informal recognition.^
^Section 4, Executive Order 10988.
i i 6
AFGE Recognition 
In May, 1964, the President of AFGE Lodge 987 asked the 
WRAMA Commander to identify an appropriate bargaining unit for 
Robins AFB.^ The commander advised the union that an installa­
tion or major unit was appropriate, although the Air Force
2
could not make a predetermination in a specific case. In 
February, 1965, nine months later, the union requested formal 
recognition of a base-wide unit of blue collar workers and dues 
withholding of the members.^ WRAMA asked for evidence of a 
stable membership of 10 percent of the blue collar workers, 
and minutes of the lodge meeting granting the employees mem­
bership. John Griner, National President of the AFGE, advised 
WRAMA by telegram that 680 WRAMA employees were bona fide 
union members, lodge minutes would not be furnished, and the 
union should not be required to certify information furnished.* 
On March 12, Lodge 987 amended the February request 
and asked that recognition include all employees except Fire
5
Protection Branch employees. A few days later, WRAMA
^Letter from AFGE Lodge 987 to Commander of WRAMA,
May 4, 1964.
^Letter from WRAMA to AFGE Lodge 987, May 6, 1964.
^Letter from AFGE Lodge 987 to Commander of WRAMA, 
February 12, 1965.
*Telegram from John Griner, President, AFGE, to WRAMA, 
March 1, 1965.
^Letter from AFGE Lodge 987 to WRAMA, March 12, 1965. 
Note: Dan Bullard encouraged the union to include white collar
workers since it would be more efficient to bargain with one 
large unit rather than several small ones.
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personnel examined the membership records and determined that
Lodge 987 had a membership of 1,514 or 10.65 percent of the
14,215 eligible employees in the unit. On March 31, 1965,
WRAMA granted formal recognition to AFGE Lodge 987 for the
Base-Wide Unit, excluding the Fire Protection Branch. Dues
withholding was also approved.^
The AFGE was gaining momentum. It sought and won
exclusive recognition for the Security Police Unit in August,
1965. An election was not required since the union presented
evidence indicating that over 50 percent of the Security Police
were union members.
The Base-Wide Unit at Robins was the largest in the
AFGE. Consequently, it received attention from the national
union headquarters. Six National Representatives of the AFGE
were sent to Robins to assist in a major recruiting drive.
By May, 1966, several hundred employees had joined the union.
This prompted Lodge 987 to request an election.
An election was held in May, 1966, and at first the
count appeared short of the necessary "60 percent majority."
However, after authorized absences were subtracted, the union
had won by a substantial majority. WRAMA granted the AFGE 
Lodge exclusive recognition for the Base-Wide Unit in June,
1966.2
^Letter from WRAMA to AFGE Lodge 987, March 31, 1965.
2lf at least 60 percent of those eligible and available 
cast their vote, a majority was a majority of those voting. If 
less than 60 percent voted, then a majority was a majority of 
those eligible and available to vote. For example, if 100 
employees were eligible and available to vote, 31 votes would 
constitute a majority if 60 voted. However, if only 52 voted,
51 vote? would consultpte^a majority (51 percent.of those eligible 
#nn,Bvailable). This is 98 percent or those voting. See Section 
7024, Air Force Manual 40-1, January, 1965).
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Negotiations for the initial agreement for the Base- 
wide Unit began in August, 1966, and were approved at WRAMA in 
1967. Headquarters ÜSAF approved the contract in March, 1968. 
The second Base-Wide Agreement was approved in May, 1971, and 
the third was approved in November, 1973.
Labor-Management Cooperation
In 1966, with most of the work force represented 
exclusively by the AFGE it became more important to get all 
levels of management involved in union relations. In order to 
accomplish this goal, the Labor Relations Officer persuaded 
the WRAMA Commander to expand the monthly meeting with the 
union. The Civilian Personnel Officer, Directors or their 
Deputies,^ and the Labor Relations Officer were designated as 
members of the Management Committee. The Labor Committee 
was composed of the President of Local 987 and the chief 
stewards of the directorates. The Civilian Personnel Officer 
and union president were co-chairmen. The purpose of the 
meeting was to foster good relations and improve communica­
tions, understanding, and cooperation between employees and 
2
management.
Subordinate level meetings were held in the weeks 
preceding the primary meeting between the management and labor 
committees. Each Branch Chief and Branch Chief Steward met 
the first week. Each Division Chief and Division Chief 
Steward met the second week. Each Director and Directorate 
Chief Steward met the third week. Usually, other management
iThe Directorates represented were Maintenance, Pro­
curement and Production, Distribution, and Materiel Management.
^Interview, Bullard.
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and labor representatives participated in the subordinate 
level meetings. The purpose of the meetings was to discuss 
problems and matters of mutual interest within each organiza­
tional entity. Problems which could not be resolved at these 
meetings would be presented at the meeting between the Labor 
Committee and Management Committee.^
The members of the committees pledged to combat 
employee absenteeism, carelessness, inefficiency, unfair manage­
ment practices, and any other practice which would decrease 
efficiency or affect morale. They also pledged to reduce 
theft, prevent accidents, and encourage ideas to increase 
production and reduce costs. They agreed further that all 
personnel engaged in labor-management relations would conduct 
themselves in a gentlemanly manner, with violators subject to 
discipline.
The meetings were moderately successful during the 
first year. Lines of communication remained open and under­
standing between groups improved. After the initial successes, 
relations seemed to cool. The union was dissatisfied because 
the Management Committee had no authority and thus would make 
no commitments during the meetings. Management was concerned 
that the meetings had degenerated into petty gripe sessions. 
Building heat, air conditioning, more vending machines, parking 
spaces, search of cars, and office doors that would not close
3
were typical subjects presented by the union.
A primary reason for disagreement between the two 
groups was their perceived roles. Generally, managers believed
llbid.
^"Labor Management Reports."
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a subject was petty and a waste of time unless it was related 
directly to production. Most managers could not see how human 
relations problems related to production. They tended to 
regard employee complaints as trivial.^ The union regarded 
itself as the guardian of worker rights. This involved 
policing the contract and insuring the equitable treatment of 
employees.^
In spite of these dissatisfactions and differences in 
roles/ the groups made constructive use of the meetings. For 
example, the reorganization of the Directorate of Distribution 
was accomplished smoothly as a result of preliminary dis­
cussions between labor and management. Procedures were 
developed for improved traffic control and closing of some 
base gates as a result of a curtailment in the security police 
force. Union stewards and managers were briefed on the pro­
visions of newly approved agreements between WRAMA and the 
union. Management and the union cooperated on worthwhile 
projects as the two supported blood drives, savings bond 
drives, and fund-raiding campaigns for charity.^
By September, 1974, management's overall attitude 
could be described as "reluctantly cooperative." Management 
intended to negotiate or consult on everything required by the 
Executive Order and the contract— no more or no less.
^Conclusion by author based on interviews with manage­
ment officials.
^Conclusion by author based on interviews with union 
officials.
^"Labor-Management Reports."
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Management was quick to point out that this did not mean it had 
to agree on anything.^
Over the years the union advised management of hundreds 
of contract violations, grievable incidents, and unfair labor 
practices which were resolved at the various organizational 
level meetings. For example, the union charged management with 
over 217 contract violations from March 1973 through September
1974.2 Most of the violations were unintentional and occurred 
because of the ignorance or apathy of managers. The apathy of 
managers contributed to their lack of knowledge of the labor 
contract. This lack of knowledge caused supervisors to make 
unnecessary mistakes in their relations with employees or the 
union. Supervisory competence in labor relations was a major 
challenge faced by management.  ^ This assertion was reinforced 
by the Labor Relations Officer at Headquarters USAF who said 
that problems were caused by bad contract language, ignorance, 
and poor management.* A few complaints were the result of 
genuine disagreement by the parties concerned, as will be seen 
in the next section: "Union Complaints." Although few in
number, these disagreements required third-party intervention, 
or the threat of imminent intervention.
5
Although the union had made its share of mistakes,
WRAMA had filed no contract violations or unfair labor practice
^Interview, Sullivan
^Undoubtedly, there were others which were not reported 
to the WRAMA Labor Relations Officer.
-i 4^Interview, Sullivan. Interview, McLean
^According to Pat Sullivan, The Labor Relations Officer.
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charges. As part of the overall strategy of seizing and main­
taining the initiative in the collective bargaining relation­
ship, WRAMA planned to file a few charges against the union. 
This would keep the union off-guard, reacting to management 
actions, and let it know that formal complaints were not res­
tricted to unilateral actions by the union. However, most 
management complaints would be informal. The Labor Relations 
Officer would advise the union officials of their mistakes 
during informal conversations and provide an opportunity for 
corrective action. The intent was to prevent public embarrass­
ment of the officials, thereby minimizing the problem and 
preventing a hostile relationship from developing.
Union Complaints 
Written records of labor-management disputes in the 
early years of Executive Order 10988 were non-existent. Such 
information began appearing in the "Report of Labor Relations" 
in 1969. According to Dan Bullard, who was Labor Relations 
Officer at the time, a series of confrontations developed 
between management and unions from 1962-1965. Each side 
seemed to be trying to determine the extent of its power under 
the new, formalized relationship. Unions began challenging 
management decisions and raising more issues of employee dis­
satisfaction. Most managers believed that complaints resulted 
from the personal frustration or self-interest of union 
stewards. However, managers conceded that some employee com­
plaints were valid. One of the biggest problems for
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management was the reluctance of its managers to accept the 
union and to accord it the rights granted under Executive Order 
10988.1
The first recorded dispute occurred in April 1969 and 
involved meal tickets at the base restaurant. The restaurant 
had been issuing meal tickets to the union and accepting reim­
bursement later. Since Air Force directives required cash 
sales, management prohibited further charges. As alternatives, 
management suggested that the union buy the meal tickets in 
advance or deposit a lump sum in advance to cover the antici­
pated cost. The AFGE's national- union protested to Head­
quarters USAF. The regulation was revised to allow the union
2to charge the tickets as it had always done.
In July, 1969, the union filed the first unfair labor 
practice complaint against management. The union charged the 
employer with violating Section 19(a)(6) by failing to consult 
prior to assigning thirty employees from the Aircraft Repair 
Branch to the Aircraft Quality Control Branch.^ At first 
management maintained that the change of work assignment was 
a retained right and therefore was not negotiable. Later 
management advised the union that a change was required in 
order to meet mission requirements. Since the employees and
^Interview, Bullard.
2"Labor-Management Relations," April 1969. Note: The
material in this section is based on the monthly reports of 
"Labor-Management Relations" unless indicated otherwise.
^Section 19(a)(6) requires the agency to confer, con­
sult, or negotiate as required in Executive Order 11491.
1#T#
stewards affected were advised of the change, management con­
tended that no further action was necessary.^ After reviewing 
the report of a fact-finding committee, the WRAMA Commander 
revoked the reassignment order and directed the Director of 
Maintenance to consult with the union. The union then with­
drew the complaint. After consultation, the employees were 
reassigned without further protest.
Apparently labor-management relations were extremely 
good in WRAMA for the next 28 months since no unfair labor 
practice complaints were filed. Also no grievances were pro­
cessed through the negotiated grievance procedure. The 
Second Base-Wide Agreement expired and the parties were without 
a contract for several months during this period. This may 
have had some restrictive effect on charges against manage­
ment. See Table 6.1.
In October, 1971, the union filed three unfair labor 
practice charges and two contract violations against manage­
ment for four incidents. In two of the cases management 
issued policies without prior coordination with the union.
Each one was resolved locally when management corrected the 
cause for the complaint. The third complaint was withdrawn 
after the same dispute was referred to arbitration. The 
final complaint was also resolved locally.
^According to Article 16 of the Second Base-Wide 
Agreement, management did not have to consult witn tne union 
if the change was required in order to accomplish the mission.
TABLE 6.1
PERIODS OF LABOR RELATIONS BETWEEN WRAMA AND AFGE 
IN WHICH NO BASE-WIDE CONTRACT EXISTED
Exclusive
Recognition
Date Approved
June 1966
Expiration 
Date of 
Contract
Date Contract 
Extended To
Inclusive Dates 
Without 
Contract
June 1966- 
March 1968
Number of 
Months With­
out Contract
21
First
Contract
Second
Contract
March 1968 March 1969 March 1970
March 1970- 
October 1970
October 1972-
October 1970 October 1971 October 1972* November 1975
7
13
Third
Contract November 1973 November 1973 %
SOURCE: Base-Wide Agreements
*0n October 17, 1973, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management Relations 
ruled that a "Memorandum of Understanding" executed by the parties on December 15, 1971, 
extended the agreement until Headquarters USAF approved a new one.
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In the first instance a manager issued an operating 
instruction on parking bicycles in the hanger areas. When the 
union learned of the directive, it sent a letter to the WRAMA 
Commander charging management with failure to consult. Upon 
receipt of the charges, the Commander rescinded the operating 
instruction. He directed the manager to reevaluate the need 
for the policy and to consult with the union prior to any 
decision to implement the policy. The union then withdrew the 
charges. After consultation, the policy was instituted without 
further protest.
In the second case operating instructions had been 
issued on leaves, assignment of overtime, and other personnel 
procedures without consulting the union. The Civilian Personnel 
Officer learned of the matter before the commander received the 
formal charges and had the operating instruction rescinded.
Since the reason for the complaint had been corrected, the 
union withdrew the charge. After consultation, the policies 
were implemented without further protest.
In the third instance the union filed a grievance when 
some employees in the Directorate of Maintenance were 
detailed to higher level positions for periods of 60-120 days. 
The employees were selected without competing under the merit 
promotion system. The union claimed that management violated 
merit promotion procedures as required by the contract. 
Management argued that the merit system was not applicable for 
temporary promotions. The union insisted that the matter be 
referred to arbitration. Management contended it was not a
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matter for arbitration since the contract did not specify that 
temporary promotions must be based on the merit system. After 
considerable debate, the parties referred the dispute to arbi­
tration.
The union also filed an unfair labor practice complaint 
for the promotion incident. But in March, 1972, while awaiting 
the arbitrator's decision, the union withdrew the unfair labor 
practice complaint. Although no reason was given, the author 
suspects that the union expected a favorable arbitration award. 
Moreover, it is likely that the unfair labor practice charge 
would have been dismissed. Section 19(d) of Executive Order 
11491, as amended, authorizes a complaint to be filed as an 
unfair labor practice or under the negotiated grievance and 
arbitration procedure, but not both.
On June 28, 1972, the arbitrator ruled that Article 28 
of the Second Base-Wide Agreement stipulated that employees 
would be detailed to higher grade positions using competitive 
promotion procedures if the assignment was for more than sixty 
days. The arbitrator recommended that the WRAMA Commander 
return the employees concerned to their previous assignments 
and make new selections using merit promotion procedures.
The Commander complied with the arbitrator's award.
The fourth violation occurred when WRAMA safety inspec­
tors surveyed IfRAMA work areas. The inspectors failed to 
invite a union representative to accompany them on the inspec­
tion as required by Article 14 of the contract.^ The union
^Second Generation Base-Wide Agreement.
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submitted a formal complaint to the WRAMA Commander after the 
inspection report was published. The union withdrew its com­
plaint after management agreed to supplement the report with 
union comments regarding safety. This enabled management to 
avoid a second inspection and still permit union participation.
In April, 1972, the union charged the employer with an 
unfair labor practice for changing the tour of duty in the 
steam plant without consulting the union. Management had 
advised the union steward in the area and maintained that 
consultation was not required because the change was necessary 
for mission accomplishment.^ The union did not agree that the 
change was mission related and wanted to refer the dispute to 
arbitration. After reviewing the report of a fact-finding 
committee, the WRAMA Commander revoked the order changing the
tour of duty. He directed the steam plant manager to consult
with the union prior to a change. After consultation, the 
tour of duty was changed without further protest.
In May, 1972, the union filed two unfair labor prac­
tice complaints with the IVRAMA Commander. Shortly thereafter,
the union withdrew the complaints and charged management with 
two contract violations.
The first protest involved a regulation which had been 
published on control of base traffic. The union withdrew 
the charge after management said it would negotiate. After
^According to Article 16, Second Base-Wide Agreement, 
if the change was mission related, management only had to 
advise the union and the employees concerned that working 
hours would be changed.
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negotiating with the union, management published the regu­
lation with minor changes.
The second protest involved the playing of radios and 
televisions during the official duty hours. The WRAMA Com­
mander delegated the authority for deciding such policies 
to directors. Some directors permitted first level super­
visors to determine the policy in their work area. Other 
directors retained the decision authority at the deputy, 
division, or branch level. The actual policies varied among 
the directorates. When the Deputy Director of Materiel 
Management refused to let workers play radios or televisions, 
the union charged him with failing to consult. After he 
showed that he had consulted with the Directorate Chief 
Steward and other stewards in the directorate, the union 
withdrew the charge.
In October, 1972, the union filed a grievance and an 
unfair labor practice complaint as a result of actions of 
the Commissary Manager. The manager had arranged a temporary 
work schedule for two employees so that they could attend 
their college and typing classes. During a two-week absence 
of the manager in September, 1972, the assistant manager 
changed the work schedule because it was not authorized by 
regulation. When the manager returned and learned of the 
situation, he contacted personnel and finance officials to 
arrange a permanent special work schedule to accommodate the 
two employees. About the same time the manager was informed 
that the employees were dissatisfied over their work schedule
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and that the union was involved. The manager then instructed 
his assistant to arrange a meeting with the two employees in 
the presence of the union steward. During the meeting the 
manager reportedly remarked that this was a problem for the 
"EEO."^ He and the assistant manager asked a few questions 
such as "What is the problem?" The employees refused to 
answer upon advice from the steward. The steward then 
adjourned the meeting without explanation.
On October 6, 1972, one of the cashiers filed a 
grievance as a result of actions of the manager and assistant 
manager of the Commissary during the meeting. The grievant 
charged that the manager and assistant manager questioned 
the two employees without giving them a change to reply, 
told the steward that she was trying to take over the 
commissary and do management's work, informed the employees 
that they did not have a problem and that management would 
determine when they had a problem, interfered with the 
employees' right to choose their own representative, used 
coercion in an attempt to interfere in the presentation and 
preparation of the grievance, interfered with the employees' 
right to present their grievance above the first level super­
visor, and denied the employees the opportunity to prepare a 
formal grievance.^
^Office of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEC). He had 
just completed two weeks EEC training.
^Case No. 40-4611(CA), August 30, 1973, United States 
Department of Labor, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- 
Management Relations, Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
Washington, DC.
3lbid.
<*1
Î
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On October 12, 1972, the union filed an unfair labor 
practice complaint concerning the same incident. The union 
alleged that the manager and assistant manager interfered with 
the relationship between the employees and their exclusive 
representative, required additional steps in the processing 
of a grievance, denied appropriate official time for the 
preparation of a grievance, and discouraged the pursuit of 
a grievance by "high pressure" questioning and urging of the 
grievants to contact the Personnel Office or utilize EEO pro­
cedures.^
Upon receipt of the charges, and a review of the sit­
uation, the WRAMA commander directed the Commissary Manager 
to apologize to the two cashiers and the steward, in the 
presence of all of the Commissary employees. By this time, 
however, the grievance had been referred to arbitration and 
the unfair labor practice complaint was under review by an 
administrative law judge.
WRAMA filed a motion to dismiss the unfair labor prac­
tice complaint on the basis that the apology satisfied the 
demands of the complainant. WRAMA also requested that the 
arbitrator dismiss the grievance on the same grounds. The 
arbitrator agreed and refused to consider the case further. 
However, the administrative law judge refused to dismiss the
llbid.
^Letter from WRAMA Commander to Commissary Manager, 
undated.
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case because an offer of settlement had not been made or 
approved at the time of the regional hearing.^
On August 30, 1973, the administrative law judge found 
that the Commissary managers were attempting to assist the two 
employees and the steward at the meeting in September, 1972, 
which was terminated by the steward. He also held that the
union had not proven that the respondent denied the employees
official time for preparations of the grievance, discouraged 
them from filing a grievance, or failed to consult, confer, 
or neogtiate. On the basis of the findings, he recommended 
to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management 
Relations that the respondent's motion to dismiss the pro­
ceedings be denied and that the complaint against the res- 
pondent be dismissed.
On January 8, 1974, the Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Labor-Management Relations reviewed the case. He ruled
that Section 19(d) of Executive Order 11491, as amended, was 
dispostive of the instant complaint. In other words, one may 
raise an issue under a negotiated grievance procedure or the 
complaint procedure of Section 19 of the Order, but not both. 
Since the complainant filed a grievance with the respondent 
on October 6, 1972, the Secretary dismissed the case.^
^Case No. 40-4611 (CA).
2Ibid. In other words he believed the case should be 
heard, but after hearing it, he recommended that the complaint 
be dismissed.
3case No. 40-4611 (CA), United States Department of 
Labor, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management
133
In November, 1972, the union filed an unfair labor prac­
tice complaint alleging that management failed to allow a 
steward to confer with an employee about a grievance. A 
manager in the Directorate of Procurement and Production, 
becoming irate because of what he considered excessive use 
of official time, jerked a telephone out of the hands.of a 
steward. After the manager apologized to the steward the 
union withdrew the charge.
The union also filed a contract violation in November, 
1972, because the Directorate of Distribution changed the 
tour of duty and lunch period for its off-base expediters. 
Management contended that it had complied with the contract 
because the change was mission related, and it had notified 
the Directorate Chief Steward.^ The union charged that tours 
of duty and lunch periods were subject to mutual agreement 
and requested that the matter be referred to arbitration.
In May, 1973, Headquarters USAF advised WRAMA that its 
base-wide contract with the AFGE expired October 27, 1972.^ 
Apparently WRAMA believed that the Second Base-Wide Agreement 
was still in effect because of a "Memorandum of Understanding" 
of December 15, 1971, which extended the agreement until a 
new contract was approved by Headquarters USAF and the
relations, A/SLMR NO. 340 January 8, 1974. Note: This was an
unusual case in that the union was unable to win an award from 
the arbitrator or Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management 
Relations, yet the union won the original remedy it sought—  
an apology.
1Letter from Directorate of Distribution to off-base 
expediters with copy to Directorate Chief Steward, Novariber 6, 1972.
2Letter from Headquarters USAF to WRAMA, May 16, 1973.
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N.uional Office, AFGE. As a result of the Air Force decision, 
WRAMA withdrew from the arbitration case. The union then 
requested that the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- 
Management Relations determine if a matter was subject to 
arbitration under the existing agreement. Headquarters USAF 
maintained that the "Memorandum of Understanding" was not 
binding because it had not approved the memorandum. Moreover, 
the Air Force contended that the contract could not be extended 
because the provisions on arbitration did not conform to 
Section 13(a), Executive Order 11491, as amended.^ On 
October 17, 1973, the Assistant Regional Director for Labor- 
Management Services, Atlanta Region, ruled that the "Memoran­
dum of Understanding, " was binding on the parties until the 
approval of a new agreement by Headquarters USAF and the 
National Office, AFGE. He concluded that although the 
Assistant Secretary ruled on whether a grievance was subject 
to arbitration under an existing agreement there was no indi­
cation in the Order that the decision was conditional upon 
whether the grievance-arbitration provisions met the criteria 
of Section 13. Thus, the Assistant Director ruled that the
2
applicability of Section 13(a) in this case was irrelevant.
^Section 13(e) prohibited the extension of a contract 
which did not conform to Section 13, "Grievance and Arbitra­
tion Procedures." Note that the contract provision was based 
on Executive Order 10988; thus, the section governing grievance 
and arbitration procedures had changed substantially.
^Case No. 40-4939 (GA), United States Department of 
Labor, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management 
Relations, Atlanta Region, October 17, 1973.
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In the meantime, the arbitrator had closed the case 
based on the mutual agreement of WRAMA and the union. While 
the decision of the Assistant Secretary was pending, WRAMA 
withdrew the change of duty tour for the off-base expediters. 
After consulting with the union, WRAMA changed the tour of 
duty without further protest from the union.^
In March, 1973, the union filed an unfair labor prac­
tice complaint, alleging that management did not promote an 
employee to a supervisory position in the Maintenance Direc­
torate because he was a steward. IfRAMA denied the promotion 
because the steward would not resign his union position while 
he served as a supervisor. The administrative law judge con­
cluded that a conflict of interest would occur if an indivi- 
dual acted as a supervisor and a union steward. Accordingly, 
he ruled that WRAMA's action did not violate Section 19(a)(1)
q
and (2). On January 11, 1974, he recommended that the 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations 
dismiss the complaint.*
^Letter from George S. King, Arbitrator, to WRAMA,
June 11, 1973.
^Without deciding it in this case, he noted that to 
permit such a situation to exist might constitute a violation 
of the Order.
^Section 19(a)(1) prohibits the agency from inter­
fering with the rights of an employee. Section 19(a)(2) 
prohibits the agency from encouraging or discouraging mem­
bership by discrimination.
4case No. 40-4715 (CA), United States Department of 
Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Washington, DC, 
January 11, 1974. Note: The Assistant Secretary's decision
had not been rendered at the time of this writing, October, 
1974.
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In April, 1973, the union filed two unfair labor prac­
tice complaints against management. The first involved the 
distribution of dues revocation forms^ to fellow workers by 
a dissatisfied union member. The union contended that the 
union member, who was detailed temporarily as a supervisor, 
was an agent of management. The union alleged that by dis­
tributing the forms, management was interfering with the 
rights of employees, and thus was in violation of Section 
19 (a)(1).2
WRAMA and the union agreed that employees would not be 
allowed official time to campaign for or against the union 
or distribute literature to that effect. Management agreed 
that the WRAMA Labor Relations Officer would be the sole 
distributor of dues revocation forms. On September 21, 1973, 
the acting Regional Administrator of the United States Depart­
ment of Labor dismissed the complaint since the cause of the 
dispute had been remedied.^
On April 24, 1973, the union filed another unfair 
labor practice complaint against WRAMA. The union alleged 
that a manager in the Directorate of Maintenance violated
^Revocation of Voluntary Authorization for Allotment 
of Compensation for Payment of Employee Organization Dues," 
Standard Form 1188.
2case No. 49-4789 (CA), United States Department of 
Labor, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management 
Relations, Atlanta Region, September 21, 1973.
^Ibid.
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Sections 19(a)(1), 19(a)(2) , and 19(a) (6)^ of the Order by 
refusing to let a steward see one of the employees in the 
Production Branch concerning a grievance. The steward was 
denied this right on 19 and 24 October, 1972, because he did 
not have an AFLC Form 368, Administrative Pass. Although the 
policy of issuing administrative passes had existed for many 
years, it was not applied consistently. The supervisor of the 
steward did not follow the policy and had given him permis­
sion to leave his work area to meet the aggrieved employee in
the Production Branch. This had been confirmed by telephone
2
between the supervisors concerned.
The union contended that the Maintenance manager's 
actions interfered with the rights of the steward and the 
aggrieved employee under the Order. The union also charged 
that the manager's discrimination against the steward dis­
couraged union membership. The union also protested that 
the requirement for stewards to use the Form 368 constituted 
a policy change in which the union was not consulted. 
Management maintained that the form was required for reasons 
of national security and cost accounting. The form enabled
Isee Footnote "3," page 135. Section 19(a)(6) 
requires the Agency to consult, confer, or negotiate as 
stipulated in Executive Order 11491, as amended.
2case No. 40-4700 (CA).
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supervisors to prohibit entry to unauthorized persons. Manage­
ment maintained further that it had no obligation to consult 
since the policy had been in effect and had not changed.^
The administrative law judge ruled that the evidence 
available did not establish that WRAMA had violated Sections 
19(a)(1), 19(a)(2), or 19(a)(6) of the Order. He recom-
2
mended that the Assistant Secretary dismiss the complaint.
The union did not appeal the finding.
In November, 1973, the union filed two unfair labor 
complaints. The first involved a union steward who had been 
charged with leave for representing an employee in a griev­
ance. The steward had used fifty-six hours of official time 
while representing two employees. When she spent sixteen 
additional hours on the cases, her supervisor charged the 
time against annual leave. In the supervisor's judgment, 
the steward was abusing the right of official time in the 
cases. VJhen the steward complained, the supervisor charged 
all but eight of the seventy-two hours as annual leave. The 
union then charged management with violation of Section 
19(a)(1), 19(a)(2), and 19(a)(4) of the Order.^ Upon receipt
llbid.
2Ibid.
2Interview, Bullard.
^That is, the agency shall not interfere with the 
rights of an employee under the Order, encourage or discour­
age membership by discrimination, or discipline or discrimi­
nate against an employee who had exercised his rights under 
the Order.
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of the complaint the WRAMA Commander revoked the annual leave 
and directed that the supervisor apologize to the steward. 
After the apology, the union withdrew the complaint.
The next unfair labor practice occurred when the 
Directorate of Maintenance issued policies on leave and 
overtime without consulting with the union and refused to 
disclose overtime records to the union. The union charged 
management with interfering with the rights of employees 
under Section 19(a)(1). Upon receipt of the charge, the 
WRAMA Commander revoked the policies and directed the mana­
ger concerned to consult with the union, insure that over­
time was allocated in accordance with the contract, and make 
overtime records available to the union. The union accepted 
this remedy and withdrew the charge. After consultation 
with the union the policies were published without protest.
In January, 1974, the union complained that manage­
ment would not permit distribution of the union newspaper 
in accordance with Article 37 of the contract. Management 
stopped distribution of the paper in September, 1973, 
because it had become a commercial newspaper instead of a 
union newspaper. This decision was precipitated by the 
action of former publisher of the base newspaper. After 
being underbid by a competitor and losing his right to pub­
lish the base newspaper, he negotiated with the union to 
publish its newspaper. When advertisements appeared in the 
union paper, management contended that it was actually a
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commercial paper which competed with the base newspaper.
Since the parties to the agreement had never intended that 
the union publish a commercial newspaper, WRAMA stopped its 
distribution on base. WRAMA offered to let the union dis­
tribute the paper without advertisements or to utilize one 
page of the base newspaper. When the parties could not agree 
the dispute was referred to arbitration.^
In a decision on April 26, 1974, the arbitrator in 
the case ignored the intent of the parties and ruled that the 
words "The Union's Newspaper" were all encompassing and the 
union was entitled to distribute its newspaper on base as 
long as it satisfied other provisions in the contract. WRAMA 
prepared an appeal but Headquarters USAF directed that it not 
be submitted. The union resumed distribution of its news- 
paper in June, 1974.
In September, 1974, the union filed an unfair labor 
practice complaint with the WRAMA Commander, charging that 
management's policy of forced leave during the Christmas 
holidays violated Section 19(a)(6) of the Order. WRAMA 
began consultations over the Christmas closing in January, 
1974, but the union contended that management was violating 
the Order because the policy was not authorized in the con­
tract. AFLC had directed the closings throughout the
1974.
^Arbitration File No. 74K07786.
^Letter from Headquarters, USAF to WRAMA, June 7,
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command, but the union held that AFLC was not an "appropriate 
authority" within the meaning of Section 12(a) of the Order.^ 
In the union's view, an appropriate authority was an agency 
outside of the Air Force. Management contended that AFLC 
was an appropriate authority and that it was the right of 
management to determine the methods, means, and personnel to 
conduct operations. The real objection by the union was that 
employees should not be "forced" to take leave. Although 
most workers approved of Christmas leave, some did not and a 
few had no leave accumulated.^ Management contended that the 
closings would save millions of dollars and agreed to work 
some of the employees who wanted to work or who did not have
3
leave accumulated.
Summary of Union Complaints 
A total of sixteen complaints were initiated or pro­
cessed through the Assistant Secretary channels. Of these, 
three complaints were withdrawn and processed through the 
negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure. Of the 
remaining thirteen, one was pending; the union withdrew 
seven to accept a local remedy, won one, and lost four. In 
one of the losses, however, the complaint was dismissed 
because the situation had already been remedied. Of the
^A contract is subject to existing or future laws or 
regulations of appropriate authority.
^Interview with Edward Maddox, President of Local 987, 
AFGE, September 23, 1974.
^A skeleton work force would be required even if the 
base was closed. Interview with Major General Holland, 
Commander of WRAMA, September 25, 1975.
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seven local remedies, three were clearly in favor of the union; 
in the other four, partial victories were gained as management 
retracted its actions only to reimplement the actions after 
consultation.
The union initiated eight^complaints through the nego­
tiated grievance and arbitration procedure. Of these the 
union won three, withdrew four to accept a local remedy, and 
lost one. In the loss, however, the complaint was dismissed 
because the situation had already been remedied. Of the 
three local remedies, one was clearly in favor of the union, 
two were partial victories because management reimplemented 
its actions after consulting with the union, and one was 
clearly in favor of management.
Grievances and Appeals— Agency Procedures 
A number of employee dissatisfactions were processed 
through agency procedures while complaints were being pro­
cessed through the negotiated procedure. Their dissatisfac­
tions resulted from three types of management actions: dis­
ciplinary actions, nondisciplinary actions, and removals. 
Disciplinary actions included suspensions and reprimands. 
Nondisciplinary actions included such things as supervisory 
appraisals, promotions, leave, harassment, traffic violations, 
and position descriptions. Removals, of course, meant
^Including the decision by Air Force to change a reg­
ulation to accommodate the union. The author has arbitrarily 
placed the complaint in this category.
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termination of employment. See Table 6.2 for the number of 
grievances and appeals from 1969 through 1974.
The largest number of grievances and appeals occurred 
in 1970 during the period when the second contract had expired
TABLE 6.2
GRIEVANCES AND APPEALS FILED AS A RESULT OF 
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, NONDISCIPLINARY 
ACTIONS, AND REMOVALS, 1969-1974,
AT ROBINS AFB
Type Action 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974*
Disciplinary Actions 24 55 32 21 26 22
Nondisciplinary Actions 44 50 30 63 60 62
Removals 8 10 11 8 4 8
SOURCE: Civilian Personnel Office Files, Robins AFB GA.
*Last four months projected based on data from first eight 
months.
and when no actions were processed under the negotiated 
grievance and arbitration procedure. Based upon the data in 
Table 6.3 it also appears that management was least success­
ful in 1970, the year with the largest number of employee 
dissatisfactions. The least successful year in processing 
dissatisfactions resulting from disciplinary actions occurred 
in 1970, with management winning 53 percent of the cases. 
Management was least successful with nondisciplinary actions 
in 1973, winning 78 percent of the cases. Management was 
least successful in removal actions in 1971, winning 45
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TABLE 6.3
AGENCY WON AND LOST RECORD FOR GRIEVANCES AND 
APPEALS FILED AS A RESULT OF DISCIPLINARY 
ACTIONS, NONDISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, AND 
REMOVALS, 1969-1975, AT ROBINS AFB
Disciplinary
Actions
1969
W
16
Nondisciplinary 
Actions 37
Removals 4
7
4
1970 1971
ÎL ÎL i_
29 26 19 13
41 9 27 3
8 2 5 6
1972 1973 1974
JiL k- E- k. JL. L-
14 7 23 3 18 4
50 13 47 13 51 11
6 2 4 0 6 2
SOURCE: Civilian Personnel Office Files, Robins AFB GA
W = Won 
L = Lost
percent of the cases. If one combines disciplinary, nondis­
ciplinary, and removal actions, management's lowest win per­
centage was 68 percent in 1970. Considering success from the 
employee's view, favorable decisions ranged from 25, 32, 30, 
24, 18, and 18 percent, respectively of combined actions from 
1969 through 1974.
Other Bargaining Units 
The lAFF was small in membership but set the pace for 
the other unions in the early years. In March, 1965, Local 
F-107 was granted exclusive recognition after presenting mem­
bership of over 50 percent of the seventy-three eligible
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firefighters.^ A boiler-plate agreement was negotiated from 
June 24, 1965, to February 8, 1966. Headquarters USAF approved 
the contract on July 21, 1966. By August, 1973, the lAFF had 
negotiated its fourth contract with Robins AFB. Generally, 
relations between management and the lAFF were uneventful. At 
one point the lAFF president wanted to eliminate the negotia­
ted grievance and arbitration provision because it was too 
costly to utilize. By this time, however, the provision was
y
required by the Executive Order.
The AFGE became the exclusive agent for the Security 
Police Unit in August, 1965. Over 50 percent of the sixty-two 
eligible security police were union members. Initially, the 
parties agreed to a boiler-plate contract.^ Headquarters USAF 
approved the second contract in May, 1969, after the parties 
had made some minor corrections in the language and format.
On October, 1970, Headquarters USAF approved the third gen­
eration agreement. It was patterned after the second base-wide 
agreement which would be approved by Air Force later that 
month. Rather than negotiate a separate fourth generation 
contract, management and the union agreed in July, 1971, to 
incorporate the Security Police Agreement into the next base- 
wide agreement.^ Negotiations began in September, 1971, and
^Interview, Bullard. ^Interview, Sullivan.
^Additional information concerning the first and second 
contracts was not available.
^Monthly reports of ''Labor-Management Relations. "
Unless indicated otherwise, the material in this section is 
based on the monthly reports of.''Labor-Management,Relations. " 
The reference is repeated only xf necessary for clarxty.
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the contract was approved in November, 1973. Security police 
provisions were listed only when special considerations were 
appropriate. Primarily, these pertained to tours of duty, 
shift rotation, work during holidays, and uniforms.^
The AFGE became the exclusive agent for the Profes­
sional Nurses' Unit in May, 1968. About 57 percent of the 
twenty-eight eligible nurses were union members. Negotiations 
began in July, 1968, and were completed in February, 1969.
The contract was similar to the base-wide and security police 
agreements. Headquarters USAF approved the agreement in 
October, 1969. A year later the parties began negotiations 
on the nurses' second generation agreement. Again it was 
similar to the security police and base-wide agreements. In 
April, 1971, the contract was forwarded through channels for 
review and approval. In June, 1971, at the request of the
parties. Headquarters USAF returned the contract for incor-
2
poration into the base-wide agreement. As in the case of 
the security police, a few special provisions were listed for 
nurses. Primarily, these pertained to tours of duty, shift
3
rotation, work during holidays, and uniforms.
In May, 1969, the AFGE was granted formal recognition 
for the 208 eligible employees of Non-Appropriated Funds Unit. 
Generally, these employees worked in the officer clubs, 
enlisted clubs, and base restaurant. Approximately 45 percent
iThird Base-Wide Agreement.
^Monthly reports of "Labor-Management Relations." 
T^hird Base-Wide Agreement.
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were union members. In November, 1969, the NAP unit was granted 
exclusive recognition.
The AFGE filed an unfair labor practice complaint 
against management for failing to grant the NAP Unit dues 
withholding. Initially management delayed dues withholding 
because the union did not submit the forms to the proper 
office. A second delay occurred because the National Cash 
Register Accounting Equipment could not handle the additional 
load. After the base had installed new equipment and begun 
dues withholding, the union withdrew the complaint.
Negotiations on the initial NAF contract began in 
June, 1970, and were completed in November, 1970. Head­
quarters, USAF, approved the boiler-plate agreement in December 
1970. A second boiler-plate NAF contract was approved in 
March, 1973.
In June, 1970, the AFGE was granted exclusive recog­
nition for the Base-Exchange and Motion Picture Services 
Unit, based on an election conducted by the Department of 
Labor on May 20, 1970. Approximately 40 percent of the one- 
hundred eligible employees of the unit were union members. 
Negotiations on the initial contract began in June, 1970.
The AFGE protested to the Base Commander because the Army 
and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) would not permit dues 
withholding until the entire contract was negotiated.^ The
^Although the Base Commander controlled daily opera­
tions of the Base Exchange, financial management was con­
trolled by the Exchange Service in Dallas, Texas. Inventory 
management was controlled through regional centers.
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union claimed losses of several thousand dollars because it 
could not collect dues from its members.
The Base Commander notified AAFES that denial of dues 
withholding was in violation of Air Force Manual 40-1, Section 
7027. AAFES ruled that the Base Commander had no authority 
to intervene and that its General Counsel in the Dallas office 
would handle all subsequent actions. Additional records on 
the subject were not available at Robins; except dues with­
holding and the initial labor contract were approved in 
January and February, 1974, respectively.
The Cost of Labor-Management Relations 
Budget or cost data for labor relations were not avail­
able. However, it was possible to estimate the annual cost.
The largest expenditure was for the labor relations staff 
personnel who were located in WRAMA headquarters and the major 
organizational elements: $188,657. The cost for items such
as office supplies and contract reproduction costs was $5,000; 
temporary duty, $3,000; and arbitration,^ $5,400. Total 
out-of-pocket cost was $202,057.^
Management was concerned over the cost of union rep­
resentation, particularly in those instances involving the 
abuse of official time. One steward was reportedly devoting
^Management's share for three arbitration cases; the 
cost could be much higher, depending on the individual case 
and the number of cases.
2All cost estimates are those of the author.
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40 hours a week to steward duties. There were other instances 
of supervisors not knowing the whereabouts of union stewards.
Major General Holland was concerned over the total effect of 
employee representation on productivity.^ If 200 stewards 
averaged 20 hours weekly, a total of 57,200 hours annually 
would be lost to mission essential tasks. Union stewards were 
also provided sixteen hours of labor relations training annually.^ 
This amounted to another 3,280 hours. Total hours lost to 
mission essential tasks was estimated at 60,480. If the
3
60,480 was assigned an average salary cost of $4 an hour, 
the total implied cost of employee representation would be 
$241,920. Excluding training, the implied cost was $228,800.
One could also estimate the cost of labor relations 
training of managers. With 1353 managers undergoing 16 hours 
of training annually at an average salary cost of $6.37 an 
hour/* the cost of labor relations training for managers 
would be $137,898.
Thus, with out-of-pocket costs of $200,000, employee 
representation and steward training costs of $240,000 and labor 
relations training of managers costs of $140,000, the total 
costs of labor-management relations was estimated at $580,000.^
llnterview. Major General Holland.
^Eight hours for contract orientation and eight hours 
for executive order orientation.
^Cost estimate based on the average annual salary of 
workers, as provided by the Civilian Personnel Office.
*Cost estimates based on the average annual salary of 
managers, as provided by the Civilian Personnel Office.
^The numbers are rounded to avoid spurrious accuracy.
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Summary
,Labor-Management relations began in the early 1940s 
at Robins Air Force Base soon after it was established as a 
supply and maintenance depot. When President Kennedy issued 
Executive Order 10988 in 1962, six unions were represented 
on base. WRAMA granted exclusive recognition in 1965 to the 
lAFF for its fire fighters and to AFGE Local 987 in 1966 for 
the Base-Wide Bargaining Unit. Local 987 represented five 
other exclusive bargaining units but the Base-Wide Unit accounted 
for almost all of the labor relations activity.
The total cost of labor-management relations was esti­
mated at $580,000. Generally, labor and management cooperated 
to accomplish the mission, but a few complaints by the union 
required third-party intervention. A number of employee com­
plaints were also processed through agency procedures.
The first chapter of the basic research has been pre­
sented. In the next chapter, the author describes and analyzes 
the contract negotiations and three generations of base-wide 
agreements.
CHAPTER VII 
THREE GENERATIONS OF BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the contract 
negotiations and the base-wide agreements formalizing the 
collective bargaining process at WRAMA. This information pro­
vides a summary of what has been accomplished through the labor- 
management program. It is a major part of the research effort 
to identify the management practices stemming from the labor- 
management relationship.
Negotiations for the initial agreement for the Base- 
Wide Unit began soon. The lengthy period of negotiations 
proved to be precedent setting as negotiations for the three 
base-wide agreements encompassed sixteen, nineteen, and 
twenty-one months respectively. If the time required for 
approval at Air Force Headquarters is considered, the periods 
required to obtain a contract were nineteen, twenty, and 
twenty-six months respectively See Table 7.1
The negotiators of the contracts tended to paraphrase 
the applicable executive orders so the language was time- 
dependent to some extent. Articles on recognition, unit defini­
tion, provisions of law and regulations, rights of the employer,
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-TABLE 7.1
PERIODS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN 
BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS
First Contract
Second Contract
Second Contract 
Supplement
Third Contract
Third Contract 
Supplement
Date
Negotiations
Began
August 1966
February 1969
Date Approved 
at WRAMA
December 1967
September 1970
November 1970 May 1971 
September 1971 June 1973
May 1974 June 1974
Date Approved 
by Higher 
Authority
March 1968
October 1970
May 1971 
November 1973
July 1974
Number of 
Months 
to Obtain 
Approval 
at WRAMA
16
19
6
21
Number of 
Months 
to Obtain 
Approved 
Contract
19
20
6
26
U l
to
SOURCE: Labor Agreement Between Warner Robins Air Materiel Area and American Federation of Government
Employees Local No. 987 Base-Wide Bargaining Unit, March 26/ 1968, and October 28, 1970;
Labor Agreement Between Warner Robins Air Materiel Area and American Federation of Government 
Employees Local No. 987 Base-Wide Bargaining Unit, Professional Nurses Bargaining Unit, and 
Security Police Bargaining Unit; November 16, 1973. Hereafter these agreements will be referred 
to as the First Base-Wide Agreement, Second Base-Wide Agreement, and Third Base-Wide Agreement.
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rights of the union,^ consultation, and union representation
were security clauses. Each was embodied in the executive order
as a specific right or obligation. Moreover, each was guar-
2
anteed or required by Air Force Manual 40-13.
Articles on wage surveys, leave, holidays, and hazard 
pay pertained to compensation. These clauses were directed 
toward application and implementation since compensation was 
established by law.
Articles such as hours-of-work, overtime, training, 
safety, job classification, and job descriptions pertained to 
working conditions. These provisions were directed toward re­
stricting unilateral decision making by management.
Articles on promotion, performance appraisal, reduction- 
in-force, and discipline were concerned with insuring that man­
agement actions were in strict compliance with regulations. In 
this manner the union was attempting to influence the operation 
of the merit system.
The grievance and arbitration provisions provided a means 
of enforcing the contract. The most significant aspect of these 
articles was third party intervention. In the union's view, 
this made it possible for more objective decisions in case of
3
disputes.
The article concerning union rights was not included in 
the first two agreements; however, union rights were explicit in 
various other provisions.
^Rights of the union, consultation, and union représenta* 
tion were guaranteed. The other provisions were required in the 
contract.
3Interview, Maddox.
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The Initial Base-Wide Agreement 
In August, 1966, about seven weeks after the exclusive 
recognition of the AFGE, Management and union representatives 
met to establish negotiating rules. The President of Local 
987 and two National AFGE Representatives comprised the union 
negotiating team. One of the National Representatives was 
Chief of the Contracts Division of the AFGE. He acted as the 
chief spokesman. The Civilian Personnel Officer, the Staff 
Judge Advocate (Senior Air Force attorney), the Deputy Direc­
tor of Maintenance and the Deputy Director of Distribution 
comprised the management team. The negotiations started poorly. 
The chief spokesman for management was the Civilian Personnel 
Officer. He opened the meeting by stating that negotiations 
would be conducted in his office each Monday for two hours 
because he had other important matters to attend to. The union 
representatives were offended because the management spokesman 
was dictating the preliminary rules instead of negotiating in 
good faith. Within a few minutes the union terminated the 
negotiations.^
Apparently the union spokesman contacted the AFGE 
National Headquarters because the following day the WRAMA Com­
mander received a telephone call from Headquarters USAF. 
Although the details of the conversation were not revealed, 
the Civilian Personnel Officer was relieved of his negotiating 
duties. The Staff Judge Advocate promptly assumed the role of 
chief spokesman for management, and another judge advocate 
joined the management team. Negotiations resumed immediately.
^Interview, Bullard. The material in this section is 
based on the interview unless stipulated otherwise.
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The negotiators decided to meet on Mondays, Wednesdays, 
and Fridays for four hours a day. The periods between the 
sessions enabled them to attend to other duties and prepare 
for the negotiations. The breaks also helped relieve tensions 
and minimize emotionalism which arose during bargaining.
Management requested a complete draft of the union's 
proposals. However, union officials were still upset over the 
initial meeting and presented a few proposals at a time. This 
allowed the union to retain the initiative and gave it a tac­
tical advantage. Management had no plan, was reactive, and 
unable to develop alternatives for trading purposes. Never­
theless, management's position was relatively strong. It had 
strong rights under the Executive Order and the power of unilat­
eral interpretation of Air Force and higher directives.
The union's practice of placing a few articles on the 
table at a time tended to slow the proceedings. Another factor 
which slowed progress was determining what items could be nego­
tiated without violating the Executive Order or Air Force direc­
tives. Also the negotiators spent considerable time in writing 
the articles in simple, understandable language so that the agree­
ment would be meaningful to the workers. Recesses also handi­
capped the proceedings. The chief spokesman for the union was 
absent for several prolonged periods because of commitments to 
other locals. This required cessation of negotiations.
The negotiators almost reached an impasse concerning 
work assignments for supervisors. The union did not want 
supervisors to perform the work of journeymen mechanics.
Management held that assignment of work was a management right 
and not negotiable. Moreover, supervisors were not in the
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Base-Wide Bargaining Unit and were not subject to the same 
restrictions as unit members. During the first six months 
of negotiations, the management team made several attempts to 
convince union officials that the subject of supervisory duties 
was not negotiable. Finally the union withdrew the article.
By May, 1967, the negotiators had reached agreement.
After a review for legal sufficiency, the agreement was for­
warded through AFLC to Headquarters USAF for approval.
Headquarters USAF returned the agreement in July, 1967. 
Criticism centered around the language of the agreement. Some 
terms were unclear and others could be interpreted too broadly. 
Different phraseology was suggested for some provisions. Thus, 
two months after reaching agreement, management and union 
officials reopened negotiations. Although the primary task 
was to refine the language of the contract, the union seized 
this opportunity to add fifteen articles for consideration.
Again, the union introduced a few articles at a time. 
Management had few counter proposals as the teams agreed to or 
modified each article. They narrowly averted an impasse on the 
assignment of overtime, classification actions, and job descriptions.
The union wanted overtime assignments rotated among 
employees, regardless of who was performing the job when the 
overtime requirement arose. Management insisted that the assign­
ment of work was not negotiable. Finally they compromised and 
management agreed to assign overtime to volunteers who were per­
forming the job and, secondly, to rotate overtime among other 
volunteers.
The union wanted a copy of every job description.
Management refused because of the costs involved. Later,
Management agreed to furnish a job description if a dispute
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arose over the employee's duties. The union also wanted to 
be present during the, classification audit of a job. Manage­
ment finally agreed to permit a union member to attend the 
critique of the annual classification audit.
By December, 1967, the parties had reached an agree­
ment and the contract was forwarded through AFLC to Head­
quarters USAF again. This time, however, Dan Bullard, the 
Labor Relations Officer, met with Air Force officials in 
Washington to insure that the agreement would not be returned 
for modification. On March 26, 1968, sixteen months after 
negotiations began. Headquarters USAF approved the contract.
The agreement contained eighty-nine pages and thirty- 
eight articles.^ In its provisions the parties defined, 
established, and guaranteed specific rights and responsibilities 
of the employer, the union, and the employees. In some instan­
ces the negotiators drafted more stringent rules than those 
provided by Air Force directives. The most substantive article 
provided for a grievance and arbitration procedure which was 
separate from the Air Force procedure. However, the most 
unusual aspect of the agreement was the code of ethics sub­
scribed to and quoted in the preface— the Code of Ethics of 
the 85th Congress. The most significant aspects of the agree­
ment, union and employee rights and obligations, are summarized 
in Appendix 4.
^First Base-Wide Agreement.
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The Second Generation Base-Wide Agreement 
On December 27, 1968, ninety days prior to the expira­
tion date of the initial base-wide agreement, the union 
advised management that it wanted to modify the existing con­
tract.^ In January, 1969, management named its negotiating 
team and exchanged proposals with the union. The union pre­
sented twenty-eight articles and management presented the 
thirty-eight articles of the initial base-wide contract.
2
Most of the changes involved minor clarification of language.
Negotiations began in February, 1969, with meetings 
scheduled three days a week for four hours a day. The Staff 
Judge Advocate, another judge advocate, the Labor Relations 
Officer, the Deputy Director of Maintenance, and the Deputy 
Director of Distribution comprised the management negotiating 
team. The Staff Judge Advocate was the chief spokesman for 
management. A National Representative from the AFGE, the 
union president, the union's fifth vice-president, the chief 
stewards of the four WRAMA directorates, and one black com­
prised the union negotiating team. The National Representative 
served as chief spokesman for the union. Except for the
^Either party could reopen negotiations in the ninety- 
to-sixty day period prior to expiration of the contract. 
Article 38, First Base-Wide Agreement.
^"Report of Labor-Management Relations." Robins AFB 
GA, December, 1969.
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National Representative the union members rotated so that six 
members comprised the union team at all times.^
By March, 1969, the parties had reached some agree­
ment. However, impasse items were developing as the negotia­
tors could not agree on the use of time clocks, custodial 
duties, detailing employees, and shift assignments. The major 
issue concerned the shift system. Management wanted permanent 
shift assignments for employees, based on (1) volunteers and 
(2) seniority. The union wanted a shift rotation system.
Time clocks also became an important issue. The union wanted 
employees with twenty-five years or more of federal service 
exempted from clocking in or out. Management disagreed due to 
the administrative work involved in manual time keeping, 
especially in the industrial areas where employees were 
scattered due to work assignments.
The negotiations recessed in April, 1969, since the 
National Representative was also involved in negotiations 
at a Navy installation. The death of one of the union nego­
tiators delayed things further. When the meetings resumed on 
June 30, 1969, the articles on details, time clocks, con­
tracting out, employee utilization, distribution of the con­
tract, and merit promotions remained as the major issues.
By August, 1969, after agreeing on merit promotions 
and details, an impasse remained over four articles. In
^Interview, Bullard. According to Bullard, the minority 
member seldom participated in the sessions even though he was 
usually present. Apparently, the union hoped his presence 
would increase minority membership. Note: The material in this
section is based on the interview unless indicated otherwise.
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order to avoid the prolonged negotiations of 1966-67, the 
negotiators sent the document through channels for approval, 
minus the articles of dispute. Moreover, they hoped to obtain 
a new contract before the old one expired on December 22, 1969. 
The parties agreed not to propose new articles if Headquarters 
USAF returned the contract for correction.
The new version was still at Headquarters USAF when 
the old agreement expired in December, 1969. A review had 
been delayed due to a back-log of agreements. The Air Force 
may have been partially responsible for the delay since it was 
reviewing each contract with extreme care.
Apparently the lack of a formal contract posed no 
particular problems. Labor-management relations during this 
period were unusually smooth and the union seemed unconcerned 
over the absence of a negotiated grievance procedure for 
employees. Management operated as though the agreement was 
still in effect but realized the union could not file a con­
tract violation.
In May, 1970, the WRAMA labor relations officer 
received the contract, with instructions to correct several 
errors. Although the union had agreed not to reopen negotia­
tions, it now insisted on presenting new articles. Primarily, 
the union wanted parking spaces on the flight-line. This 
would have enabled employees to park next to the hangers 
instead of several blocks away. Management refused to con­
sider the new provision on the basis of the joint agreement 
not to submit new items for consideration. In July tlie correc­
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tions were completed and the contract was forwarded to Head­
quarters USAF once again. On October 28, 1970, Headquarters 
USAF approved the agreement, twenty months after negotiations 
began.
The Labor Relations Officer developed a training pro­
gram to inform managers and stewards about the provisions of 
the new contract. The training began in January and was 
effective overall. However, management complained that 
stewards used the training for gripe sessions.
The parties remained at impasse over the four issues, 
despite the new agreement. In November, 1970, they requested 
assistance from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 
After several days of fruitless meetings the mediator withdrew. 
The union threatened to refer the dispute to the Federal 
Services Impasse Panel. Instead, the negotiators continued to 
meet once each month.
One of the impasse areas concerned employee utiliza­
tion. More specifically, the union wanted to restrict the 
type of work which could be assigned to supervisors. At first 
management refused to negotiate, maintaining that such a 
provision would affect employees and supervisors outside the 
bargaining unit, including military personnel. Later, manage­
ment said that the work restrictions would be difficult to 
control, thereby increasing operating costs. Headquarters 
USAF would not support the contention that the issue was non- 
negotiable so management finally agreed to a discussion. The
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union withdrew the request for supervisory restrictions when 
management agreed to require certain actions of supervisors.^ 
Management viewed the use of time clocks as an effi­
cient means of accounting for employee time. Since manage­
ment considered manual time-keeping as a costly alternative 
it did not want to exempt any employee from clocking in or 
out. The union wanted employees with twenty years of federal 
service exempted from the requirement.
Management was concerned with operating costs and was 
eager to contract out certain work to reduce costs. The union 
wanted no contracting out. As an alternative, the union 
wanted authority to approve or disapprove contract work.
Another impasse item affecting cost was the union 
request that management provide a copy of the contract to every 
employee. Management refused on the basis of cost. However, 
it provided pocket size copies of the contract and permitted 
the union to pay for additional copies that could be printed 
on management's order for printing.
Slowly the groups resolved their differences and in 
April, 1971, they settled the final issue of time clocks. A 
supplement to the basic agreement containing the previous 
impasse items was forwarded through channels. On May 10, 1971, 
Headquarters USAF approved the supplement. The supplement 
would expire along with the basic agreement.
Iperhaps if management had related the "assignment of 
work to supervisors" to "methods of work" it could have 
resisted negotiations on the basis of a "retained right of 
management."
163
The second generation base-wide agreement contained 
thirty-nine articles and 114 pages.^ Most of its provisions 
were identical to the initial agreement, although minor changes 
were noted in sixteen of the original thirty-eight articles.
Only one article, "Conduct and Discipline," was added. Although 
substantial material was added to the articles on promotions 
and grievances, generally these provisions were restatements 
of Air Force directives. The most significant aspects of the 
agreement, union and employee rights and obligations, are 
summarized in Appendix 4.
The Third Generation Base-Wide Agreement 
The second generation contract would be renewed on its 
anniversary date for one additional year unless either party 
advised the other of its desire to terminate or modify the 
agreement. If negotiations were reopened, the contract would 
continue in effect until the new one was approved by Head­
quarters USAF, provided the duration of the old agreement did 
not exceed two years. On August 28, 1971, sixty days prior 
to the automatic renewal of the second-generation contract, 
the union advised management it wanted to modify the agree­
ment. ^
^Second Base-Wide Agreement.
2
Article 39, Second Base-Wide Agreement. 
^"Labor-Management Relations," August, 1971.
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The Labor Relations Officer headed the management 
negotiating team, with other members consisting of a judge 
advocate, a representative of the Base Commander, and a 
representative of the Comptroller. A National APGE Represen­
tative headed the union team which consisted of the President 
of Local 987, the Fifth Vice-President, and a National Repre­
sentative who had been assigned as an assistant to the Presi­
dent of the local.1 Other union officials served on the union 
staff at various times.
After consultation in September, 1971, the negotiators 
adjourned until they could review Executive Order 11616, which 
had been signed by the President on August 28, 1971. Also, 
the parties expected guidance on the new order from their 
respective headquarters.
Meetings resumed in October, 1971, and were scheduled 
each week for Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday from 0830 to 
1230. By mutual consent, the parties did not adhere to the 
schedule closely. The union requested a recess in early 
January, 1972, due to the unavailability of the National Rep­
resentative. Meetings resumed in February. Only limited 
results had been achieved by June, 1972, when the nonavaila­
bility of the National Representative forced another adjourn­
ment.
lAll but the Fifth Vice-President were full-time.uniçn 
employees. Note; Unless indicated otherwise, the material in 
this section is based on an interview with Patrick R. Sullivan, 
Labor Relations Officer from February 1973 to the present.
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Negotiations resumed in August with moderate success. 
By November, 1972, nine issues still required agreement: time
clocks, reserve parking, merit promotions, temporary duty, 
duration of contract, use of facilities, employee services, 
hours of work, and employee utilization. The parties seemed 
unaware that the contract expired October 28, 1972, and 
relations continued as usual. The negotiators continued to 
meet, but only once a month and with limited success. In 
February, 1973, the Labor Relations Officer and chief spokes­
man for management, accepted a promotion. He was replaced 
in both roles by Patrick K. Sullivan. Soon the parties had 
agreed on temporary duty, duration of contract, hours of work, 
and employee utilization. Only five unresolved issues 
remained.
In April, 1973, the parties forwarded the contract to 
Headquarters AFLC, minus the disputed provisions. The follow­
ing month Headquarters AFLC returned the agreement for a few 
minor corrections. By June 22, the corrections were made and 
the contract was finalized— after twenty-one months and 248 
hours of negotiations. Five months later, on November 16, 
1973, Headquarters AFLC approved the agreement.^
The parties remained at impasse over five issues. The 
first area concerned the accounting of employee time. The 
union wanted employees with twenty years of service in grade
^Headquarters USAF delegated approval authority to AFLC,
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GS-9^ or above exempted from clocking in or out. Management 
wanted to retain the practice of exempting employees with 
twenty-five years of service in grade GS-11 or above.^
The next issue involved union representation. The 
union wanted a union representative with voting privileges 
appointed to the Civilian Welfare Council. The Base Commander 
refused to appoint a union representative since he could only 
appoint two council members. Management maintained that since 
the other three members were elected by employees at Robins, 
the union could get the representation it desired through 
employee support.
Another area of dispute concerned reserve parking 
spaces. Initially the union wanted all reserve parking elimi­
nated. Later, it became obvious that the union wanted reserve 
parking for its stewards, the right to review all reserve 
parking permits, and the right to review the penalty assessed 
for parking violations. Management held that the last two 
items were non-negotiable since non-bargaining unit members 
would be involved. The union maintained that the subjects 
were negotiable since any space reserved for a non-bargaining 
unit employee took away a space for a bargaining unit member. 
As for parking spaces for stewards, management did not believe
^And the wage system equivalent.
^This was an impasse issue in the negotiations for the 
second base-wide contract and was resolved when management 
finally agreed to exempt employees with twenty-five years of 
service. Grade level was not stipulated in the contract.
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that reserve spaces were appropriate unless a steward rep­
resented employees in separate locations. Such situations 
were unlikely since over 200 stewards were available to 
represent employees. Moreover, it would be unfair to other 
employees to reserve so many spaces for the stewards.
The union wanted the employer to furnish office space, 
desks, and telephones for Branch, Division, and Directorate 
Chief Stewards. Management maintained that the space and 
equipment was not available and would be too costly even if 
available.
Finally, the union wanted the article on promotion to 
apply to all positions for which bargaining unit employees 
were eligible. The union requested representation on Career- 
field Panels.1 It also wanted promotions to first level super­
visors restricted to non-supervisory employees. Again manage­
ment hesitated to make any agreement with bargaining unit 
employees which would affect employees outside the unit. 
Management would not agree to union membership on Career-Field 
Panels because membership was restricted to individuals with 
personnel experience. Management did not agree on the restric­
tions concerning first level supervisory positions because of 
the wide grade spread of the positions. In other words, a 
first level supervisor could compete for another first level 
supervisory position at a higher grade.
^Career-field Panels determined the number of candidates 
eligible for grades above GS-11.
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Although mediation had been unsuccessful in resolving 
the impasse which delayed agreement on the second base-wide 
contract, the parties decided to try mediation again. After 
only moderate success during November and December, 1973, the 
mediator withdrew.
In May, 1974, Patrick Sullivan, the new Labor Relations 
Officer and chief negotiator for management, was successful in 
reconvening negotiations. Within five weeks and thirty-six 
hours of negotiations, the parties had agreed on a supplement 
to the third-generation base-wide contract. They resolved all 
of the impasse issues but one— time clocks. The supplement 
was forwarded through channels and was approved by Headquarters 
AFLC on July 19, 1974.
The third-generation base-wide agreement contained 
forty-nine articles and 190 pages.^ Essentially, it was a 
modification of the second agreement. The negotiators deleted 
the article "Public Purposes Served” and the provision on 
supplemental agreements. Some of the articles were divided 
into separate clauses. Others were added: "Environmental
Differential Pay," "Maintenance of Air Force Form 971," and 
"Supervisor-Employee Relations."
The supplement contained the impassed provisions, 
provisions of "Promotions," and the articles titled "Use of 
Official Facilities" and "Employee Services."
^Third Base-Wide Agreement.
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Significant changes were noted in the articles: "Hours
of Work and Tours of Duty," "Grievance Procedure," "Arbitra­
tion," and "Duration of A g r e e m e n t . T h e  changes concerning 
grievance and arbitration resulted from the amendment to 
Executive Order 11491 by Executive Order 11616. Other changes 
were relatively minor. The most significant aspects of the 
agreement, union and employee rights, and union obligations are 
summarized in Appendix 4.
Negotiating Strategy 
In August, 1974, the WRAMA Commander notified the union 
of his desire to open negotiations.^ The parties met in 
September to exchange proposals. Management presented twenty 
articles in which it wanted to modify the language or make 
minor changes. For the first time, management had seized the 
initiative. The union had not intended to reopen negotiations 
on the first anniversary of the contract. Generally, the 
union was satisfied with the existing agreement. Nevertheless, 
after conferring with the National Representative who was 
present to resume negotiations, the union submitted nine 
articles for modification and two new articles, pay and reor­
ganization. Thus, in September, 1974, the parties began nego­
tiations on a fourth-generation base-wide agreement.
^Articles 16, 35, and 39, respectively, as designated 
in the Second Base-Wide Agreement.
Either party could reopen negotiations within ninety- 
to-sixty days of the first or second anniversary date of the 
contract; Article 49, Third Base-Wide Agreement.
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The author was permitted to attend the preliminary 
meeting. It was evident that management negotiators had 
learned from earlier experiences. In addition to seizing the 
initiative by opening negotiations, management had developed 
a firm negotiating strategy. Management had been reactive 
to union actions in the past. In the future management planned 
to keep the union off balance by submitting proposals and 
counter proposals. Management's new strategy was to give 
nothing, give a little to get something in return, present a 
final alternative before mediation, and accept a mediation 
compromise or an impasse as appropriate. Actually, manage­
ment strategy went beyond these four steps. It was designed 
to regain control in areas where management had relinquished 
unilateral authority before management had sufficient nego­
tiating experience. It also involved correcting ambiguous or 
vague contract language or eliminating provisions which caused 
conflicts between management and labor.
Moreover, management preferred that all grievances be 
subject to the negotiated grievance procedure. Management 
believed that the union was able to exploit the current 
situation. According to the Labor Relations Officer, it was 
common for the union to process a weak complaint through the 
Air Force procedure, in which case the employee's claim would 
probably be denied. This enabled the union to use won-lost 
statistics to its advantage. For example, it could say, "Look 
what we can del We won all ten of the grievances through the 
negotiated system. But the ninety who chose to process their
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grievances through the Air Force System lost their cases."
Since the Air Force had some bad managers, the union occasion­
ally had a strong case. It would process this case through 
the negotiated procedure and probably win. This enabled the 
union to save money since the Air Force absorbed the processing 
costs for the ninety losers.^ And they could use their statis- 
tics to help attract members.
The union was less willing to describe its negotiating 
strategy. Nevertheless, comments by union officials during 
interviews with the author revealed certain strategy. Union 
officials believed they had a substantive document. Although 
they hoped to obtain additional gains, maintaining the initia­
tive by presenting their proposals first no longer seemed 
important. Union strategy seemed to focus on expanding the 
scope of negotiations by inserting more regulations or 
abstracts of regulations into the contract. Once the regu­
lation was in the contract, it was no longer subject to uni­
lateral interpretation by management. The union could inter­
pret the provision in the contract also, and if disputes arose 
over interpretation, they were subject to arbitration. Another 
facet of the union's strategy concerned precedence. Once the
^Hypothetical example by Labor Relations Officer.
^Current Air Force policy is for all units to negotiate 
a provision for binding arbitration in contracts so that the 
union will be forced to process more complaints through the 
negotiated procedure. The intent is to force the union to 
share the costs and thereby decrease the number of weak cases. 
Interview, Robert T. McLean, Chief, Labor and Employee Rela­
tions Division, Directorate of Civilian Personnel, Headquarters, 
USAF, April 26, 1974. Marquardt found that only,38 percent of 
all Air Force contracts in 1971 contained a binding arbitration 
clause, "arquardt, ?. 216.
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regulation was inserted into the contract and the regulation 
was changed, the contract took precedence over the regulation.^ 
Inserting the regulation into the contract also enabled the 
union to force management to comply with its own regulation, 
or face a charge of violating the contract.
The union planned to continue submitting proposals 
concerning the equitable treatment and welfare of the employees 
in order to gain more and more control over this area. What 
it did not gain today, it would seek tomorrow, until finally 
the modus operandi would be bilateral decision making. The 
encroachment would be so slow, so subtle that the union would 
be firmly entrenched by the time management realized it.
Three Generations of Gains 
As noted in the section "Other Authoritative Studies" 
in Chapter I, Marquardt made a study of 120 collective 
bargaining agreements in the Air Force. Based on these 
agreements, he identified twenty articles that contained 
substantive material.
For analytical purposes, he excluded security and 
duration clauses. He reasoned that they were required in all 
contracts and thus, were not subject to negotiation. This 
logic is questionable since the base-wide agreements at 
Robins indicate that the security and duration clauses con­
tain substantive material which was negotiated. Moreover,
^Ruling by Federal Labor Relations Council, Elmendorf- 
Wildwood, Decision Case 72A-10. May 15, 1973.
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by his argument, grievances would not be included in an up­
dated analysis since Executive Order 11491 as amended 
requires that each contract contain a grievance procedure.
The articles in Marquardt's study are listed in Table 
7.2. Note that the First Base-Wide Agreement at Robins 
included seventeen articles. The Second Base-Wide Agreement 
contained nineteen of twenty and the Third Base-Wide Agree­
ment contained all twenty of the articles in the study. All 
of the WRAMA base-wide agreements contained articles which 
were not listed by Marquardt.
His study also revealed that initial agreements signed 
in 1964-65 averaged four substantive clauses. Initial con­
tracts approved in 1971 averaged eight substantive articles 
per agreement, with an average of ten clauses for all agree­
ments in 1971. Discounting the security and other required 
clauses, the initial base-wide agreement at Robins contained
thirty substantive clauses,^ the secbnd contained thirty-
2
three, and the third contained thirty-seven. Considering 
Marquardt's "negotiated rights" criterion in his 1971 study, 
it is clear that all of the V7RAMA base-wide agreements were 
substantive documents.
Applying the criterion of "negotiated rights" to the 
IfRAMA agreements, one can alter the interpretation and obtain
^Some articles contained more than one substantive
issue.
2"Use of Time Clocks" was not counted in the third 
contract since the parties were at an impasse over the article.
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TABLE 7.2
SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES IN WRAMA BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS, 
COMPARED WITH SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES IN AIR FORCE 
AGREEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE MARQUARDT STUDY
Clauses Included in 
WRAMA and Air Force 
Agreements_____
Hours of Work 
Overtime 
♦♦Additional Pay 
Wage Surveys
Annual Leave 
Sick Leave 
Holidays
Leave Without Pay
Administrative Pay 
♦Clean Up Time 
Promotion Plane 
Performance Appraisal
Reduction-in-Force 
Assignment of Work 
Training 
Safety
♦Discipline 
Grievance Procedures 
Job Classifications 
Arbitration
Totals in Air Force 
 Contracts_____
94
90
6
31
93
74
41
54
61
35
86
31
80
55 
46 
93
39
96
41
73
n = 120
♦Included in second Robins Agreement but not in the first 
Agreement.
♦♦Included in third Robins Agreement but not in the first or 
second agreements.
SOURCE; Marquardt, Martin W. "The Scope of Bargaining at United 
States Air Force Installations Within the Forty-eight Con­
terminous States Under Executive Order 11491: An Analysis and
Projection," Unpublished Dissertation, University of Alabama 
(1972).
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significantly different results. In Table 7.3 the author 
considered significant rights negotiated by the union in base- 
wide agreements. "General" rights guaranteed by Executive 
Order or regulation were excluded. For example, consultation 
on "personnel policies or practices" was excluded as a gain 
under "consultation" because of the lack of specificity.
"Hours of work," however, was included under "consultation" 
as a specific right. The right of the union to post material 
on official bulletin boards at Robins was included as a nego­
tiated gain. Although this right was guaranteed by regulation, 
it was considered a "specific" gain. Based on this interpre­
tation, the author derived seventeen categories of negotiated 
rights. The union gained 56 rights in the first, 73 in the 
second, and 110 in the third contract. The increase in nego­
tiated rights from the first to the second agreement was 30 
percent, and the increase in rights from the second to the 
third agreement was 51 percent. The increase in rights from 
the first to the third contract was 96 percent.
The greatest increases in negotiated rights from the 
first to the second agreement were in the areas of union 
notification, working conditions, disciplinary action, and 
distribution of agreement. The greatest increases in rights 
from the second to the third agreement were in the areas of 
consultation, union notification, committee membership, use 
of official facilities, and distribution of agreement.
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TABLE 7.3
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS NEGOTIATED BY THE UNION 
IN BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS^
Description First Second Third
of Rights Agreement Agreement Agreement
1. Recognition 2 2 2
2. Dues Withholding 1 2 1
3. Use of Official Facilities 3 4 9
4. Consultation 3 3 8
5. Committee Membership 7 6 22
6. Union Notification 7 12 15
7. Use of Official Time 4 4 5
8. Administrative Leave 1 1 1
9. Employee Services 3 ■ 4 4
10. Training 2 2 3
11. Working Conditions 13 19 21
12- Arbitration 2 2 2
13. Grievances 4 4 4
14. Procedures for Resolving
Impasses 2 2 3
15. Disciplinary Action 0 1 1
16. Distribution of Agreement 0 3 7
17. Duration of Agreement _2 _2 2
56 73 110
SOURCE; First, Second, and Third Base-Wide Agreements.
^General rights guaranteed by Executive Orders or regulations were 
excluded. For example, consultation on personnel policies and practices 
was excluded, but the right to post material on bulletin boards was 
included.
One right was given for each group provided a copy or given 
access to a copy of the agreement. If the number of copies provided to 
a group quadrupled, the number of rights also quadrupled.
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This analysis enables one to see the quantitative gains 
in negotiated rights. The information in Appendix 4 permits 
value judgments concerning the significance of a particular 
gain.
Note that the union made inroads in the decision 
making process by negotiating rights of consultation, com­
mittee membership and notification. In the first and second
base-wide contracts, about 30 percent of the gains were related 
to joint-decision making. In the third contract, decision
making gains increased to 41 percent of the total gains.
The most significant gains in this area concerned 
consultation rights. The most significant consultation right 
was the requirement for management to confer before changing 
the hours of work. Moreover, management had to begin consul­
tations with the union at least four weeks prior to the change. 
In 1967, before the initial base-wide contract was approved, 
the unilateral decision authority of management was unre­
stricted. Other significant consultation gains were related 
to compensation. The union was provided information by the 
Federal Wage Board, and union members could make presentations 
to the Board prior to a final decision. Also, one union mem­
ber served on the Wage Board and five union members were wage 
data collectors. The union could consult and negotiate with 
management whenever it believed that the amount of hazard 
pay should change or that hazard pay should be paid for a job. 
These provisions may become extremely significant. If the 
union can show evidence of gaining additional pay for employ­
ees, union membership may increase.
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The union gained membership on every major decision 
making council or committee. Although union members had ex 
officio rights in some instances, they still had the oppor­
tunity to influence the final decision. By December, 1971, 
the union was represented on 15 committees with 20 voting 
and 5 ex officio members. With six members on the welfare 
committees and equal membership on the environmental dif­
ferential pay and wage data collector committees, the union 
was in an influential position.
In addition to conferring, management was notifying 
the union or providing information about subjects of interest 
to the union. This information enabled the union to keep 
abreast of management decisions and insure that management 
adhered to its own regulations and the contract.
The union was preoccupied with insuring fair and 
equitable treatment for employees.^ This preoccupation was 
reflected in the negotiated rights pertaining to the subject.^ 
Note, however, that the percentage of total rights for this 
category declined, with 52 percent, 49 percent, and 36 per­
cent, respectively, reflected in the three agreements.
Considering the number only, employees gained the 
most in improved working conditions. However, considering
^This conclusion was based on interviews with union 
and management officials.
^Rights 7-13 of Table 7.3 pertain to fair and equitable 
treatment of employees. Any classification, however, is some­
what arbitrary as rights may relate to more than one category.
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the effect on the employer, the use of official time in 
representing employees was significant. Stewards were using 
hundreds of official working hours to meet with, counsel, 
and represent employees. Management was concerned over the 
union's abuse of this right since some of the stewards were
T
becoming non-productive in their government duties.
The negotiated grievance and arbitration process was 
probably the most substantive gain, especially in the union's 
view. This provided for third party intervention and increased 
the probability for an objective decision. As noted in the 
section on negotiating strategy, management also regarded the 
negotiated grievance procedure as significant and actually 
preferred it over the Air Force grievance procedure. Since 
the union would have to share the cost of processing the 
grievance, management believed that the union would permit 
few invalid grievances beyond the first supervisory level.
!I
Three Generations of Obligations
With the increased rights and power of the union came
increased responsibility. If one considers union obligations
as gains along with rights, then obligations account for about
2
17-18 percent of total union gains. As shown in Table 11 of 
Appendix 4, the union gained twelve obligations in the first
^Interview, Major General Holland.
^That is, 56 rights + 12 obligations = 68 gains, 12/68 
= .18; 73 rights + 15 obligations = 88 gains, 15/88 = .17;
110 rights + 22 Obligations = 132 gains, 22/132 = .17.
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base-wide contract, three in the second, and seven in the third. 
When viewed in terms of enforceability, however, union res­
ponsibility is not significant. Of the twenty-two obligations, 
only obligations (0) 0-5, 0-7, 0-11, 0-12, 0-16, 0-18, and 0-22 
are enforceable. Of these seven obligations, 0-16 is diffi­
cult for management to monitor and control and 0-22 is rela­
tively insignificant. Thus, the author concludes that the 
union has gained much in return for a small obligation.
Summary
The description and analysis of the contract negotia­
tions and three generations of base-wide agreements provide 
the reader with a summary of the labor-management program and 
many of the management practices at Robins AFB. The first 
agreement was approved in December, 1967, the second in 
October, 1970, and the third in June, 1973. The agreements 
were substantive documents, as reflected by a growth in the 
number of articles, substantive rights, union inroads into 
joint-decision making, and the union's role in insuring 
the welfare of employees. Union obligations increased also 
but were small compared to union gains.
With the second part of the basic research complete, 
we are now ready for the final segment— an examination of 
the perceptions of managers and workers concerning the impact 
of collective bargaining on management practices.
CHAPTER VIII
MANAGER AND WORKER PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING 
THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
ON TWENTY-ONE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
AT THE WARNER ROBINS AIR 
LOGISTICS CENTER
A major part of the research to determine the impact 
of collective bargaining on management, practices within WRAMA 
concerned a survey of managers and workers. During the week of 
September 23-28, 1974, 347 workers and forty-one managers com­
pleted a questionnaire (See pp. 292-295) designed to reveal the 
perceptions of managers and workers concerning the impact of 
collective bargaining on management practices. Union stewards 
assisted the author in distributing and collecting the ques­
tionnaire during a series of meetings held throughout the week 
in the base cafeteria. Officials selected this facility as the 
most convenient to the majority of WRAMA employees.
The survey was conducted during the employees' official 
working hours and was supported by management and union officials 
Only four employees refused to complete the questionnaire 
although a few expressed anxiety over their participation. 
Generally, they accepted reassurances from the union steward 
and the author that their responses would remain anonymous.
liacT'-
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Completion time for the questionnaire ranged from twenty min­
utes to an hour. Many of the respondents who spent more than 
thirty minutes on the survey seemed to be relaxing or using 
the period as a rest break. For the few who had difficulty 
reading, the author explained each question to insure their 
understanding.
The author also interviewed management and union officials 
during August, September, and October of 1974 as part of the 
basic research to determine the inqpact of collective bargaining 
on management practices. Everyone seemed interested in the out­
come of the research project. Prior to the interviews the 
author met with officials of Local 987 and briefed them on the 
purpose of the research. Although they were extremely coopera­
tive their comments were more guarded than those of management 
officials.
This chapter is devoted to the presentation and analysis 
of the responses to the questionnaire. Where appropriate the 
data is supplemented with information learned during interviews 
or from analysis of the labor contract or the labor-management 
relationship.
General Hypothesis 1
The first objective in the questionnaire was to determine 
if managers and workers believe management practices have been 
adopted at Robins AFB since 1962 because of the labor-management 
relationship. By restating the objective the author derived General 
Hypothesis 1: Managers and wodcers believe that certain management
practices have evolved from the labor-management relationship 
since 1962. As indicated in the research model, if a majority
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of managers and workers agree that one of the management prac­
tices evolved from the labor-management relationship, it will 
be concluded that General Hypothesis 1 is true.
Each of the twenty-one management practice statements 
on the questionnaire involved two questions: (1) Is it a
management practice? and (2) Was it the result of the union?
A calculation of manager and worker responses indicated 
whether a majority of each group believed a particular management 
practice existed. Then a chi square test was conducted to 
determine whether the proportion of agreement or disagreement 
between the groups was statistically significant. If a major­
ity of both groups said the practice did hot exist, no further 
evaluation was made. If one or both groups said a practice 
existed, additional calculations were made. For those who 
said the practice existed and that it evolved as a result of 
the labor-management relationship, calculations were made to 
determine if their responses represented a majority of all 
managers or all workers, as applicable. Then a chi square 
test was conducted to determine whether the proportion of 
agreement or disagreement between this manager subset and 
worker subset was statistically significant.
Management Practice 1 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show manager and worker responses 
regarding Management Practice (MP) 1. Managers believe over­
whelmingly (98%) when acting on working conditions or personnel 
policies or practices, that memageroent considers employee reactions.
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TABLE 8.1
MPI; MANAGEMENT CONSIDERS EMPLOYEE 
OR UNION REACTIONS WHEN ACTING ON 
WORKING CONDITIONS OR PERSONNEL 
POLICIES OR PRACTICES
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 40 1 98 2
Workers 258 89 74 26
Chi Square 9.82^
A large consensus of workers also agree as 74 percent responded 
"yes." Thus we conclude that MPI exists.
In order to test whether a significant difference 
exists between the proportional responses of managers and 
workers a null hypothesis was formulated: Ho: There is no
difference between managers and workers in the proportion with 
which they give "yes" and "no" answers that MPI exists. The 
alternative hypothesis became: HI: One group gives a greater
proportion of "yes" answers than the other group that MPI 
exists. Based on the chi square table in a standard statistical
iThe calculations were derived using the Merrell Chi 
Square Program for 2X2 contingency tables. Headquarters Air 
University, USAF, December 10, 1974. See Appendix 2.
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text^ the range of rejection for one degree of freedom at the 
5 percent level of significance is 3.84.^ Hence = 9.82
is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. (This 
approach to stating and treating hypotheses will be used for 
all succeeding management practices.) Although both groups 
believe that MPI exists there is enough disparity in their 
responses to conclude that a potential problem exists. Mana­
gerial bias probably accounts for some of the disparity; that 
is, one would expect most managers to answer affirmatively 
because the Executive Order requires them to consider employee 
or union reactions when acting on working conditions or person­
nel policies or practices. In real situations, however, people 
sometimes act without considering even the most obvious con­
sequences.
A sufficient number of unfair labor practices and con­
tract violations have occurred to make it obvious that manage­
ment does not always consider employee or union reactions prior 
to acting.3 Nevertheless, it appears that top management is 
attuned to the problem.* Employee relations are emphasized 
in monthly labor meetings in an attempt to make managers sen­
sitive to employee needs. Pocket-size copies of the labor 
contract are furnished each supervisor and all are encouraged 
to become thoroughly familiar with its contents.
lYamane, p. 879.
^For all tests, the significance level is 5 percent and 
degrees of freedom is 1.
^Refer to the section on union complaints in Chapter VI.
^Interviews with Major General Holland, Patrick Sullivan, 
Dan Bullard, and WRAMA Deputy Directors.
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The apathy of some lower and mid-level supervisors is 
generally conceded as the cause of the problem.^ Of course 
the union is prepared to help management combat apathy by its 
willingness to file unfair labor practice and contract viola­
tions. Most union officials are convinced that assessment of 
penalties against violaters will eliminate most of the problems.
Table 8.2 shows that the managers and workers who 
believe MPI exists, also believe the practice evolved from the 
labor-management relationship.^ The 100 percent "yes" res­
ponse of those in the managerial subset accounts for 98 per­
cent of all managers. The "yes" response of workers represents
TABLE 8.2
MPI EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
_____________________:________B a s p j p f l s e ^ _________________
Group Number Percent^ Percent?
Managers 
Workers 
Chi Square 7.76
Yes No Yes No Yes No
40 0 98 0 100 0
209 49 60 14 81 19
^Based on a sample size of.41 managers and 347 workers. 
Based on a subset of 40 managers and 258 workers.
^Interviews with top management and the "Labor Relations 
Reports" indicate that apathy is the problem. If one assumes 
that most contract violations are unintentional, the large 
number which has occurred at WRAMA support the contention that 
apathy is a problem.
2Interview, Maddox
^That is, because employees are union members, have the 
right to join unions, or because of labor union activities.
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60 percent of all workers and 81 percent of the subset^ of 
workers. Thus, it is concluded that MPI evolved as a result 
of the labor-management relationship.
In order to test whether a significant difference 
exists between the proportional responses of the subsets of 
managers and workers, a null hypothesis was formulated.
Ho: There is no difference between the managerial
subset group and the worker subset group in the pro­
portion with which they give "yes" and "no" answers 
that MPI is the result of the labor-management relation­
ship.
The alternative hypothesis became:
HI: One subset group gives a greater proportion of
"yes" answers than the other subset group that MPI is 
the result of the labor-management relationship.
Based on the range of rejection, = 7.76 is significant and 
the null hypothesis is rejected.
The extremely high "yes" responses of managers may 
indicate that management would not be as concerned with employee 
reaction if it were not for the union,^ If this is true, the
The group of workers who perceive that the practice 
exists is referred to as the subset of workers. The same 
reference applies to managers.
^In order to avoid unnecessary repetition the same null 
and alternative hypotheses will be used in the second test of 
proportional responses for each management practice without 
repeating each formulation.
^This cannot be said with certainty because of the way 
MPI is worded . . . "considers employee or 'union' reactions 
. . . ." If one considers "union" reactions before acting, he 
would do so only because the union was there. Thus, he should 
logically conclude that the practice was caused by the union.
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union may tend to regard certain management acts as insincere. 
This could lead to a decline in the labor-management relation­
ship. Note that the "no" response of those in the worker sub­
set who do not believe MPI was caused by the union repre­
sents 14 percent of all workers. This infers that they think 
management would have considered employee reactions if the 
union did not exist. Since this is a rather small percentage, 
it may infer that many other workers think management would not 
consider employee and union reactions if it could avoid it.
By extension of this logic it is likely that many of 
those who think MPI is not a practice also think that manage­
ment is able to avoid considering employee and union reactions. 
More than one management official asserted that the manager's 
job is production. They regarded union officials as almost 
illiterate and preoccupied with trivial matters. Of signifi­
cance, these managers regard as trivial anything not related 
to production. This suggests that WRAMA managers need leader­
ship training so that they can compare the results of produc­
tion-centered leadership with other leadership styles.
Management Practice 2 
Table 8.3 shows that 76 percent of the managers and 
86 percent of the workers believe that management is reluctant 
to fire an employee. Accordingly, it is concluded that MP.2 
is a practice at Robins. Based on the range of rejection
= 3.61 is not significant and the null hypothesis is accep­
ted that managers and workers agree that management is
MP2;
1*9
TABLE 8.3
MANAGEMENT IS RELUCTANT TO 
FIRE AN EMPLOYEE
Response
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 31 10 76 24
Workers 297 50 86 14
Chi Square 3.61
reluctant to fire an employee. Table 8.4 shows that 32 percent 
of all managers believe that reluctance to fire an employee is 
the result of the union. A slight majority of all workers, 55
TABLE 8.4
MP2 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent Percent
Yes Yes Yes No
Managers 13 18 32 44 42 58
Workers 190 107 55 31 64 36
Chi Square 6.75
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
^Based on subset of 31 managers and 297 workers.
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percent, believe that MP2 was caused by the union. Since a 
consensus of all managers and workers do not agree that the 
practice evolved as a result of the union, it is not conclusive 
that the union's presence causes management to be reluctant in 
terminating employees. Although the union has some influence 
in such hesitance by management, other factors are probably 
more important.
It is well known that it is extremely difficult to dis­
miss a civil service employee. The many hours required to 
document and defend a case against an employee are enough to 
discourage dismissal in all but the most serious cases. 
Undoubtedly this plays a major role in management's reluctance 
to discharge an employee. Also, whenever a manager brings 
charges against an employee, it is common for the employee to 
make countercharges. The ensuing investigation usually uncovers 
mistakes of the manager and he is often criticized or even 
penalized along with the employee.
Another major factor in the reluctance to fire an 
employee is the manager's concern for the individual. Removals 
are quite serious and can be devastating for the employee and 
hsi family. Many managers realize that an employee has made 
a commitment to the organization--a commitment to spend years 
of his life in accomplishing organizational goals. This, in 
turn, leads to an organizational commitment to offer the 
employee the security that terminations are not regarded 
lightly and that every feasible alternative is exhausted before 
an involuntary separation.
Considering only employees who say MP2 exists, 42 per­
cent of the managers and 64 percent of the workers believe it
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is the result of the union. Based on the range of rejection,
X =6.75 is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This confirms the obvious . . . managers and workers do not 
agree as to the cause of management's reluctance to fire an 
employee.
The APGE's record of claiming credit for every positive 
benefit that employees have received over the years may account 
for the employees' positive opinions. Since the majority of 
workers believe that the union prevents management from firing 
a worker, management should evaluate the difference of opinion 
to determine if a potential problem exists. Management should 
emphasize its policy of reluctance to fire employees. Perhaps 
management should also develop a program for informing workers 
of employee benefits resulting from management actions. Con­
vincing workers of management's concern for employee welfare 
seems important also.
Management Practice 3
Table 8.5 shows that 66 percent of the managers and
69 percent of the workers believe that MP3 exists. Based on
2
the range of rejection, X = .33 is not significant and the 
null hypothesis is accepted that managers and workers agree 
that MP3 is a current practice.
Table 8.6 shows that 24 percent of all managers and 43 
percent of all workers believe that MP3 is caused by the union; 
whereas, 42 percent of all managers and 26 percent of all 
workers say that it did not evolve from labor-management
m
TABLE 8.5
MP3: MANAGEMENT IS RELUCTANT
TO LAY OFF AN EMPLOYEE
_______Responses
Group
Managers
Workers
Number
Yes No 
27 14
239 108
Percent
Yes
66
69
No
34
31
Chi Square .33
TABLp 8.6
MP3 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Group
Responses
Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 10 17 24 42 37 63
Workers 148 91 43 26 62 38
Chi Square 7.31
^Based on a sample size of 41 manA 
^Based on a subset of 27 managers
gers and 347 workers 
and 239 workers.
relations. Thus it cannot be concluded from these data that 
management's reluctance to lay off an employee is or is not 
the result of the union.
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Note that 62 percent of the workers who perceive that
MP3 is a practice also believe that it was caused by the
union. About 63 percent of those in the managerial subset dis­
agree, as do 38 percent of the workers. Some workers in the 
38 percent group probably realize, as do most managers, that 
local management and the union have little or no control over 
layoffs. Such actions are usually directed by higher authority. 
The union has no control over who or how many workers will be 
laid off. Its only gain in this area is a contract provision 
requiring management to give employees as much advance notice 
as possible.! Thus, in the final analysis, one must conclude 
that MP3 did not evolve as a result of the union. Considering 
the disagreement reflected by the responses of these groups 
and the range of rejection, = 7.31 is significant; there­
fore, the null hypothesis is rejected. This disparity is 
probably not cause for alarm. As in the case of MP2, the 
union's tendency to assume credit for acts which can be inter­
preted positively may affect the employee's bias in this
matter. However, the worker reeponee may be a further indica­
tion that management needs a program to inform employees of its 
concern for employee welfare. Management should also reaffirm 
its policy of reluctance to lay off an employee.
Management Practice 4
Table 8.7 shows that 95 percent of the managers and 64 
percent of the workers believe that MP4 exists. Thus, it is 
concluded, that management consults with the union on working
^Article 27, Third Base-Wide Agreement.
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conditions and personnel policies and practices. Based on the 
range of rejection, = 14.32 is significant and the null
TABLE 8.7
MP4: MANAGEMENT TALKS WILLINGLY WITH EMPLOYEES
OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ABOUT WORKING 
CONDITIONS OR PERSONNEL POLICIES OR 
PRACTICES
_______Responses________
Group_________________ Number_________Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 39 2 95 5
Workers 224 123 64 35 «’
Chi Square 14<32
hypothesis is rejected. Although both groups believe MP4 
exists, there is enough disparity in their responses to con­
clude that a potential problem exists.
As in the case of MPI a sufficient number of unfair 
labor practices and contract violations have occurred to make 
it obvious that management does not always talk willingly with 
employees or their representatives about working conditions 
or personnel policies or practices. Again, apathy is con­
sidered a contributing factor. It is more likely, however, 
that violations occur because management does not believe 
it is necessary to consult or because it does not want to 
consult. The union believes that management consults because
mthe Executive Order requires it.^ In other words, the union 
believes management does not talk willingly. Some management 
officials expressed the view that management should consult 
only when required to do so. One important official stated 
that managers were paid to make decisions and local union 
officials were ill-prepared to assist them in the decision­
making process. He held that unions were ineffective at the 
local level so labor-management relations should be restricted 
to the national level. These comments suggest that managers 
have not accepted completely the tenet of the Order; that 
is, union participation will improve the administration of 
government.2 Until this idea is accepted, one cannot expect 
labor and management to reach the optimum level of cooperation.
Table 8.8 shows that 46 percent of all managers and 
40 percent of all workers believe that MP4 exists as a result 
of the labor-management relationship. Conversely, 49 percent 
of all managers and 24 percent of all workers disagree. From 
these data, it is inconclusive that MP4 did or did not evolve 
as a result of the labor-management relationship. Historically 
management has met with the union and employees through special 
and monthly meetings.^ The primary purpose of those meetings 
was to obtain union support of management policies and to 
utilize the union as a means of communicating with employees.
^Interviews with union officials.
^The word "union" is inserted here in place of the word 
"employee" because the union is the employee's exclusive rep­
resentative.
^Interview, Bullard and "Labor Relations Reports.”
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TABLE 8.8
MP4 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
1 2 Group Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 19 20 46 49 49 51
Workers 139 85 40 24 62 38
Chi Square 3.05
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
Zsased on subset of 39 managers and 224 workers.
Ultimately these meetings led to actual consultation on person­
nel policies and practices. Thus, it is concluded that MP4 
evolved as a result of labor-management relations.
Managers are rather evenly divided on the issue of how 
consultation evolved, with 51 percent believing that the union 
was not responsible. This suggests that about one-half of the 
managers would involve employees in management decisions even 
if the union was not there. One may also infer that many 
of remaining one-half would not consult with employees or 
unions unless it was required. If this is true then managers 
should benefit from exposure to participative management 
theory.1 Although a majority of those in the worker:subset
Igcanlan defines participative management as "getting 
things done through other people by creating an environment in 
which they develop mental and emotional involvement in a group 
situation which encourages them to contribute to goals and
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believe that MP4 is a result of labor-management relations, 
this opinion is not significantly different from those in the 
managerial subset. Based on the range of rejection, = 3.05 
is not significant and the null hypothesis is accepted.
Management Practice 5 
Table 8.9 shows that 98 percent of the managers and 68 
percent of the workers talk willingly with employees or their 
representatives about grievances. Thus it is concluded that
TABLE 8.9
MP5; MANAGEMENT TALKS WILLINGLY WITH 
EMPLOYEES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES 
ABOUT GRIEVANCES
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 40 1 98 2
Workers 236 111 68 32
Chi Square 14.19
MP5 is a management practice. Based on the range of rejection, 
= 14.19 is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected.
share responsibility for them." Participation should be real 
but not excessive. Advantages of participative management 
include "better quantity and quality, less turnover and 
absenteeism, acceptance of change, fewer grievances, improved 
decisions, and ease of management." Burk K. Scanlan, Principles 
of Management and Organizational Behavior (John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., New York), 19737 p. 29>.
1*6
Although both groups believe that MP5 exists there is enough 
disparity in their responses to conclude that a potential prob­
lem exists.
Grievance and appeal actions processed through agency 
procedures ranged from seventy-three to 115 annually from 1969 
through 1974, During the same period twenty-four complaints 
were processed through the negotiated grievance and arbitra­
tion procedure or the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- 
Management Relations.^ Hundreds of other complaints were 
resolved informally and at lower supervisory levels.
One would expect a high "yes" response from managers 
since they are required to settle grievances at the lowest 
level possible. However/ the fact that hundreds of disputes 
are resolved informally supports the management response. In 
spite of this success, almost one-third of the workers doubt 
management's sincerity. Perhaps fewer grievances and appeals 
would be processed beyond the first supervisory level if 
workers believed management would talk willingly about employee 
problems. It appears that an information program designed to 
inform employees of management's willingness to discuss 
employee problems would be worthwhile as it may result in 
fewer formal complaints.
Table 8.10 shows that 39 percent of all managers and 
50 percent of all workers believe that managers talk willingly
^These data include actions which were initiated for 
processing outside the Air Force but were resolved locally.
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TABLE 8.10
MP5 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
1 2 Group Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 16 24 39 58 40 60
Workers 174 62 50 18 74 26
Chi Square 19.75
gBased on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers 
^Based on subset of 40 managers and 236 workers.
with employees or their representatives about grievances 
because of the union. Conversely, 58 percent of all managers 
and 18 percent of all workers believe the union was not res­
ponsible for MP5. Based on these data one cannot conclude 
that MP5 evolved as a result of labor-management relations, 
but it is possible that it did not.
Other information is also inconclusive. Although the 
agency grievance and appeal system was the only system avail­
able to employees from 1930-1962,^ it does not follow neces­
sarily that managers talked willingly with workers. Thus it 
cannot be said conclusively that MP5 did not evolve as a result 
of the union merely because an agency grievance system has
^Van Riper, p. 439.
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existed since 1930. Interviews with management and union 
officials were also inconclusive since opinion was divided as 
to the cause of MP5. Without additional data the author con­
cludes that MP5 is not a result of the labor-management rela­
tionship because it is a practice that most managers would 
follow merely from an interest in the employees' welfare.
It is intuitively obvious that management and worker 
views are significantly different as 74 percent of the workers 
and 40 percent of the managers who perceive that MP5 exists 
believe that it exists as a result of the union. Eased on 
the region of rejection, = 19.75 is significant and the 
null hypothesis is rejected. One may infer that since a large 
percentage of these workers believe MP5 exists because of the 
union, they also believe MP3 would not exist without the 
union. This supports the earlier contention that workers 
doubt management's sincerity in dealing with employee problems.
Management Practice 6
Table 8.11 shows that 95 percent of the managers and 
78 percent of the workers do not believe that management 
converts positions from civilian to military to avoid dealing 
with unions. Thus it is concluded that MP6 is not a manage­
ment practice. Based on the range of rejection, = 7.72 
is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. Although 
only 5 percent of the managers and 22 percent of the workers 
agree that MP6 is followed by management, the difference in 
the proportion of agreement is significant. The question is
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TABLE 8.11
MP6: MANAGEMENT CONVERTS POSITIONS FROM
CIVILIAN TO MILITARY TO AVOID 
DEALING WITH UNIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 2 39 5 95
Workers 76 271 22 78
Chi Square 7.72
why almost one-fourth of the workers believe MP6 is a practice. 
Perhaps this result, considered with responses to other ques­
tions thus far, suggests that management needs an information 
program to publicize its concern for employees. Certainly, 
management needs to insure that positions are classified properly,
Management Practice 7 
Table 8.12 shows that 76 percent of the managers and 
58 percent of the workers believe that MP7 is a management 
practice. Thus, it is concluded that management coordinates 
job and reorganization changes with the union prior to the 
effective date of change. Based on the range of rejection,
= 4.06 is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Although both groups believe MP7 exists, there is enough 
disparity in their responses to conclude that a potential 
problem exists.
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TABLE 8.12
MP7: DOWNGRADING RECLASSIFICATION OF JOB LEVEL
CHANGE OF JOB DESCRIPTION, OR REORGANIZATION 
IS DISCUSSED WITH THE UNION PRIOR TO THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CHANGE
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 31 10 76 24
Workers 201 146 58 42
Chi Square 4.06
Since MP7 is required in the labor contract^ it is 
interesting that about one-fourth of the managers do not con­
sider it a practice. Also, since 42 percent of the workers 
do not think MP 7 exists, management should examine the situa­
tion to determine if managers are aware of and are following 
the practice.
Table 8.13 shows that 73 percent of all managers and 
50 percent of all workers believe that MP7 is a result of labor- 
management relations. Thus, the data are inconclusive. The 
requirement of MP7 by the labor contract, union inroads into 
joint-decision making, the union's perceived role as the pro­
tector of employee rights and enforcer of the contract, and 
interviews with management officials support the contention 
that MP7 evolved from the labor-management relationship.
^Third Base-Wide Agreement.
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TABLE 8.13
MP7 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
1 2 
Group Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes Yes No
Managers 30 1 73 2 97 3
Workers 172 29 50 8 86 14
Chi Square 2.08
^Based on sample   ____^__________  ___
^Based on subset of 31 managers and 201 workers.
mple size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
It is interesting that 97 percent of the managers and 
86 percent of the workers who believe MP7 exists also believe 
the practice is a result of the union. With observed frequen­
cies of A = 30, B = 1, C = 172, and D = 29, the expected 
frequencies become A = 27, B = 4, C = 175, and D = 26.^ Since 
B is less than 5, the chi square test in this instance is 
meaningless.
Management Practice 8
Table 8.14 shows that 93 percent of the managers and 
53 percent of the workers believe that management considers 
employee needs and desires when acting on working conditions
^OIOC, Merrell Expected Frequency Program, Headquarters 
Air University, USAF, December 11, 1974. See Appendix 4 for 
complete data.
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TABLE 8.14
MPB: MANAGEMENT CONSIDERS EMPLOYEE NEEDS AND
DESIRES WHEN ACTING ON WORKING CONDITIONS 
OR PERSONNEL POLICIES OR PRACTICES
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 38 3 93 7
Workers 184 163 53 47
Chi Square 21.97
or personnel policies or practices. It is concluded that MP8 
exists. Although both groups believe MP8 is a management 
practice, the difference in the proportion of their responses 
results in a X of 21.97 and causes a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. This suggests that a potential problem exists.
Since 47 percent of the workers believe that MP8 is 
not a practice, some managers may be insensitive in the area 
of human relations, or ineffective as human resource managers. 
These data seem to reinforce an earlier suggestion that WRAMA 
managers need additional training in leadership to supplement 
their technical management skills.
Table 8.15 shows that the responses of those who 
believe MP8 exists and also believe it was caused by the union 
account for 29 percent of all managers and 26 percent of all 
workers. The negative responses account for 63 percent of all
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TABLE 8.15
MPB EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Group Number
Responses
Percent'' Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 12 26 29 63 32 68
Workers 92 92 26 26 50 50
Chi Square 5.06
Ipased on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
Based on subset of 38 managers and 184 workers.
managers and 26 percent of all workers. From these data, it 
cannot be concluded that MP8 resulted from the labor-management 
relationship; however, it is possible that it did not. Thus, 
it is necessary to consider additional information to deter­
mine if MP8 was caused by the union.
Interviews with management and union officials lead to 
the conclusion that MP8 is not a result of labor-management 
relations. However, the union insists that management some­
times makes the wrong decisions concerning employee needs. 
However, the presence of the union will insure that MP8 
continues.^
^Interviews with Sullivan, Bullard, Maddox, and Gibbs.
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Management convictions that MP8 exists are stronger than 
management convictions that it did not result from labor- 
management relations. Workers are almost evenly divided on 
each issue. Considering only those who believe MP8 exists, 68 
percent of the managers and 50 percent of the workers believe 
that it did not evolve as a result of the union. Based on the 
range of rejection, = 5.06 is significant and the null hypo­
thesis is rejected. Thus, opinions of these managers and 
workers are significantly different.
Since about one-third of those in the managerial subset 
believe MPB evolved as a result of the union, this may infer 
that they would not be as concerned about employee needs and 
desires if the union was not present. Employees seem to sup­
port this contention as 50 percent believe MP8 is a result of 
the union. Again, it is suggested that WRAMA managers need 
additional leadership training.
Management Practice 9
Table 8.16 shows that 83 percent of the managers and 
65 percent of the workers believe management selects employees 
for release during a RIP^ in the fairest way possible. Thus 
it is concluded that MP9 is a management practice. Based on 
the range of rejection, X = 4.34 is significant and the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Although both groups believe MP9 is 
a practice, there is enough disparity in their responses to 
conclude that a potential problem exists.
^Reduction-1n-Force.
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TABLE 8.16
MP9: WHEN A RIF OCCURS, MANAGEMENT SELECTS EMPLOYEES
FOR RELEASE IN THE FAIREST WAY POSSIBLE
_______Responses_______
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 34 7 83 17
Workers 227 120 65 35
Chi Square 4.34
Union officials believe that one of the major roles of 
the union is to insure fair and equitable treatment of employ­
ees. This attitude is reflected in their concern for fair 
selection under the merit promotion system. Although union 
officials believe that management adheres to merit principles 
generally, enough violations and promotions of "buddies" occur 
to cause much union criticism of the merit system.^ This con­
cern over equity is probably reflected in the 35 percent who 
do not believe management selects employees for release in the 
fairest way possible.
Management's 17 percent "no" response is perhaps a 
greater cause for alarm. Why would not all managers believe 
that employees are selected in the fairest way possible? The 
management response may indicate that union concern is justified
^Interviews with union officials.
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or that selection procedures need improvement. At the very 
least management should examine the procedures to insure that 
they are adequate.
Table 8.17 shows that the responses of those who believe
TABLE 8.17
MP9 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
1 2 
Group Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 12 22 29 54 35 65
Workers 133 94 38 27 58.6 41.4
Chi Square 7.48
^Based on samplt 
^Based on subset of 34 managers and 227 workers.
e size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
MP9 exists and also believe it evolved from labor-management 
relations account for 29 percent of all managers and 38 percent 
of all workers. Conversely, their responses that MP9 did not 
result from the union account for 54 percent of all managers 
and 27 percent of all workers. It is possible, therefore, 
that MP9 is not a result of the union, but it is inconclusive 
that it evolved from the union. Thus, it is necessary to con­
sider additional information to determine if MP9 was caused 
by the union.
%T)9
Interviews with union and management officials lead to 
the conclusion that MP9 is not a result of the labor-management 
relationship.1 However, the union has assumed that one of its 
major functions is to insure fair and equitable treatment of 
employees. Union presence will insure that MP9 continues.
Considering only those who believe MP9 exists, 65 per­
cent of the managers believe MP9 did not evolve from labor- 
management relations and 58.6 percent of the workers believe 
it did. Based on the range of rejection, X = 7.48 is signifi­
cant and the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the opinions 
of these managers and workers are significantly different.
It is difficult to assess why more managers did not 
reject the possibility that the union is responsible for fair 
selection in a RIF. Is it possible many managers believe 
union presence is necessary to insure equitable treatment of 
employees by management?
Management Practice 10
Table 8.18 shows that 73 percent of the managers and 
48 percent of the workers believe that MPIO is a management 
practice. Thus, it is possible that management downgrades 
only those positions which should be at a lower skill level. 
Based on the range of rejection, = 8.43 is significant 
and the null hypothesis is rejected. The chi square test 
confirms the obvious disagreement between the groups.
^Ibid.
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TABLE 8.18
MPIO: MANAGEMENT DOWNGRADES ONLY THOSE POSITIONS
WHICH SHOULD BE AT A LOWER SKILL LEVEL
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 30 11 73 27
Workers 166 181 48 52
Chi Square 8.43
The managers who say MPIO is not a practice, 27 percent, 
may realize that many positions are downgraded in an arbitrary 
manner. Budget reductions are often the cause. By the time 
the effect of a reduction in the budget of the Department of 
Defense filters through each echelon of command, a division 
chief or branch chief may be told that certain positions are 
being deleted or downgraded because of a shortage of funds. 
Similar actions may occur because of special programs. A 
current program which is designed to produce job openings for 
members of minority groups requires that a position be down­
graded one skill level if it becomes vacant. Classification 
audits to determine which positions can be downgraded with the 
least effect on the mission are disregarded when such actions 
are caused by budget reductions or special programs.
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Note that workers are about evenly divided as 52 per­
cent said MPIO was not a practice. Some of this group may be 
aware of the arbitrary manner in which positions are downgraded 
when budget reductions or special programs are involved.
Other workers may agree with union officials who believe 
supervisors protect their "buddies" by exaggerating job res­
ponsibilities and tasks in position descriptions.^ If this 
supposition is true, the annual classification audit may result 
in the grade reduction of the wrong positions. If union 
officials are correct, this may account for a substantial number 
of the 52 percent who believe MPIO is not a practice.
In spite of these exceptions, management and union 
officials agree that, generally, management downgrades only 
those positions which should be at a lower level. It is also 
advisable that top management reemphasize that MPIO will be 
adhered to closely. Special emphasis to classification 
analysts and all supervisory personnel is appropriate. A 
management information program which publicizes this procedure
Interview with union officials. Note: Grade classi­
fication is primarily a function of the tasks and responsibili­
ties which are contained in the job description. Thus, a skilled 
writer who is willing to devote the time and effort can usually 
justify a particular grade by exaggerating the tasks and res­
ponsibilities of the job. Obviously, only so much time can be 
devoted to writing job descriptions. Thus, a supervisor who 
justifies a higher but improper grade for a "buddy" must devote 
less time to the justification of other positions. Consequently, 
some of the positions may be minimally justified. This, in 
turn, may result in their downgrade during the annual classifi­
cation audit.
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should help dispell any fear of special treatment and improve 
employee-management relations.
Table 8.19 shows that responses of those who believe 
MPIO exists and also believe it evolved from labor-management 
relations account for 15 percent of all managers and 24 percent
TABLE 8.19
MPIO EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent-' Percent'
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 6 24 15 58 20 80
Workers 83 83 24 24 50 50
Chi Square 10.47
Ipased on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
^Based on subset of 30 managers and 166 workers.
of all workers. Conversely, their responses that MPIO is not 
a result of the union account for 58 percent of all managers 
and 24 percent of all workers. Thus, from thpse data it is 
possible that if MPIO is a practice it is not a result of the 
union. But, it is inconclusive that it evolved from labor- 
management relations. Thus, it is necessary to consider addi­
tional information to determine if MPIO was caused by the union.
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Comments from management and union officials lead the 
author to conclude that MPIO did not evolve from the labor- 
management relationship. Annual audits of positions have been 
conducted for many years and it is to management's advantage 
to grade the positions properly. Positions graded too high 
will result in unnecessary costs. Positions graded too low 
will result in extra costs because of high attrition rates. 
However, union presence may insure that an equitable and 
accurate job audit system continues.
Considering’ only those who believe MPIO exists, 20 
percent of the managers believe the union is responsible and 
80 percent believe it is not. Workers are evenly divided on
g
the issue. Based on the range of rejection, X = 10.47 is 
significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the 
opinions of these managers and workers are significantly dif­
ferent. This disagreement reaffirms the earlier suggestion that 
management needs to insure that positions are classified prop­
erly. Union presence should not be required to insure proper 
job audits.
Management Practice 11
Table 8.20 shows that 95 percent of the managers and 
83 percent of the workers believe that management considers 
employee needs and desires when granting leave. It is con­
cluded that MPll is a practice. Based on the range of rejec­
tion, = 3.33 is not gignificant^and the null hypothesis is 
accepted. Note that the disparity in agreement is not signifi­
cant even though the union attempted to create an issue over
mTABLE 8.20
MPll: MANAGEMENT TAKES EMPLOYEES NEED AND
DESIRES INTO ACCOUNT WHEN GRANTING LEAVE
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes Yes No
Managers 39 2 95 5
Workers 287 60 83 17
Chi Square 3.33
the AFLC policy of closing the base for one week during the 
Christmas holiday season. The union filed an unfair labor 
practice complaint and publicized the issue in the union news­
paper .
Table 8.21 shows that the responses of those who
TABLE 8.21
MPll EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Group
Responses
Number Percent Percent'
Yes Yes No Yes No
Managers 11 29 27 68 28 72
Workers 130 157 38 45 45 55
Chi Square 4.81
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
^Based on subset of 39 workers and 287 workers.
^The Robins Review, Warner Robins GA, September 16, 1974
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believe MPll exists and that the union is responsible for the 
practice account for 27 percent of all managers and 38 percent 
of all workers. The "no" vote is more conclusive; it accounts 
for 68 percent of the managers and 45 percent of the workers.
It is concluded from these data that it is possible that MPll 
did not result from the union; and it is inconclusive that it 
evolved as a result of the union. Thus, it is necessary to 
consider additional information to determine if MPll was caused 
by the union.
According to management and union officials, leave 
policy at Robins has always considered employee needs and 
desires. Thus, it is concluded that MPll did not evolve as 
a result of the labor-management relationship. Nevertheless, 
such policies are now clearly stated in the labor contract and 
are enforceable by the union. Thus, union presence will 
insure that the practice continues.
The responses of those in the subsets indicate that 72 
percent of the managers and 55 percent of the workers in the 
subsets do not believe that the practice evolved from the labor- 
management relationship. Based on the range of rejection,
= 4.81 is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Although the majority of both groups said "no," the proportion 
of agreement is significantly different. The union's tendency 
to assume credit for employee benefits may explain why as 
many as 45 percent of the workers believe MPll evolved from 
labor-management relations.
4 #
Management Practice 12 
Table 8.22 shows that 37 percent of the managers and 
69 percent of the workers think management assigns menial tasks 
to employees. It is possible, therefore, that MP12 is a
TABLE 8.22
MP12: EMPLOYEES ARE DETAILED TO MENIAL
TASKS SUCH AS CLEANUP DETAILS
Responses
Groups Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 15 26 37 63
Workers 239 108 69 31
Chi Square 18.37
practice at Robins. The chi square test confirms that the 
disagreement is significantly different: based on the range
of rejection, = 18.37 is significant and the null hypothesis 
is rejected.
Since the labor agreement protects employees from such 
details,^ the author must conclude that MP12 is not a practice. 
The union can file a complaint each time a violation occurs
^Section A, Supplement 1, Second Base-Wide Agreement 
and Article 41, Third Base-Wide Agreement. The requirement 
in the labor agreement that employees beassigned duties 
commensurate with their skills may account for the high 
negative response of managers.
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and thus prevent any widespread practice of assigning employees 
to menial tasks. Violations occur infrequently and must be 
considered exceptions.
Major General Holland, upon being informed by the union 
president that machinists^ were picking up paper, ordered the 
activity to cease immediately. It seems that the commander 
had instructed his staff to get the base cleaned up in prépara- 
tion for a visit from a high ranking official. The union 
concedes that menial details occur infrequently but it is 
common to use highly skilled workers on the details. The 
union considers these details to be demeaning and points out 
that it is not cost effective to use highly skilled workers 
on such projects.
In spite of the conclusion that MP12 is not a practice, 
69 percent of the workers believe it is. Top management should 
reemphasize to all supervisors that skilled workers will not 
be assigned menial tasks. An information program should pub­
licize this procedure to dispel the erroneous impressions of 
workers.
Table 8.23 shows that the responses of those who 
believe MP12 is a practice and that it evolved as a result of 
labor-management relations account for 20 percent of all
^According to Maj Gen Holland, cleanup details were 
composed of machinist helpers.
p
It is not uncommon for staff officers to over-react 
to suggestions or even hints by general officers. Reactions 
to orders or requests are especially swift emd thorough.
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TABLE 8.23
MPI2 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent^ Percent^
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 8 7 20 17 53 47
Workers 80 159 23 46 34. 66
Chi Square 1.66
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
^Based on subset of 15 managers and 239 workers.
managers and 23 percent of all workers. Conversely# their 
responses indicating that the union is not responsible for 
the practice account for 17 percent of all managers and 46 
percent of all workers. Thus, the results are inconclusive. 
Intuitively, it is unlikely that the union would cause manage­
ment to adopt this practice unless the labor-management 
relations were poor and the parties were engaged in hostile 
and recriminatory acts.
Considering these responses only in relation to the 
number who perceive the existence of the practice, managers 
are about evenly divided as to its cause, although 53 percent 
think the union is responsible. Conversely, 66 percent of 
the workers in the subset say the practice is not connected 
with the union. Based on the range of rejection and a
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of 1.66, the null hypothesis is accepted. The difference of 
opinion is not statistically significant.
In the final analysis a conclusion regarding cause is 
not applicable because the author has concluded that MP12 is 
not a practice. If MP12 did exist, it would not be as a result 
of the union because there is no pronounced hostility between 
the union and management. Certainly management should insure 
that skilled employees are not assigned to menial details.
This will permit more efficient employment of labor and avoid 
the costs of processing complaints concerning menial assign­
ments .
Management Practice 13 
Table 8.24 shows that MP13 is a management practice as
TABLE 8.24
MPI3: WHEN NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE UNION 
MANAGEMENT MAKES SEVERAL PROPOSALS AND COUNTER 
PROPOSALS ON EACH ARTICLE BEFORE STATING 
ITS REAL POSITION
_______Responses_______
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 27 14 66 34
Workers 275 72 79 21
Chi Square 4.63
220
66 percent of the managers and 79 percent of the workers res­
ponded "yes.” Based on the range of rejection = 4.63 is 
significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. Although both 
agree that MP13 is a practice, the proportion of their responses 
is significantly different.
Most respondents know very little about the negotiating 
strategy of management.^ So this answer, more than any other, 
reflects what they think is probably true, rather than their 
actual experience or knowledge. Apparently some of the mana­
gers do not realize that various proposals and counter propo­
sals by management and labor constitute an acceptable practice 
in collective bargaining.
Table 8.25 shows that the response of those who believe
TABLE 8.25
MP13 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
______________ Responses____________
Group Number Percent^ Percent^
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 23 4 56 10 85 15
Workers 225 50 65 14 82 18
Chi Square .03
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers 
Based on subset of 27 managers and 275 workers.
^Based upon statements of respondents to the author.
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MP13 exists and that it evolved as a result of labor-management 
relations account for 56 percent of all managers and 65 percent 
of all workers. It is concluded that the practice of bargain­
ing by a series of proposals and counter proposals is a result 
of the labor-management relationship. Considering these res­
ponses only in relation to the number who perceive the exis­
tence of the practice, 85 percent of the managers and 82 per­
cent of the workers believe MPI3 evolved as a result of the 
union. Based on the range of rejection, = .03 is not sig­
nificant and the null hypothesis is accepted.
Management Practice 14 
Table 8.26 shows that 95 percent of the managers and
TABLE 8.26
MPI4: EMPLOYEES ARE PROVIDED SPECIAL TOOLS
IF SUCH ITEMS ARE REQUIRED 
ON THE JOB
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 39 2 95 5
Workers 293 54 84 16
Chi Square 2.58
84 percent of the workers believe management provides special 
tools and clothing. It is concluded that MP14 is a management 
practice. Based on the range of rejection, X = 2.58 is not
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significant and the null hypothesis is accepted. Some workers 
stated that management does not provide enough special tools 
and equipment. Perhaps management should examine this situation 
more closely.
Table 8.27 shows that the responses of those who believe
TABLE 8,27
MP14 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
_____________ Responses ____ _____
1 2Group Number Percent Percent
Yes H2. Yes No Yes No
Managers 14 25 34 61 36 64
Workers 150 143 43 41 51 49
Chi Square 3.86 i
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
Zsased on subset of 39 managers and 293 workers.
MP14 exists and that it evolved from the labor-management 
relationship represent 34 percent of all managers and 43 per­
cent of all workers. Conversely, their negative responses 
represent 61 percent of all managers and 41 percent of all 
workers. Thus, it is possible that MPI4 is not a result of 
the union; it is inconclusive that the union is responsible 
for MP14. Thus, it is necessary to consider additional 
information to determine if MP14 was caused by the union.
Based on interviews with management and union officials 
and an analysis of the labor agreements, it is concluded that
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MP14 did not evolve from the labor-management relationship. 
Furnishing special tools and clothing is an Air Force require­
ment . ^
Considering these responses only in relation to the 
number who perceived the existence of the practice, 51 percent 
of the workers believe the union is responsible for MP14 and 
64 percent of the managers disagree. Based on the range of 
rejection, X = 3.86 is significant and the null hypothesis 
is rejected. Note that workers are about evenly divided on 
the question as 49 percent agree with management. The union's 
tendency to claim credit for employee benefits may explain 
why many believe the practice evolved from labor-management 
relations.
Management Practice 15
Table 8.28 shows that 93 percent of the managers and 
62 percent of the workers believe that management attempts to 
assign overtime equitably and considers employee desires in 
allocating overtime. It is concluded that MP15 is a manage­
ment practice. Based on the range of rejection, = 13.48 
is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. Although 
both groups agree that MP15 is a practice, the proportion of 
their responses is significantly different.
A high percentage of workers, 38 percent, reject the 
notion that MP15 is a practice. This infers that some managers
"The employer agreed to furnish tools, clothing, and 
equipment, as required by Air Force directives," Article 19, 
First and Second Base-Wide Agreement'^V~and Article 38, Third 
Base-Wide Agreement.
TABLE 8.28
MP15: MANAGEMENT CONSIDERS EMPLOYEE DESIRES
WHEN ASSIGNING OVERTIME TO QUALIFIED 
EMPLOYEES AND ATTEMPTS TO ASSIGN 
OVERTIME EQUITABLY
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 38 3 93 7
Workers 217 130 62 38
Chi Square 13.48
may not be considering employee desires and assigning overtime 
equitably. Since one unfair labor practice complaint has been 
filed on this subject, management may wish to emphasize the 
proper procedures for allocating overtime.^
The data in Table 8.29 are inconclusive that MP15 
evolved from the labor-management relationship but show that 
it is possible that the union is not responsible for the prac­
tice. The responses of the managers who perceive that MP15 
is a practice but not a result of the union represent 56 percent 
of all managers. However, interviews with management and 
union officials and an analysis of the labor contracts^
^As prescribed in Article 10, Third Base-Wide Agreement.
^Article 17, First and Second Base-Wide Agreement and 
Article 10, Third Base^Wide Agreement.
TABLE 8.29
MP15 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent^ Percent^
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 15 23 37 56 40 60
Workers 117 100 34 29 54 46
Chi Square 3.31
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
^Based on subset of 38 managers and 217 workers'.
indicate that the union is responsible for MP15. Of course, 
it may be said that management has attempted to assign over­
time equitability for many years. But the difference is that 
union criteria for equitable allocation are now stipulated in 
the labor agreement.
Considering the responses only in relation to the 
number who believe the practice exists, workers are divided 
rather evenly as only 54 percent believe the union is respon­
sible for the practice; whereas, 60 percent of the managers 
do not agree with this contention. Since X = 3,31 is not 
within the range of rejection, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
The disagreement between workers and managers is not statis­
tically significant. This appears to be an encroachment by 
the union into the management right of assigning work.
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Management Practice 16 
Table 8.30 shows that MP16 is a practice, as 93 percent 
of the managers and 70 percent of the workers answered affir­
matively. As 30 percent of the workers disagree, some managers
TABLE 8.30
MP16; UPON REQUEST EMPLOYEES ARE ADVISED IF 
THEY WERE CONSIDERED FOR PROMOTION AND IF 
SO, THEIR RANK ORDER ON THE REGISTER
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 38 3 93 7
Workers 244 103 70 30
Chi Square 8.15
may not be complying with this practice. This disagreement is 
reflected in a of 8.15 and the rejection of the null 
hypothesis.
The data in Table 8.31 are inconclusive that MP16 
evolved from the labor-management relationship but show that 
it is possible that the union is not responsible for the prac­
tice. The responses of the managers who perceive that MP16 
is a practice but not the result of the union represent 54 
percent of all managers. However, interviews with management 
and union officials and an analysis of the labor contract^
^Article 28, Base-Wide Agreements.
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TABLE 8.31
MPI6 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT
OP LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes
Managers 16 22 39 54 42 58
Workers 152 92 44 26 62 38
Chi Square 6.04
Isased on sample size of 41 managers and 244 workers. 
^Based on subset of 38 managers and 244 workers.
indicate that the union is responsible for MP16. Promotions 
are a sensitive issue to union officials. This practice is 
a further attempt by the union to insure fair selections and 
to police the merit promotion system.^
Considering the responses only in relation to the 
number who believe the practice exists, 62 percent of the 
workers believe the practice is a result of the union. Only 
42 percent of the managers agree. Thus, % = 6.04 is within
the range of rejection and the null hypothesis is rejected.
In view of the complexity of the merit system and the latitude 
for selections, it is no wonder that confusion exists. There 
is agreement, however, that publication of merit procedures 
in the labor contract has enabled greater understanding of the
^Interview, Maddox.
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system.1 This appears to be a positive result of the labor- 
management relationship.
Management Practice 17 
Table 8.32 shows that MP17 is a practice as 80 percent 
of the managers and 75 percent of the workers answered "yes."
TABLE 8.32
MP17: AN EMPLOYEE IS NOT REQUIRED TO FURNISH A
DOCTOR'S STATEMENT AS PROOF OF ILLNESS UNLESS 
THE EMPLOYEE IS SUSPECTED OF ABUSING 
THE PRIVILEGE
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 33 8 80 20
Workers 261 86 75 25
Chi Square .031
The null hypothesis is accepted as = .031 is outside the 
range of rejection. The "no" responses of 20 percent of the 
managers and 25 percent of the workers may indicate that 
some managers are requiring medical statements when they are 
not required. Since this can result in a contract violation 
charge, management may want to direct managers to review 
Article 13 of the Third Base-Wide Agreement.
^Interviews with management and union officials.
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The data in Table 8.33 are inconclusive that MP17 , 
evolved from the labor-management relationship but show that 
it is possible that the union is. .not responsible for the prac­
tice. The responses of the managers who perceive that MP17 is
TABLE 8.33
MP17 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT 
OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
1 2 Group Number Percent Percent
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 12 21 29 51 36 64
Workers 139 122 40 35 53 47
Chi Square 4.06
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
^Based on subset of 33 managers and 261 workers.
a practice but is not the result of the union represent 51 
percent of all managers.
However, interviews with management and union officials 
and an analysis of the labor contract^ indicate that the union 
is responsible for MP17. It is obvious that the union regards 
"proof of illness" as a sensitive issue because management is 
required to go to extraordinary lengths to continue asking an 
employee for medical certification. This is another instance
^Article 31, First and Second Base-Wide Agreements and 
Article 13, Third Base-Wide Agreement.
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of the union's ability to obtain management action concerning 
an issue of interest to employees.
Management Practice 18 
Table 8.34 shows that MP18 is a practice as 90 percent 
of the managers and 76 percent of the workers responded "yes." 
Based on the range of rejection = 3.58 is not significant 
and the null hypothesis is accepted. As discussed in Chapter
TABLE 8.34
MPI8: MANAGEMENT ADVISES EMPLOYEES IN WRITING AT 
LEAST TWO WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF CHANGES IN HOURS 
OF WORK AND TOURS OF DUTY
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 37 4 90 10
Workers 263 84 76 24
Chi Square 3.58
VII MP18 is required by the contract. MP18 must be considered 
a substantive union gain into the area of joint-decision 
making. However, management does not always follow this pro­
cedure. As a consequence several contract violations have 
been filed.^ This suggests that management needs to emphasize 
the procedure concerning changes in duty hours.
^Interview, Sullivan. Also, refer to the section: 
"Union Complaints," Chapter VI.
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Table 8.35 shows that MPIB evolved as a result of 
labor-management relations. The responses of those who believe 
MP18 exists and that the union is responsible for the practice
TABLE 8.35
MP18 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent^
2
Percent
Yes No les No Yes No
Managers 27 10 66 24 73 27
Workers 201 62 58 18 76 24
Chi Square .44
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers.
^Based on subset of 37 managers and 263 workers.
account for 66 percent of all managers and 58 percent of all 
workers. Considering these responses only in relation to the 
number who are aware of the practice, 73 percent of the man­
agers and 76 percent of the workers believe the union is res­
ponsible for MP18. Based on the range of rejection, = .44 
is not significant and the null hypothesis is accepted. This 
is another instance of union encroachment into the management 
right of assigning work.
Management Practice 19 
Table 8.36 shows that 63 percent of the workers believe 
that MP19 is a practice; whereas, 71 percent of the managers
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TABLE 8.36
MP19; WHEN NEGOTIATING, MANAGEMENT DOES NOT GIVE 
UP ANYTHING TO EMPLOYEES IF IT CAN BE AVOIDED
_______ Responses ______
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 12 29 29 71
Workers 219 128 63 37
Chi Square 18.87
disagree. One can conclude from this data that it is possible 
that MP19 exists and it is possible that MP19 does not exist. 
Based on the region of rejection, X = 18.87 is significant 
and the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, the disagreement 
between managers and workers is confirmed.
This practice is similar to MP13 in that most mana­
gers and workers have little actual knowledge of management's 
negotiating strategy. However, in the case of MP19, indivi­
duals are able to form opinions based on their knowledge of 
the contract. Air Force directives, and employee benefits.
One may interpret the large "no" response of managers, 
71 percent, as an opinion that management has made substantial 
concessions to the union. An analysis of the base-wide agree­
ments in Chapter VII supports this contention. Substantive 
gains by the union would be expected in the first decade of 
good faith bargaining. Since management began the relationship
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with labor in a relatively strong position it could easily 
concede a few things in "good faith" during major negotiating 
sessions. This does not mean that MP19 is non-existent. Indeed 
the Labor-Relations Officer has described management's attitude 
as reluctantly cooperative. The objective is to retain all 
rights possible without union interference. Management's 
negotiating strategy is to (1) give nothing, (2) give a little 
to get something in return, (3) present a final alternative 
before mediation, and (4) accept a mediation compromise or an 
impasse as appropriate. Based on this information, it is con­
cluded that MP19 is a management practice.^
TABLE 8.37
MP19 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Group
Responses
Number Percent’' Percent'
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 12 0 29 0 100 0
Workers 125 94 36 27 57 43
Chi Square 124.77
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
^Based on subset of 12 managers and 219 workers.
The responses of those who perceive that MP19 is a 
practice and also believe it evolved from the labor-management
^Interview, Sullivan. Note; Sullivan is the chief 
negotiator for management.
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relationship account for 29 percent of all managers and 36 
percent of all workers. The "no" responses account for 0 per­
cent of all managers and 27 percent of all workers. Thus it 
is inconclusive from these data whether or not IIP 19 evolved 
from the labor-management relationship. Intuitively, however, 
it is obvious that a practice which is an integral part of 
labor-management relations was developed on the basis of those 
relations.
Considering only the groups who perceive that MP19 
is a practice, all of the managers and 57 percent of the wor­
kers believe it is a result of the union. The chi square 
test in this instance is not meaningful since the expected 
frequency for cell B is less than 5. Expected frequencies 
are A = 7.1, B = 4.9, C = 129.9, and D = 89.1.^ However, it 
is intuitively obvious that labor and management views in 
this instance are significantly different. This difference 
should not cause any unfavorable consequences.
Management Practice 20
Table 8.38 shows that MP20 is a practice as 88 percent 
of the managers and 72 percent of the workers answered affirm­
atively. However, the null hypothesis is rejected because 
X = 3.92 is greater than 3.84. Although both groups agree 
that MP20 is a practice the proportion of their responses 
is significantly different. In the author's judgment the 
difference of opinion should not cause unfavorable consequences,
^Merrell Expected Frequency Program.
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TABLE 8.38
MP20; MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ARE TRAINED
IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Group
Responses
Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 36 5 88 12
Workers 250 97 72 28
Chi Square 3.92
Table 8.39 shows that the response of those who per­
ceive that MP20 is a practice and also believe it evolved from
TABLE 8.39
MP20 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent Percent'
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 22 14 54 34 61 39
Workers 192 58 55 17 77 23
Chi Square 4.99
^Based on a sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
^Based on subset of 36 managers and 250 workers.
the labor-management relationship account for 54 percent of all 
managers and 55 percent of all workers. Thus it is concluded
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that MP20 evolved as a result of the union. Although the "yes" 
responses do not represent a significant majority, elementary 
logic supports the conclusion. A practice which is an integral 
part of labor-management relations was developed on the basis 
of those relations.
Considering only the groups who perceive that managers 
are trained in labor-management relations, 61 percent of the 
managers and 77 percent of the workers believe the practice 
is a result of the union. Based on the range of rejection,
= 4.99 is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Although both groups agree, the proportion of their response 
is significantly different. This difference of opinion should 
not cause unfavorable consequences.
Management Practice 21 
Table 8.40 shows that 76 percent of the managers and 
57 percent of the workers believe that management sponsors 
training in labor-management relations for union stewards.
Thus it is concluded that MP21 is a practice. Based on the 
range of rejection = 4.48 is significant and the null hypo­
thesis is rejected. The author can visualize no unfavorable 
consequence from this disparity in agreements between managers 
and workers. But management might improve its image by pub­
licizing the practice.
Table 8.41 shows that the responses of those who 
perceive that MP21 is a practice and also believe that it 
evolved from the labor-management relationship account for 63
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TABLE 8.40
MP21: MANAGEMENT SPONSORS TRAINING LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS FOR UNION STEWARDS
Responses
Group
Managers
Workers
Number 
Yes No 
31 10
198 149
Percent
Yes
76
57
No
24
43
Chi Square 4.48
TABLE 8.41
MP21 EXISTS AND IT EVOLVED AS A 
r e su lt OF LAB0R-I4ANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent"' Percent'
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 26 5 63 12 84 16
Workers 184 14 53 4 93 7
Chi Square 4.20
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
^Based on subset of 31 managers and 198 workers.
percent of the managers and 53 percent of the workers. Accord­
ingly, it is concluded that MP21 is a result of labor-manage­
ment relations. Again, this conclusion is supported by elemen­
tary logic.
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Considering only the groups who perceive that MP21 is a 
practice, 84 percent of the managers and 93 percent of the 
workers believe it is a result of the union. The chi square 
test is not meaningful in this instance since the expected fre­
quency for cell B is less than 5. Expected frequencies are 
A = 28.4, B = 2.6, C = 181.6, and D = 16.4.^ Assuming a dis­
parity of agreement, the author can discern no unfavorable con­
sequence .
Table 8.42 is a summary of the analysis of manager and 
worker responses concerning the existence and cause of manage­
ment practices at Robins AFB.
General Hypothesis 2
The next question involves an assessment of the overall 
impact of labor-management relations on management practices. 
This may be stated as General Hypothesis 2: Managers and
workers believe the management practices have improved since 
1962 as a result of the labor-management relationship.
In order to test the hypothesis, the following state­
ment was constructed: Generally, management practices have
improved since a Presidential Executive Order in 1962 author­
ized employees to join unions. Managers and workers then 
answered a two part question: (1) Have management practices
improved? and (2) (Did this occur as a) Result of the union?
As indicated in the research model, if the majority of both
llbid.
TABLE 8.42
A SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES
MP
Majority of 
all Managers 
and all 
Workers :
MP Exists
Majority of 
all Managers 
and all 
Workers ; MP 
Exists and 
it is Result 
of Union
OF MANAGERS
Majority of 
Manager and 
Worker Sub­
set; MP 
Exists and 
it.is Result 
of Union
AND WORKERS
Null HO; 
Managers 
and Workers 
Agree MP 
Exists
Null HO; 
Manager 
and Worker 
Subset Agree 
MP Exists 
and it is 
Result of 
Union
Final 
Conclusion 
MP Exists
Final 
Conclusion 
MP Result 
of Union
1 Yes Yes Yes Reject Reject Yes Yes
2 Yes Yes-Possible Yes, No- 
Possible
Accept Reject Yes No
3 Yes Inconclusive Yes, No- 
Possible
Accept Reject Yes No
4 Yes Inconclusive Yes, No- 
Possible
Reject Accept Yes Yes
5 Yes No-Possible Yes, No- 
Possible
Reject Reject Yes No
6 No Not
Applicable
(N/A)
N/A Reject N/A No N/A
7 Yes Yes-Possible Yes Reject No Test Yes Yes
8 Yes No-Possible No-Possible Reject Reject Yes No
9 Yes No-Possible Yes, No- 
Possible
Reject Reject Yes No
10 Yes, No- 
Possible
No-Possible No-Possible Reject Reject Yes NO
11 Yes No-Possible No-Possible Accept Reject Yes No
12 Yes, No- 
Possible
Inconclusive Yes, No- 
Possible
Reject Accept No N/A
NI
%
TABLE 8.42 (Continued)
Null HO;
MP
Majority of 
all Managers 
and all 
Workers:
MP Exists
Majority of 
all Managers 
and all 
workers : MP 
Exists and 
it is Result 
of Union
Majority of 
Manager and 
Worker Sub­
set: MP 
Exists and 
it is Result 
of Union
Null HO: 
Managers 
and Workers 
Agree MP 
Exists
Manager 
and Worker 
Subset Agree 
MP Exists 
and it is 
Result of 
Union
Final 
Conclusion 
MP Exists
Final
Conclusion 
MP Result 
of Union
13 Yes Yes Yes Reject Accept Yes Yes
14 Yes NO-Possible Yes, No- Accept Reject Yes No
15 Yes NO-Possible Yes, NO- 
Possible
Reject Accept Yes Yes
16 Yes No-Possible Yes, No- 
Possible
Reject Reject Yes Yes
17 Yes No-Possible Yes, No- 
Possible
Accept Reject Yes Yes
18 Yes Yes Yes Accept Accept Yes Yes
19 Yes, No- 
Possible
Inconclusive Yes Reject No Test Yes Yes
20 Yes Yes Yes Reject Reject Yes Yes
21 Yes Yes Yes Reject No Test Yes Yes
N)
O
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groups respond "yes" to the first part and their "yes" res­
ponses to the second part represent a majority of all managers 
and all workers, it will be concluded that General Hypothesis 
2 is true. The chi square test is applied to determine if the 
views between management and workers are significantly differ­
ent.
In order to test the difference in perceptions between 
the groups, a null hypothesis was formulated;
Ho: There is no difference between managers and workers
in the proportion with which they give yes and no 
answers that management practices have improved.
The alternative hypothesis became:
HI: One group gives a greater proportion of yes res­
ponses than the other group that management practices 
have improved.
Table 8.43 shows that 61 percent of the managers and 
80 percent of the workers believe that management practices 
have improved since 1962 when Executive Order 10988 authorized 
employees to join unions. Thus it is concluded that manage­
ment practices have improved. Based on the range of rejection 
at the 5 percent level of significance and 1 degree of freedom,
= 8.69 is significant and the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Although both groups agree that management practices have 
improved, the proportion of their responses is significantly 
different.
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TABLE 8.43
GENERALLY, MANAGEMENT PRACTICES HAVE IMPROVED 
SINCE A PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER 
IN 1962 AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEES 
TO JOIN UNIONS
Responses
Group Number Percent
Yes No Yes No
Managers 25 16 61 39
Workers 277 70 80 20
Chi Square 8.69
SOURCE: Summary of Responses of Managers and Workers,
Appendix 3.
Upon the initial observation, the results seem sur­
prising that more workers than managers think practices have 
improved. However, with greater reflection these results 
should be anticipated. This will be clear after analyzing 
the responses to the second question.
Given that practices have improved, the second part of 
the question is concerned with whether practices have improved 
because of the union. Table 8.44 shows that the responses 
of those who perceive that management practices have improved 
and also believe improvement is a result of labor-management 
relations account for 51 percent of all managers and 70 per­
cent of all workers. Thus it is concluded that General Hypo­
thesis 2 is true: Management practices have improved as a
result of the leüsor-management relationship.
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TABLE 8.44
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES HAVE IMPROVED BECAUSE
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
Responses
Group Number Percent Percent'
Yes Yes No Yes No
Managers 21 4 51 10 84 16
Workers 242 35 70 10 87 13
Chi Square 8.69
SOURCE; Summary of responses of managers and workers. 
Appendix 3.
^Based on sample size of 41 managers and 347 workers. 
^Based on subset of 25 managers and 277 workers.
Considering only the groups who perceive that manage­
ment practices have improved, 84 percent of the managers and 87 
percent of the workers believe the improvement came as a result 
of labor-management relations. Unfortunately, the chi square 
test in this instance is not meaningful since the expected 
frequency for cell B is less than 5. Expected frequencies 
are A = 21.8, B =  3.2, C = 241.2, and D = 35.8^ Nevertheless, 
it is intuitively obvious that a substantial percentage of 
those in each subset agree the improvement is a result of 
labor-management relations.
llbid.
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This brings us back to why more workers than managers 
believe management practices have improved and the answer should 
now be obvious. Workers believe the union is responsible for 
management's improvement. But a substantial minority of mana­
gers, 39 percent, believe that practices have not improved.
Of this group, 56 percent believe the union is responsible for 
management's failure to improve.^ If this group is added to 
the 25 managers who believe management practices have improved, 
as shown in Table 8.43, then the management response becomes 
83 percent instead of 61 percent. If the same type calcula­
tion is performed on the worker group, the worker response 
becomes 84 percent instead of 80 percent. Thus, the explana­
tion is simple, management and worker opinion of management 
improvement would be almost identical except for those who 
believe the union has prevented improvement.
Interviews indicate that top management does not 
believe that union participation in decision making results in 
improved management. Management's attitude of reluctant coop­
eration as expressed by the Labor Relations Officer is also 
consistent with the author's explanation that the 39 percent 
in Table 8.43 represents those who believe the union has 
impeded improvement of management practices. Management may 
want to reexamine its attitude since "reluctant cooperation" 
may lead to a decline in labor-management relations at Robins.
^See Table 3, Appendix 3.
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General Hypothesis 3
The final question is based on an assumption that mana­
gers and workers are opposed to some practices. Restating 
this assumption results in General Hypothesis 3: Managers
and workers are opposed to certain management practices.
In order to test the hypothesis managers and workers 
were asked to identify any of the twenty-one practices to 
which they were opposed in the order in which they most opposed 
the practice.
Worker and manager opposition to management practices 
1-21 is recorded and summarized in Tables 6-9 in Appen­
dix 3. Based on these data the total opposition points for 
each management practice and the order of opposition were 
derived for workers and managers.
Table 8.45 shows that workers rank MP12 as the worst 
practice, followed by MP2 and MP19. The reader will recall 
that MPI2 involves assigning menial tasks to workers, MP2 
is management's reluctance to fire an employee, and MP19 con­
cerns management's strategy of not giving up anything during 
negotiations.^
The most surprising result is opposition to MP2. 
Apparently some workers believe that management should dis­
miss employees more readily.
^The complete list of MPs is included in Appendix i.
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TABLE 8.45
Management
Practice
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION 
TOTAL OPPOSITION POINTS 
AND RANK ORDER 
BY WORKERS
Total
Opposition
Points
Rank
Order
(1) 163& 7
(2) 554 2
(3) 221 4
(4) 114 12
(5) 177 6
(6) 187 5
(7) 98 13
(8) 137 10
(9) 19 20
(10) 149 9
(11) 122 11.
(12) 716 1^
(13) 95 14
(15) 48 15
(16) 153 8
(17) 39 16
(18) 33 18
(19) 396 3
(20) 35 17
(21) 21 19
The total number of opposition points for Management 
Practice 1 is obtained by adding the points in row 1, Table 
6.
^Rank order is based on total opposition points. MP12 
is the practice workers oppose most.
Note: Workers recorded no opposition to MP14.
SOURCE: Table 6, Appendix 3.
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Table 8.46 shows the relative opposition toward these 
management practices. With a maximum relative opposition of 100, 
it is apparent that the degree of opposition is minimal. The
TABLE 8.46
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION, RELATIVE 
OPPOSITION, AND RANK ORDER BY WORKERS
Management
Practice
Relative  ^
Opposition
Rank
Order
(1) 2 7
(2) 8 2
(3) 3 4
(4) 2 12
(5) 2 6
(6) 3 5
(7) 1 13
(8) 2 10
(9) .3 20
(10) 2 9
(11) 2 11
(12) 10 1
(13) 1 14
(15) .6 15
(16) 2 8
(17) .5 16
(18) .4 18
(19) 5 3
(20) .5 17
(21) .3 19
^Relative opposition equals total opposition points 
divided by maximum opposition points and multiplied by 10. A 
maximum number of 7,287 opposition points is possible and is 
obtained by multiplying 347 (total number of workers in sample) 
times 21 (total points for most opposed management practice).
^The rank order is based on total opposition points, 
but relative opposition produces the same results.
SOURCE: Derived from Table 7, Appendix 3.
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largest relative opposition is 10 and it rapidly drops to 3 or 
less after the third most opposed management practice.
Table 8.47 shows that managers rank MP2 as the worst 
practice. MP3 is second and MP21 is a distant third.^
TABLE 8.47
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION TOTAL OPPOSITION 
POINTS AND RANK ORDER BY MANAGERS
Management Total Opposition Rank
Practice Points Order
(2) 208& lb
(3) 141 2
(4) 21 4
(6) 21 4
(7) 19 12
(10) 20 7
(11) 21 4
(12) 20 7
(13) 20 7
(16) 20 7
(17) 20 7
(21) 37 3
^The total number of opposition points for Management 
Practice 1 is obtained by adding the points in row 1, Table
9.
bpank order is based on total opposition points. Note: 
the fifth, sixth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh positions are 
omitted because of tie scores.
SOURCE: Table 9, Appendix 3.
^MP3 is management's reluctance to lay off workers. 
MP21 is management's sponsorship of training of union stewards.
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Apparently some managers feel that management should not be 
reluctant in dismissing or laying off employees. A few also 
object to labor-management training for union stewards.
As Table 8.48 indicates, the relative opposition of 
management to the first and second ranked practices is much 
stronger than its relative opposition to other practices.
TABLE 8.48
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION RELATIVE 
OPPOSITION AND RANK ORDER 
BY MANAGERS
Management Relative , Rank
Practice Opposition Order
(2) 24 1
(3) 16 2
(21) 4 3
(4) 2 4
(6) 2 4
(11) 2 4
(10) 2
(12) 2
(13) 2
(16) 2
(17) 2
(7) 2 12
^Total opposition points possible equals 41 (total 
number of managers in sample) times 21 (total points for most 
opposed management practice), or 861. Relative opposition 
equals total opposition divided by 861 and multiplied by 10.
SOURCE: Derived from Table 9, Appendix 3.
Although the opposition to MP2 is not considered great, manage­
ment should guard against any trend which would decrease
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reluctance to fire an employee. As discussed in an earlier 
section, management has a commitment to an individual once it 
assumes employment responsibility. To dismiss an employee 
without exploring all other alternatives is to abdicate mana­
gerial responsibility.
The author compares management opposition to management 
practices with that of workers in Table 8,49. Note that the
TABLE 8.49
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION, RELATIVE 
OPPOSITION AND RANK ORDER, BY 
WORKERS AND MANAGERS
 Workers_____________   Managers_
Management Rank Relative Relative Rank
Practice Order Opposition Opposition Order
(12) 1 10 2 7
(2) 2 8 24 1
(19) 3 5
(3) 4 3 16 2
(6) 5 3 2 4
(5) 6 2
(1) 7 2
(16) 8 2 2 7
(10) 9 2 2 7
(8) 10 2
(11) 11 2 2 4
(4) 12 2 2 . 4
(7) 13 1 2 12
(13) 14 1 2 7
(15) 15 .6
(17) 16 .5 2 7
(20 17 .5
(18) 18 .4
(21) 19 .3 4 3
(9) 20 .3
SOURCE: Table 8.46 and 8.48.
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relative opposition of management is at least twice as great 
as that of workers for the first and second ranked practices. 
Both ranked MP2 high in comparison to other practices although 
management recorded three times more opposition than workers. 
Management opposition to MP12, the practice most opposed by 
workers, was slight. Management recorded no opposition to 
MP19, the workers' third ranked practice.^ Although relative 
opposition, was minimal, both recorded the same amount for 
MP21, management's third ranked practice.
Based upon these observations, it is concluded that 
managers and workers are opposed to certain management prac­
tices. Therefore, General Hypothesis 3 is true. Nevertheless, 
opposition is minimal.
summary
The research data concerning worker perceptions was 
presented and analyzed in this chapter. The author applied 
the rule of a simple majority of 51 percent to determine mana­
ger and worker beliefs concerning existence and cause of 
twenty-one management practices. A majority of managers and 
workers agree that seventeen of these are current practices. 
Both groups agree that MP6, converting positions to avoid 
dealing with the union, is not a practice. The groups dis­
agree on MPIO, MP12, and MP19. Managers believe that MPIO 
is a practice— downgrading only those positions which should
^"When negotiating, management does not give up any­
thing if it can be avoided."
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be at a lower skill level. Workers believe that MP12 and MP19 
are practices. MP12 is detailing employees to menial tasks and 
MP19 concerns management's strategy of not giving,up anything 
when negotiating. Based upon additional analysis the author 
concluded that MPIO and MP19 are practices and that MP12 is 
not. See Figure 8.1 for a graphic summary of the perceptions 
of managers and workers.
Manager and worker perceptions are far less conclusive 
concerning the cause of the management practices. The groups 
agree that MPI, MP13, MP18, MP20, and MP21 evolved from the 
labor-management relationship. MPI involves considering 
employee and union reactions; MP13, bargaining techniques;
MP18, advance notice of duty changes; MP20, management training 
in labor relations; and MP21, steward training in labor rela­
tions.
The groups disagree concerning MP2, MPS, MP7, MP8,
MP9, MPIO, MPll, MP14, MP15, MP16, and MP17. Workers believe 
MP2, reluctance to fire employees, is caused by the union.
The response of the managers is inconclusive since it does 
not account for a majority, either pro or con. Managers 
believe MP7, coordinating job classification and reorganization, 
is the result of the labor-management relationship. The res­
ponse of workers is inconclusive. In the cases of MPS, MP8,
MP9, MPIO, MPll, MP14, MPIS, MP16, and MP17, management 
believes the practices are not caused by the union. The res­
ponses of the workers concerning these practices are
Managers - MP is a practice 
Workers - HP is not a practice
f
Managers - MP is not a practice 
Workers - MP is a practice
HP - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 - MP
Haj 
Agree 
MP is 
Not a 
Prac­
tice
Majority Agree - HP is a practice
to
Ul
w
Figure 8.1 Sisomary of Manager and Worker Responses Concerning Existence of Twenty-one Management Practices
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inconclusive. MPS concerns grievances, MP8 is considering 
employee needs and desires, MP9 involves fair selection during 
a RIF, MPIO concerns downgrading of positions, MPll is related 
to leave policy, MP4 involves special tools and clothing, MP15 
concerns overtime, MP16 concerns promotion information, and 
MP17 is related to sick leave abuse.
The responses of the groups are inconclusive about the 
cause of MP3, MP4, MP12,^ and MP19. MP3 is reluctance to lay 
off employees, MP4 is consulting with the union and employees, 
MP12 is assigning menial tasks, and MP19 is negotiating strat­
egy.
To summarize, although the perceptions of managers and 
workers only enable the author to conclude that MPI, MP13,
MP18, MP20, and MP21 evolved from labor-management relations, 
additional analysis produces similar conclusions concerning 
MP4, MP7, MP15, MPI6, MP17, and MP19. Analysis of the percep­
tions of managers and workers is indecisive or inconclusive 
concerning MP2, MP3, MPS, MP8, MP9, MPIO, MPll, and MP14. 
However, additional analysis enables the author to conclude 
that these practices did not evolve from the labor-management 
relationship. Cause is not a factor in the case of MP6 and 
MP12 since the practices do not exist. Figure 8.2 is a graphic 
summary of the perceptions of managers and workers.
Chi square analysis was useful in determining if mana­
ger and worker perceptions concerning existence and cause of
^Given the possibility that it exists.
Workers - HP caused by Onion 
Managers - Inconclusive
Managers - MP caused by Union 
WoAers - Inconclusive
I nrn
M P - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12
Maj Inconclusive
Haj Agree - HP not caused Iqr Union
Maj Agree - HP caused by Union
Managers - MP not caused by Union 
Workers - Inconclusive
19 20 21 - MP
€—
to
in
in
Figure 8.2 Summary of Manager and Worker Responses Concerning Cause of Twenty-one Management Practices
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the practices were significantly different. The null hypothesis 
that perceptions of managers and workers are not significantly 
different concerning existence of a practice is accepted in 
the case of MP2, MP3, MPll, MP14, MP17, and MP18. The null 
hypothesis that perceptions of managers and workers are not 
significantly different concerning cause of a practice is 
accepted in the case of MP4, MP12, MP13, MP15, MP17, and MP18. 
Both null hypotheses are accepted for MP17 and MP18.
The null hypothesis concerning existence is rejected 
for MPI, MP4, MPS, MP6, MP7, MP8, MP9, MPIO, MP12, MP13, MPlS, 
MP16, MP19, MP20, and MP21. The null hypothesis concerning 
cause is rejected for MPI, MP2, MP3, MP5, MP8, MP9, MPIO,
MPll, MP14, MP16, MP17, and MP20. This test is not applicable 
for MP6, as MP6 is not a practice. This test was not conducted 
for MP7, MP19, and MP21 because the expected frequency for cell 
B was less than 5. Both hypotheses are rejected in the case 
of MPI, MPS, MP8, MP9, MPIO, MP16, and MP20.
Managers and workers agree that management practices 
have improved as a result of the union. Nevertheless, the 
proportion of their responses as to whether improvement 
occurred is significantly different. Thus, the null hypothesis 
is rejected. The chi square test was not conducted concerning 
manager and worker perceptions about the cause of the improve­
ment since the expected frequency for cell B was less than 5. 
Management's attitude of "reluctant cooperation" may be res­
ponsible for the disparity in agreement. If so, this attitude 
can lead to a decline in labor-management relations at Robins.
257
Opposition to management practices is minimal. Although 
some criticism is directed to every practice except MP14# it 
is negligible in most cases.
Considering relative opposition on a scale of 0-100, 
workers are most opposed to MP12 with a score of 10, MP2 
with 8 and MP19 with 5. Managers are opposed to twelve of the 
twenty-one practices, but only minimally. The practices man­
agers oppose most are MP2 with a relative opposition score of 
24, MP3 with 16, and MP21 with 4.
Based upon the analysis of manager and worker responses 
concerning the twenty-one management practices, the author 
identified problem areas or potential problem areas and sug­
gested certain corrective measures. In order to bring about 
greater acceptance of managerial responsibility under the 
Executive Order, the author suggests that managers be given 
instruction in leadership and participative management. In 
order to discourage apathy, management should consider disci­
plining managers who violate the contract or commit an unfair 
labor practice.
The author also suggests that management improve its 
image in the eyes of workers. Primarily this entails a pro­
gram to inform employees that many of their benefits are the 
result of management efforts. WRAMA personnel should be aware 
that managers are interested in the problems and welfare of 
employees, that management reduces the grades of positions 
only when warranted, and that management provides labor-relations
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training to union stewards. Management should examine those 
practices it considers vital to labor-management relations, 
insure that managers are complying with the practices, and make 
employees aware that the practices are being emphasized. In 
particular, management should insure fair selections during 
a RIP, assign tasks commensurate with employee skills, assign 
overtime properly and equitably, keep employees advised of 
their promotion status, advise employees in writing two weeks 
in advance of changes in hours of work and tours of duty, pro­
vide special tools and clothing when required, and request 
doctors' statements as proof of illness only when authorized 
by the contract.
The third and last segment of the basic research has 
been completed. In the final chapter, the author summarizes 
the management practices which have evolved from the labor- 
management relationship and makes additional conclusions con­
cerning the impact of collective bargaining on management 
practices.
CHAPTER IX 
THE PAST DECADE AND THE FUTURE
The purpose of the research was to determine the impact 
of collective bargaining on management practices at the Warner 
Robins Air Logistics Center. Based upon an analysis of the 
labor-management relationship, the base-wide agreements, and 
the perceptions of managers and workers, the author, identified 
a number of management practices that evolved as a result of 
labor-management relations from 1962 through the latter part 
of 1974. Further analysis of these practices, labor-management 
relations, and the labor contracts led to additional conclus­
ions concerning the impact of collective bargaining on manage­
ment practices.
The Management Practices
Tiie following management practices evolved from the 
labor-management relationship.
1. Management consults with the union during monthly 
labor-management meetings or special meetings concerning 
personnel policies and working conditions^
iThis practice is equivalent to MP4 of the questionnaire. 
Management is required to consult on all personnel policies 
or working conditions over which it has authority. However, 
the author has listed additional management practices which 
may be classified in these categories because they were 
specifically negotiated or identified in the questionnaire or 
the labor-management relationship.
'^2T9 :
2. Management consults with the union four weeks
before a change in the hours of work or tours of duty, even if
the change is mission related^
3. Management consults with the union concerning pro­
motion evaluation patterns, unless a change is directed by
higher headquarters
4. Management consults with the union concerning the 
opening or closing of base entrances
5. Management consults with the union on local changes 
to the supervisory appraisal system
6. Management consults with the union on the down­
grading reclassification of job level, change of job descrip-
2
tion, or reorganization before the effective date of change
7. Management consults with the union on wage surveys 
through the presentations of union representatives and the 
committee membership of union members
8. Management consults on environmental differential 
pay at union request
9. Management consults with the union before approval 
or disapproval of suggestions emanating from the suggestion 
program
10. Management consults with the union through union 
membership on the following committees or councils: EEO;
civilian welfare; suggestion; charity fund; ground safety;
^This practice includes MP18 of the questionnaire.
^This practice is equivalent to MP7 of the questionnaire
. — -
environmental and differential pay; health, safety, and fire; 
and non-appropriated funds
11. Management notifies the union before an emergency 
change in the hours of work
12. Management notifies the union before contracting 
out any work
13. Management notifies the union of a higher head­
quarters-directed change to the supervisory appraisal system
14. Management notifies the union of a grievance
hearing
15. Management notifies the union of reductions-in-
force
16. Management notifies the union of personnel regu­
lations
17. Management notifies the union of employees assigned 
to the base-wide unit
18. Management notifies the union of accessions and 
separations
19. Management notifies the union of suggestions
20. Management notifies the union of promotion eval­
uation patterns
21. Management notifies the union of critiques of 
annual job classification surveys
22. Management notifies the union of job classifica­
tions for wage board positions
23. Management notifies the union of injury frequency 
and cost rates
2«2
24. Management notifies the union of disputes involv­
ing overtime .
25. Management notifies the union of disputes involv­
ing job descriptions
26. Management considers employee or union reactions 
when acting on working conditions or personnel policies or 
practices^
27. Management assigns employees to shifts based upon 
volunteer status and seniority
28. Management permits employees to swap shifts and 
requires them to return to their shift at the end of the two- 
week shift period
29. Management assigns overtime to volunteers who are 
performing the job; overtime assignments are then made to 
volunteers who are best qualified^
30. Management advises employees as far in advance as 
possible when they are required to work overtime and by noon 
Thursday if they are required to work during the weekend
31. Work details are rotated equitably unless the
detail results in a temporary promotion
32. Work details are usually related to the require­
ments and qualifications of the position
naire.
3
^This practice is identical to MPI of the questionnaire 
‘This practice is equivalent to MP 18 of the question-
Assuming their regular days off occur on the weekend.
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33. If possible, management selects volunteers for 
holiday work
34. Management advises employees one week in advance 
of holiday work
35. Management authorizes the first two weeks of annual 
leave on the basis of seniority
36. Employees are authorized rest periods
37. An employee is not required to furnish a doctor's 
statement as proof of illness unless the employee is suspected 
of abusing the privilege
38. If contracting out of work results in the separa­
tion of an employee, management informs the employee of his 
impending termination
39. Management opens additional entrances during shift
changes
40. Management counsels employees one year before 
their retirement
41. Supervisors post the names of award recipients on 
bulletin boards
42. Managers admonish employees in private
43. Employees with twenty-five years of service are 
exempt from clocking in or out
44. Management requires no local tests in the promo­
tion evaluation of employees
2ë4
45. Upon request, employees are advised if they were 
considered for promotion and, if so, their rank order on the 
register^
46. Management selects employees on the basis of merit 
for details to higher grade positions of sixty to 120 days and 
grants temporary promotions to the selectees
47. Management publishes a list of newly promoted 
employees each month
48. Managers mark the performance ratings in ink in 
the employee's presence
49. When an employee's performance is sufficient to 
warrant withholding of a pay increase, management advises 
the employee in writing sixty days before such withholding, 
or if sixty days written notice is not given, management 
reevaluates the employee's performance sixty days after the 
withholding
50. Management advises employees of approved health 
benefit plans
51. Management instructs employees in safety pro­
cedures
52. Management advises employees that a union member 
can represent them in a job classification dispute
53. Management advises employees of the nature and 
procedures of union dues withholding
iThis practice is identical to MP16 of the question­
naire .
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54. Management advises employees of their right to 
join or refrain from joining the union
55. Management trains employees adequately before 
assigning them to jobs or machines
56. Management selects employees for training on the 
basis of the merit promotion system
57. Management attempts to arrange employee work 
schedules to permit off-duty, job-related training or education
58. Management grants exclusive recognition to the 
union that employees select by majority vote in an election
59. Management authorizes one steward and one alter­
nate steward for each fifty employees
60. Management withholds union dues for any employee 
electing such an option, beginning any pay period
61. Management stops dues withholding at the employee's 
request, but only on March 1 and September 1
62. Management does not change the amount of dues 
withholding more than once each year
63. Management authorizes union stewards unlimited 
official time to prepare for meetings with management
64. Management authorizes union stewards unlimited 
official time to represent employees
65. Management authorizes union stewards eight hours 
of official time to prepare before representing an employee
66. Management provides union stewards and supervisors 
eight hours of orientation each year on Executive Order 11491 
as amended
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67. Management provides supervisors and union stewards 
and ten additional union members eight hours of orientation 
each year on the base-wide agreement^
68. Management authorizes administrative leave to 
permit employees to hold union office
69. Management authorizes the use of official facilities 
for union meetings and elections during non-duty hours
70. Management authorizes the union to post union 
material on official bulletin boards on base and to publish 
information in the base newspaper
71. Management permits distribution of the union news­
paper throughout various organizations on the base
72. Management provides reserve parking spaces, office 
space if available, and lockers for certain union officials
73. Management provides a negotiated grievance and 
arbitration procedure
74. Management utilizes consultation, negotiation, 
fact-finding, and mediation to resolve impasses
75. Management disciplines employees who discriminate 
against union members or who defame the union or its officers
76. Management provides 3,500 copies of the base-wide 
contract for distribution by the union and provides one copy 
to each supervisor for review by employees
77. Management provides for cancellation, renewal, 
and modification of the base-wide contract
^Practice 66 and 67 includes MP20 and MP 21 of the 
questionnaire.
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78. Management negotiating strategy is to identify 
subjects or issues during daily operations which are causing 
problems in the labor-management relationship and attempt to 
negotiate a permanent solution at the earliest date authorized 
for modification of the contract
79. Management utilizes a firm negotiating strategy 
of initiating proposals, giving nothing, giving a little
to get something in return, presenting a final alternative 
before mediation, and accepting a mediation compromise or 
accepting an impasse^
80. Management enforces the base-wide contract and 
union compliance with the code of fair labor practices by 
informal requests to the union to correct the situation, or 
formally charging the union with violating the contract or 
commiting an unfair labor practice
81. Management uses the union to achieve management 
objectives in such areas as blood drives, savings bond drives, 
and fund raising campaigns^
82. Management uses the union to improve production
83. Management uses the union to decrease costs
84. Management uses the union to decrease absenteeism
85. Management requires the union to promote and abide
by Air Force safety standards
^This includes MP13 and MP 19 of the questionnaire.
^The union agreed to support management objectives, 
often through actual participation in the effort.
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86. Management requires the union to advise employees 
of dues withholding procedures
87. Management requires the union to represent all 
employees in the Base-Wide Bargaining Unit
88. Management requires the union to encourage employ­
ees to participate in off-duty education and training programs 
for self-improvement purposes
89. Management requires stewards to advise super­
visors before contacting employees
90. Management requires the union to remove material 
from official bulletin boards after it has been posted thirty 
days
91. Management requires the union to promote the health 
and welfare of employees
92. Management requires the union to insure mission 
accomplishment
93. Management requires the union to nominate managers 
with technical qualifications for the Suggestion Committee
94. Management requires the union to guard against 
abuse of official time by stewards
95. Management requires the union to encourage employ­
ees to familiarize themselves with regulations and rules of 
conduct
96. Management requires the union to refrain from 
publishing or posting material which is scurrilous, libelous, 
or unlawful
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97. Management requires the union (representatives) to 
act temperately and gentlemanly while engaging in labor-manage­
ment relations.
98. Management requires the union to penalize union
members for intemperate or defamatory acts against superiors
99. Management requires the union to recognize the
authority of supervisors to maintain proper conduct and dis­
cipline
100. Management requires the union to recognize the 
desirability of resolving complaints against employees in the 
interests of justice and equity
101. Management requires the union to withhold wage 
information until it has been officially released by Wage 
Board officials
Bilateral Decisions and Union Power
In the author's opinion, the 101 management practices 
which evolved from the labor-management relationship have 
increased the power of the union substantially. Although union 
officials argue that the union lost power with each subsequent 
Executive Order, the facts do not support this contention. It 
is true that the union can only negotiate forty hours on 
official time. But this does not seem to have had any dele­
terious effect upon the content of the labor contract. There 
is no evidence that loss of informal and formal recognition 
has caused a significant decline in AF6E membership. The union 
is the exclusive representative for five bargaining units and
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accounts for 99.2 percent of the union membership and approxi­
mately half of the employees eligible for membership.
Judging from practices which involve consultation with 
the union, notification of the union, and union membership on 
numerous committees within WRAMA, the union made inroads into 
joint decision making.
Although bilateral decisions account for a relatively 
small amount of the total decision process, the union has made 
inroads. In a sense, all of the 101 practices which have 
evolved from the collective bargaining relationship represent 
bilateral decisions. These, in turn, affect hundreds of other 
decisions which are made annually.
The most significant practices affecting decisions in 
daily operations are those involving consulting, informing, 
union representation on management committees, and working 
conditions. Of these, "four weeks advance notice and consul­
tation before changing hours of work or tours of duty," seems 
to be the most significant consultation effort. In the past 
management could make such a change arbitrarily and on short 
notice. Consultation on environmental differential pay and 
consultation resulting from union membership on the Wage Survey 
Board are also significant. It should help membership recruit­
ing if the union can show that it caused pay increases through 
the Wage Survey Board as well as increases of environmental 
differential pay.
It seems inevitable that the union will make further 
inroads into bilateral decision making. It is sure to gain
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additional consultation rights as the scope of bargaining 
increases and additional personnel policies and practices are 
formulated or changed.
Union negotiating strategy seems calculated to achieve 
this objective. The union already has a substantive document 
but can expand bilateral decision authority by negotiating more 
regulations or provisions of regulations into the contract.
Once the provision becomes part of the contract, it becomes 
subject to bilateral interpretation, it takes precedence over 
changes in the regulation, and it enables the union to force 
management to comply with its own regulation.
WRAMA may want to consider this outcome before it nego­
tiates more regulations into the contract. Assuming manage­
ment has always been careful in the writing of directives, it 
should be even more meticulous in such composition in the 
future. Contracts are interpreted bilaterally and sometimes 
by third parties. Thus, poor wording of a regulation which is 
inserted into a contract will result in a poorly worded con­
tract. Ultimately, this may result in a "poor decision" by an 
arbitrator who must rule on the facts and the wording of the 
agreement.
Management's desire to make all complaints subject to 
the negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure is consis­
tent with including more regulations in the contract; that is, 
disputes over interpretation and application of the contract 
must be processed through the negotiated procedure. However,
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the union will gain more from this policy than management. 
Management assumes that the number of valid grievances will 
decrease if grievances cannot be processed through the agency 
procedure. This decline may not occur. Even if it does, 
management must decide if it is worth the cost of a further 
erosion of unilateral decision authority.
The Most Significant Management Practice 
The negotiated grievance and arbitration procedure is 
probably the most significant of all the management practices, 
especially in the union's view. The union believes that a 
neutral third party is absolutely essential to objective and 
fair treatment.
Thus far, arbitration has proven a successful means 
for the union to obtain redress at WRAMA. Since the scope of 
bargaining increases as bilateral authority increases and 
vice versa, it seems likely that the union will attempt to 
make wages, hours, and working conditions fully arbitrable.
Presently, union authority in these areas is relatively 
limited. Congress sets pay rates and the Executive Orders and 
regulations protect management rights concerning hours and 
working conditions. Undoubtedly, legislative change is required; 
however, conditions may be favorable for such change. Since 
the strike is illegal, federal sector unions lack the economic 
power of those in the private sector. This imbalance is lead­
ing to clamoring in the public sector for the right to strike. 
Illegal strikes have already occurred. Thus, Congress
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may view full arbitration as a more desirable alternative.
Unions already bave a voice in local pay rates through the Wage 
Board and the setting of environmental differential pay. 
Arbitration to resolve disputes over pay is only a step or two 
away. Arbitration may prove to be superior to the strike 
because most strikes are outdated and socially dysfunctional. 
They often cause wide-spread inconvenience to the public and 
the economic gain is not sufficient to offset the economic 
loss. The inconvenience of public strikes is even more pro­
nounced .
If arbitration in the public sector is extended to 
include the full range of issues involving wages, hours, and 
working conditions, it can change the entire labor movement.
If it is successful in the public sector, it will probably 
be adopted in the private sector. If so, the strike will 
become a rare event. This assumes that successful arbitration, 
maturity in federal labor relations, and public pressure will 
lead to a decline in the growing number of strikes in the 
public sector.
Fair Treatment and Protection of Employees
A large number of the 101 practices involves the fair 
and equitable treatment of employees. This reflects the union's 
preoccupation with the subject. An obvious outcome of these 
practices is that the manager is forced to consider union and 
employee reactions before acting if he is going to manage 
effectively. Otherwise, he may unwittingly commit some
m
infraction of the contract rules. Union officials do not 
necessarily want to spend their time policing the contract.
But with contract enforcement as the power, the union can 
intervene in favor of employees. The grapevine reports from 
two-hundred stewards and other management consultations and 
advisements provide the union with information about managers 
and management activities. This information system enables 
the union to keep abreast of management decisions and insure 
that management adheres to its own regulations and the contract.
Certainly, the union has shown a willingness to oppose 
poor management in an attempt to bring about a change. It has 
represented employees in hundreds of disputes over the years. 
Most of these were resolved informally at the first supervisory 
level. In the disputes involving formal charges, however, 
the union can claim partial or complete success in eight of 
twelve unfair labor practice decisions and seven of eight 
grievance decisions. Of the decisions rendered beyond base 
level, the union can claim partial or complete success in two 
of five unfair labor practice decisions and four of four 
grievance decisions. Employees are less successful in pro­
cessing complaints through the agency procedure. Favorable 
decisions for employees range from 18 percent to 32 percent 
from 1969-1974, with 32 percent in 1970 as the best year for 
employee success.
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Management Strategy and the Outcome 
In the past decade management has been reactive to 
union proposals and counterproposals. The union had seized 
the initiative through negotiations and had kept management 
off balance with numerous charges of unfair labor practices 
and contract violations.
Management learned from this experience and developed 
a negotiating strategy based on initiative. Not that manage­
ment has been a soft touch, but its new strategy is to be firm 
and "reluctantly cooperative" while seizing and maintaining 
the initiative. In management's view this means initiating 
contract negotiations and the earliest date possible, sub­
mitting proposals, and offering counterproposals to anything 
the union might suggest. Management plans to give nothing, 
give a little to get something in return, present a final 
alternative before mediation, and accept a mediation com­
promise or an impasse in the event of a dispute. Management 
plans to keep the union off balance by forcing it to react 
to occasional formal charges of an unfair labor practice or 
contract violation.
Management strategy also involves using the union to 
obtain management objectives such as improving production, 
decreasing turnover of personnel, minimizing cost, and raising 
funds for charities. Management has laid the foundation for 
greater union involvement by stipulating numerous responsibil­
ities in the contract and by obtaining union participation in
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blood drives and fund raising. The requirement for management 
to consult on many issues is likely to continue. Thus, manage­
ment should take a positive approach and use union participa­
tion constructively. For example, management should assign 
responsibility to the union for identifying drug and alcohol 
abusers with management deciding the individual's fate. In 
almost all cases the individual can remain employed, pending 
the outcome of his attendance at a rehabilitation center or 
response to local medical treatment, as appropriate.
Reserve parking is another area where the union can be 
used effectively. Management can assign reserve parking 
spaces to the WRAMA Commander, the Base Commander, the Direc­
tors, and Deputy Directors. The union can assign all other 
spaces and resolve all complaints concerning parking.
While management strategy appears to be a practical 
method to regain some unilateral authority and use union par­
ticipation constructively, management must be careful that its 
strategy is not interpreted as a "hard line" approach to labor- 
management relations. Otherwise, hostility between labor and 
management is certain to result in a disadvantage to manage­
ment. The union can use its participative powers in such a 
way as to decrease production, increase formal complaints, 
and increase operating costs.
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Management Improvement 
Another significant conclusion is that management 
practices have improved as a result of labor-management rela­
tions. An examination of the labor-management relationship 
indicates that union complaints are confined to relatively 
minor problems. This suggests that management deals effectively 
with major issues. Analysis of management and worker percep­
tions tends to confirm this conclusion. Opposition to the 
twenty-one management practices is insignificant. Moreover, 
a substantial majority of the managers and workers believe 
management practices have improved. A majority also credit 
this improvement to labor-management relations.
Although serious management problems are nonexistent, 
there is room for improvement. It is not a vote of confidence 
for a majority of managers and workers to say that the union 
is responsible for management improvement. This infers that 
if the union was nonexistent, management practices would not 
have improved. This inference is reflected in the disparity 
of the responses to several of the management practices.
Several factors are related to the manager and worker 
responses. The overall attitude of management, especially top 
management, is described as "reluctantly cooperative;" that is, 
managers consult only to the extent necessary to conform to 
Executive Order or regulation. This, in turn, reinforces the 
attitudes of those production-oriented managers who regard the 
union as being engaged in trivial pursuits and unqualified to
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participate in the decision process. Furthermore, apathetic 
managers remain ignorant of contract requirements, with little 
incentive to learn. As a consequence, contract violations and 
unfair labor practices occur.
All of this suggests that managers be given instruc­
tion in leadership and participative management theory. This 
training will enable them to compare the results of produc­
tion-centered leadership with other leadership styles. Perhaps 
they will modify their own leadership styles. Although par­
ticipative management theory is easier to understand than to 
apply, the promise of increased output, higher quality, less 
turnover, less absenteeism, greater acceptance of change, and 
fewer grievances should give more of the WRAMA managers the 
incentive to attempt the practice.
In order to show good faith, management should con­
sider disciplining a manager who is quilty of a contract vio­
lation or an unfair labor practice. This will discourage 
apathy and encourage compliance with the contract and the 
Executive Order.
Employee responses to several practices indicate that 
management needs to improve its image. The author suggests 
that management develop a program to inform WRAMA personnel 
of employee benefits that exist because of specific manage­
ment practices. Employees should be made aware of the willing­
ness of managers to discuss employee problems. Management's 
concern for the welfare of the employee should receive special
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emphasis. Management should reaffirm its practice of reducing 
the grade of a position only when it is warranted. It should 
publicize the practice of providing labor-relations training 
to union stewards. Management should examine the list of 101 
practices and any others that specifically relate to employee 
benefits. It should give wide-spread publicity to the fact 
that managers implement and adhere to these practices.
Based upon the responses of managers and workers, some 
doubt exists that all managers adhere to certain practices. 
Management should examine all of its practices and insure 
managerial compliance, especially with those practices which 
are important to labor-management relations. Management should 
make employees aware of its efforts to insure that managers 
comply with these particular practices. This should further 
improve the image of management. Those in the survey which 
management should review are;
1. When a RIF occurs, select employees for release 
in the fairest way possible and in accordance with directives 
from higher authority
2. Assign tasks to employees which are commensurate 
with their skills
3. Consider employee needs when assigning overtime to 
qualified employees and assign overtime equitably
4. Upon request, advise employees if they were con­
sidered for promotion, and, if so, their rank order on the 
register
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5. Advise employees in writing at least two weeks in 
advance of changes in hours of work and tours of duty
6. Provide employees special tools and clothing if
such items are required on the job
7. Do not require a doctor's statement as proof of
illness unless it is required in accordance with the contract
The Cost Paradox of Labor- 
Management Relations
Paradoxically, one of the problems stemming from effec­
tive labor-management relations in the high costs associated 
with the program. Yet poor labor-management relations also 
lead to high costs.
It is apparent that the union can obtain benefits for 
employees, but benefits cost money. With the economy in a 
recession, inflation a serious problem, and DOD reductions and 
austere funding a reality, any new program requiring the outlay 
of funds is likely to be rejected. This may affect future 
personnel programs,and policies as well as contract negotia­
tions. It. will also affect the ability to provide leadership 
and participative management training for WRAMA managers. So, 
unless training can be accomplished with available funds, it may 
be postponed indefinitely. If these results occur, labor- 
management relations may deteriorate.
With severe funding problems over the horizon, it is 
likely that the labor-management program will be reduced dras­
tically. The labor-relations staff will probably be among
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the first casualties along with education and training pro­
grams. Line managers can help offset these losses by becoming 
more knowledgeable in labor relations and especially in the 
existing contract. Self-study during off duty time may be the 
only means available to acquire this knowledge. Perhaps a 
small group of labor experts at APLC can provide needed advice 
to staff and line managers and assist WRAMA and other AFLC 
bases in contract negotiations in the same way.
Management is concerned over the number of hours 
devoted to employee representation. It regards these hours 
as lost to mission essential tasks. When assigned cost factors, 
the implied cost for labor-management relations is $380,000 
annually. Including fund outlays, the total cost is $580,000 
annually.
As personnel reductions occur base wide, the workload 
will decline, but not in proportion to the loss in manpower. 
Fewer workers will be expected to produce more. Workers will 
be less able to offset the nonproductive time of stewards who 
are involved in tasks which are not mission essential. Thus, 
management may attempt to decrease the number of stewards at 
a greater rate than the decrease in the number of workers.
Ironically, if these factors result in poor labor- 
management relations the most likely outcome will be decreased 
production, increased turnover and absenteeism, and increased 
operating costs, the problems management wishes to avoid.
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APPENDIX 1 
SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
APPROVED UNDER USAF SCN 75-11
SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
(1-3)
The purpose of this survey is to learn what management practices have been adopted because of union 
activities. Individual questionnaires will be kept confidential. Completion of the questionnaire is 
voluntary. You do not have to respond to any item or element if you do not wish to do so. You do not 
have to give your name. Your questionnaire will not be released to anyone under any circumstances.
Only the summarized data will be published. Information about age and sex will be used only to determine 
if individual groups believe management practices provide equal opportunities.
Please complete the following:
Grade b. Year first employed at Warner Robins
(4-6) (7-8)
Age
(9-10)
d. Sex e. Place of birth (city and state)
(11) (12-14)
f . I am a supervisor or manager: Yes No
(15)
Approximate city population
to
VO
to
II. There are no right or wrong answers. Only what you think or believe to be true is important, indicate 
whether the statements listed below describe current management practices at Warner Robins AFB. Then 
indicate if your answers are true because of union activities; i.e., because employees are union members, 
have the right to join unions, or because of management-union relations.
For example, if you believe management 
promotes the best qualified employees, 
check "Yes" in Column 1. If you believe 
management follows this procedure to 
avoid conflict with the union, check "Yes" 
in Column 2. But if you believe management 
does not promote the best qualified, check 
"No" in Column 1. If you believe the union had 
nothing to do with this result, check "No" in 
Column 2. Of course, other combinations 
of answers are possible. Just give the 
answers you believe describe the situation 
best.
COLUMN 1 
A Management Practice
COLUMN 2 
Result of Union
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes X
Yes
No
No
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2
Generally . A Management Practice Result of Union
1. Management considers employee or union
reactions when acting on working conditions
or personnel policies or practices Yes No No Yes
(16) (17)
2. Management is reluctant to fire an employee No Yes Yes No
(18) (19)
3. Management is reluctant to lay off an employee Yes No Yes No
(20) (21)
4. Management talks willingly with employees or
their representatives about working conditions or No Yes No Yes
personnel policies or practices. (22) (23)
5. Management talks willingly with employees or No Yes Yes No
their representatives about grievances. (24) (25)
6. Management converts positions from civilian Yes No No Yes
to military to avoid dealing with unions. (26) (27)
7. Downgrading reclassification of job level,
change of job description, or reorganization is No Yes No Yes
discussed with the union prior to the effective (28) (29)
date of change.
8. Management considers employee needs and desires
when acting on working conditions or personnel Yes NO No Yes
policies or practices. (30) (31)
9. When a RIF occurs, management selects employees No Yes Yes No
for release in the fairest way possible. (32) (33)
10. Management downgrades only those positions Yes No No Yes
which should be at a lower skill level. (34) (35)
11. Management takes employees' needs and desires No Yes No Yes
into account when granting leave. (36) (37)
12. Employees are detailed to menial tasks Yes No Yes _ NO
to
VO
w
such as clean-up details. (38) (39)
COLUMN 1 
A Management Practice
COLUMN 2 
Result of Union
13. When negotiating an agreement with the 
union, management makes several proposals and 
counter proposals on each article before stating 
its real position.
14. Employees are provided special tools and 
clothing if such items are required on the job.
15. Management considers employee desires when 
assigning overtime to qualified employees and 
attempts to assign overtime equitability.
16. Upon request, employees are advised if they 
were considered for promotion and, if so, their 
rank order on the register.
17. An employee is not required to furnish a 
doctor's statement as proof of illness unless 
the employee is suspected of abusing the 
privilege.
18. Management advises employees in writing at 
least two weeks in advance of changes in hours 
of work and tours of duty.
19. When negotiating, management doesn't give 
up anything to employees if it can be avoided.
20. Managers and supervisors are trained in 
labor-management relations.
21. Management sponsors training in labor- 
management relations for union stewards.
22. Generally, management practices have 
improved since a Presidential Executive 
Order in 1962 authorized employees to 
join unions.
No Yes
(40)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
(42)
No
(44)
Yes
(46)
Improved
No
(48)
Yes
(50)
No
(52)
No
(54)
Yes
(56)
No
(41)
No  Yes
(43)
No  Yes
(45)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
_  NO 
(47)
No
(49)
Yes
(51)
_  No 
(53)
_  No 
(55)
Yes
(57)
Result of Union
to
VD
Yes No
(58)
Yes No
(59)
23. Each number corresponds to a management practice listed in this questionnaire. If you are opposed 
to any of the management practices, place a 1 by the practice you oppose most. Place a 2 by the next 
practice which you oppose most, etc., until you have listed all of those to which you are opposed. Do 
not indicate opposition unless you have already indicated that it is a management practice.
FOR EXAMPLE: If you dislike management practice 11 the most,
place a "1" in item 11. If the next practice 
you dislike is management practice 5, place a 
"2" in item 5. If you like all the other 
management practices, do not list another 
practice. You have finished the questionnaire.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. __ 7 . ______8 . _____ 9. _______ 10._____  11. ____
a b c d e f g h i  j K
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 1 7 . _____ 1 8 . ________ 19.   20. ____  21. ____  5
L M N  O P Q R S T U  m
APPENDIX 2
CHI SQUARE PROGRAM AND 
EXPECTED FREQUENCIES
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CHI SQUARE 
* * * * * * * * * *
IOC MERRELL CHISQ PROGRAM FOR 2 X 2  CONTINGENCY TABLES
20C LAST UPDATE 10 DEC 74
22 ASCII ANS
25 10 PRINT; " "
30 PRINT: "ENTER OBSERVED FREQUENCIES A,B,C,D"
40 READ:A,B,C,D
50 T=A+B+C+D
6 0 TNUM=T* (A*D-B*C-T/2.)*(A*D-B*C-T/2.)
70 TDEN=(A+B)* (C+D)* (A+O* (B+D)
80 CHISQ=TNUM/TDEN
90 PRINT 900,CHISQ
100 900 FORMAT (/IH, "CHISQ=",1X,F10.2)
110 PRINT: "ANOTHER CALCULATION (Y OR N)?"
120 READ:ANS
130 IF(ANS.EQ."Y")GO TO 10
140 STOP
150 END
NOTE: The title, "Merrell Chi Square Program" is merely an
identifier to access the computer. The chi square 
formula is recorded on the computer tape file under this 
title.
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EXPECTED FREQUENCY 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
OlOC
*20C
*30
*40
*50
*60
*70
*80
*90
*100
*110
*120
*130
*140
*150
*SAVE
MERRELL EXPECTED FREQUENCY PROGRAM 
LAST UPDATE 11 DEC 74
10 PRINT; ENTER OBSERVED FREQUENCIES. 
READ: A, B, C, D
IF (A. EQ.O.. AND B. EQ. 0)
T = A + B + C + D
"A, B, C, D.
GO TO 20
EA
EB
EC
ED
= (A 
+ (A 
+ (C 
+ (C
B)
B)
D)
D)
*
*
*
*
(A + C) /T 
(B + D) /T 
(A + C) /T 
(B + D) /T 
PRINT 900, EA, EB, EC, ED
FORMAT (IH, "EXPECTED FREQUENCIES A, B, C, D:" (4F10.0) 
GO TO 10 
20 STOP 
END 
EFREQ 
DATA SAVED-EFREQ 
*EDIT 
-PS: /TT/
APPENDIX 3
STATISTICAL DATA PERTAINING TO 
MANAGER AND WORKER RESPONSES
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TABLE 1 
MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 
Management
Practice Exists Result of Union
Number Percent Number Percent
Practice YES - Æ YES NO NO YES NO
1 40 98 40 0 98 0
1 2 0 1 • 0 2
2 31 76 13 18 32 44
10 24 3 7 7 17
3 27 66 10 17 24 42
14 34 4 10 10 24
4 39 95 19 20 46 49
2 5 0 2 0 5
5 40 98 16 24 39 58
1 2 0 1 0 2
6 2 5 1 1 2 2
39 95 5 34 12 83
7 31 76 30 1 73 2
10 24 1 9 2 22
8 38 93 12 26 29 63
3 7 0 3 0 7
9 34 83 12 22 29 54
7 17 1 6 2 15
10 30 73 6 24 15 58
11 27 3 8 7 20
11 39 95 11 28 27 68
2 5 1 1 2 2
12 15 37 8 7 20 17
26 63 7 19 17 46
13 27 66 23 4 56 10
14 34 5 9 12 22
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Management
Practice Exists Result of Union
Management Number , Percent Number Percent
Practice YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
14 39 95 14 25 34 61
2 5 0 0 0 5
15 38 93 15 23 36 66
3 7 2 1 5 2
16 38 93 16 22 39 54
3 7 1 2 2 5
17 33 80 12 21 29 51
8 20 4 4 10 10
18 37 90 27 10 65 24
4 10 4 0 10 0
19 12 29 12 0 29 0
29 71 3 26 7 63
20 36 88 22 14 54 34
5 12 2 3 5 7
21 31 76 26 5 63 12
10 24 3 7 7 17
SOURCE: Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, September 23-28, 1974
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TABLE 2 
WORKER RESPONSES
Management 
Practice Exists Result of Union
Number Percent Number Percent
Practice YES NO YES NO YES ■ _ W YES NO
1 25C 74 209 49 60 14
89 26 31 58 9 17
2 297 86 190 107 55 31
50 14 12 38 4 11
3 239 69 148 91 43 26
108 31 21 87 6 25
4 224 64 139 85 40 24
123 35 39 84 11 24
5 236 68 174 62 50 18
111 32 51 60 15 17
6 76 22 49 27 14 8
271 78 31 240 9 69
7 201 8 172 29 50 8
146 42 27 119 8 34
8 184 53 92 92 26 26
163 47 45 118 13 34
9 227 65 133 94 38 27
120 35 35 85 10 25
10 166 . 48 83 83 24 24
181 52 49 132 14 38
11 287 83 130 157 38 45
60 17 12 48 4 14
12 239 69 80 159 23 46
108 31 30 78 9 22
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Management
Practice Exists Result of Union
Management Number Percent ' Nqmber Percent
Practice YES w YES NO YES NO YES NO
13 275 79 225 50 65 14
72 21 22 50 6 14
14 293 84 150 143 43 41
54 16 16 38 5 11
15 217 62 117 100 34 29
130 38 36 94 10 27
16 244 70 152 92 44 26
103 30 25 78 7 22
17 261 75 139 122 40 35
86 25 26 60 8 17
18 263 76 201 62 58 18
84 24 27 57 8 16
19 219 63 125 94 36 27
128 37 43 85 12 24
20 250 72 - 192 58 55 17
97 28 14 83 4 24
21 198 57 184 14 53 4
149 43 30 119 9 34
SOURCE: Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, 23-28 September 1974
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TABLE 3
IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Management Practices 
Have Improved Result of Union
Number Number Number Number
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Managers 25 61 21 4 51 10
16 39 9 7 22 17
Workers 277 80 242 35 70 10
70 20 16 54 5 16
SOURCE: Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, September
23-28, 1974
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TABLE 4
IOC MERRELL CHI SQUARE PROGRAM 
HEADQUARTERS AIR UNIVERSITY 
USAF
Does MP Exist? 
Observed Frequencies
Is MP Result of Union? 
Chi Observed Frequencies Chi
Practice A B C D Squa A B C D Squa
1 40 1 258 89 9.32 40 0 209 49 7.76
2 31 10 297 50 3.61 13 18 190 107 6.75
3 27 14 239 108 0.33 10 17 148 91 7.31
4 39 2 224 123 14.32 19 20 139 85 3.05
5 40 1 236 111 14.19 16 24 174 62 19.75
6 2 39 76 271 7.72 1 1 49 27 1.36
7 31 10 201 146 4.06 30 1 172 29 2.08
8 38 23 184 163 21.97 12 26 92 92 5.06
9 34 7 227 120 4.34 12 22 133 94 7.48
10 30 11 166 181 8.43 6 24 83 83 10.47
11 39 2 287 60 3.33 11 28 130 157 4.81
12 15 26 239 108 18.37 8 7 80 159 1.66
13 27 14 275 72 4.63 23 4 225 50 0.03
14 39 2 293 54 2.58 14 25 150 143 3.86
15 38 3 217 130 13.48 15 23 117 100 3.31
16 38 3 244 103 8.15 16 22 152 92 6.04
17 33 8 261 86 0.31 12 21 139 122 4.06
18 37 4 263 84 3.58 27 10 201 62 0.44
19 12 29 219 128 18.87 12 0 125 94 124.77
20 36 5 250 97 3.92 22 14 192 58 4.99
21 31 10 198 149 4.48 26 5 184 14 4.20
(Have MPa Improved?) (Result of Union?)
22 25 16 277 70 8.69 21 . 4 242 35 0.63
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TABLE 5
OlOC MERRELL EXPECTED FREQUENCY PROGRAM 
HEADQUARTERS AIR UNIVERSITY 
USAF
Management
Does MP Exist? 
Expected Frequencies
Is MP Result of Union? 
Expected Frequencies
Practice A B C D A B C D
1 31.5 9.5 266.5 80.5 33.4 6.6 215.6 42.4
2 34.7 6.3 293.3 53.7 19.2 11.8 183.8 113.2
3 28.1 12.9 237.1 109.1 16.0 11.0 142.0 97.0
4 27.8 13.2 235.2 111.8 23.4 15.6 134.6 89.4
5 29.2 11.8 246.8 100.2 27.5 12.5 162.5 73.5
6 8.2 32.8 69.8 277.2 1.3 0.7 48.7 27.3
7 11.4 29.6 48.6 126.4 27.0 4.0 175.0 26.0
8 23.5 17.5 198.5 148.5 17.8 20.2 86.2 97.8
9 27.6 13.4 233.4 113.6 18.9 15.1 126.1 100.9
10 20.7 20.3 175.3 171.7 13.6 16.4 75.4 90.6
11 34.4 6.6 291.6 55.4 16.9 22.1 124.1 162.9
12 26.8 14.2 227.2 119.8 5.2 9.8 82.8 156.2
13 31.9 9.1 270.1 76.9 22.2 4.8 225.8 49.2
14 35,1 5.9 296.9 50.1 19.3 19.7 144.7 148.3
15 26.9 14.1 228.1 118.9 19.8 18.4 112.4 104.6
16 29.8 11.2 252.2 94.8 22.2 15.4 145.4 98.6
17 31.1 9.9 262.9 84.1 16.9 16.1 134.1 126.9
18 31.7 9.3 268.3 78.7 28.1 8.9 199.9 63.1
19 24.4 16.6 206.6 140.4 7.1 4.9 129.9 89.1
20 30.2 10.8 255.8 91.2 26.9 9.1 187.1 62.9
21 24.2 16.8 204.8 142.2 28.4 2.6 181.6 16.4
(Have MPs Improved?) (Result of Union?)
22 31.9 9.1 270.1 76.9 21.8 3.2 241.2 35.8
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TABLE 6
MANAGErŒNT PRACTICE OPPOSITION NUMBER OF WORKERS
OPPOSING A PRACTICE, BY ORDER OF OPPOSITION
___________________Order of Opposition______________
Management
Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
'______ Number of Workers Opposing Practice________
(1) 6^ 1 1
(2) 17 8 1 1
(3) 4 4 3
(4) 1 3 1
(5) 7 1 1
(6) 2 2 2 2 1
(7) 4
(8) 3 1 2 1
(9) 1
(10) 2 1 1 2 1
(11) 4 1 1
(12) 12 10 10 1 2
(13) 2 2 1
(15) 1 1
(16) 1 4 1 1 1
(17) 1 1
(18) 1 1
(19) 8 7 1 2 1 1
(20) 1
(21) 1
SOURCE: Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, 23-28 September 1974
®Six workers listed Management Practice 1 as the practice they 
oppose most.
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TABLE 7
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION, TOTAL OPPOSITION
POINTS OP WORKERS, BY ORDER OF OPPOSITION
Order of Opposition
Management
Practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total Opposition Points
9 10
(1) 126^ 19 18
(2) 357 160 19 18
(3) 84 80 57
(4) 21 60b 19 14
(5) 140 19 18
(6) 42 40 38 36 16 15
(7) 84 14
(8) 63 20 38 16
(9) 19
(10) 42 20 19 36 17 15
(11) 84 20 18
(12) 252 200 200 18 34 12
(13) 40 38 17
(15) 18 17 13
(16) 21 80 19 17 16
(17) 21 18 •
(18) 17 16
(19) 168 140 19 36 17 16
(20) 21 14
(21) 21
SOURCE : Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, 23-28 September 1974
^The 126 points are obtained by multiplying 6 (the number from row 1, 
column 1 of Table 6) times 21 (the number of points given for the most 
opposed management practice).
^The 60 points In row 4, column 2, are obtained by multiplying 3 (the 
number from row 4, column 2, of Table 6) times 20 (the number of points given 
for the next most opposed practice).
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TABLE 8
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION, NUMBER OF MANAGERS 
OPPOSING A PRACTICE, BY ORDER OF OPPOSITION
Management Order of Opposition
Practice 1 2 3
(2) 8^ 2
(3) 1 6
(4) 1
(6) 1
(7)
(10) 1
(11) 1
(12) 1
(13) 1
(16) 1
(17) 1
(21)
SOURCE; Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, 23-28 September 1974 
^Eight managers listed Management Practice 2 as the practice they
oppose most.
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TABLE 9
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE OPPOSITION, TOTAL OPPOSITION POINTS OP
MANAGERS, BY ORDER OF OPPOSITION
Order of Opposition
Management
Practice 1 2 3
Total Opposition Points
(2) 168* 40
(3) 21 120
(4) 21
(6) 21
(7) 19b
(10) 20
(11) 21
(12) 20
(13) 20
(16) 20
(17) 20
(21) 19 18
SOURCE: Survey of Management Practices, Robins AFB GA, 23-28 September 1974
*The 168 points are obtained by multiplying 8 (the number from row 1,
column 1 of Table 8) times 2I (the number of points given for the most opposed
management practice).
^he 19 points are obtained by multiplying 1 (the number from row 5,
column 3 of Table 8) times 19 (the number of points given for the third most
opposed management practice).
APPENDIX 4
SUMMARY OF UNION AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
AND OBLIGATIONS ACCRUING FROM THE 
BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS
Description of Right
1. Recognition
a. Union
b. Union Stewards
2. Dues Withholding
3. Consultation
a. Monthly Labor-Management 
Meetings
TABLE 10
UNION AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS ACCRUING FROM THE BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS 
First Agreement Second Agreement
b. Wage Survey
c. Hours of work
d. Environmental Differential 
Pay
e. Suggestions
f. UipleBentatlon of Promotion 
Evaluation Patterns
g. Base Entrances
Exclusive
Number not specified 
voluntary
Limited labor connittee 
to six members
Consultation limited
Consult two weeks in advance, 
if change mission related
Authorized a reasonable number
Cancel only in March or 
September
Increased to eight members
Deleted
NOTE: "Dashes” mean "no change" and an "asterisk" means "not in the agreement"
Third Agreement
Authorized one steward 
and one alternate steward 
for each fifty employees
The amount of dues with­
holding could not be changed 
more than once a year
Increased to ten members
Maximum of ten union members 
could make presentation
Consult four %feeks in advance 
even if change mission related
Consult at union request
Management will not approve 
or disapprove suggestion 
without consulting union
Consult prior to change 
unless change directed by 
higher headquarters
consult prior to opening 
or closing. Union could 
request traffic survey any 
time
Description of Right
h. Local Change to Supervisory 
Appraisal System
4. Committee Membership
a. EBO Committee
b. Civilian Welfare Council
c. Civilian Welfare Council
d. Suggestion Committee
e. Charity Fund Council
f. Ground Safety
g. Wage Survey
h. Data Collectors Ccaaittee 
for Wage Survey
i. Environmental and Differential 
Pay Ccemd.ttee
j. Health, Safety, and Fire 
Hetzards Coordination Grotç
k. Non-Appropriated Funds Council
5. union Notification
a. Injury Frequency and Cost Rates
b. Job Classification for Wage 
Board Positions
First Agreement Second Agreement 
Consult prior to change
Third Agreement
One union member
One non-voting union member
Select managerial committee 
from union nominees
One union member
Union menber accompany inspector
At least one qualified union Deleted 
member from among twenty 
nominees, if possible
One union member
Copy to union
Updated list to union each 
six months
Three union merbers
One union member for each 
of five committees
Hiree non-voting union 
manbers (in addition to 
naainations of managers)
One union member
One-half would be union 
members (5)
One-half would be union 
members (3)
One union member
W
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Description of Right 
c. Hours of Work
d. Overtime Records
e. Job Descriptions
f. Reduction-In-Force
g. Personnel Regulations
h. List of Employees in Base- 
Wide unit
i. List of Accessions and Separations
j. Higher Headquarters Directed 
Oumge to Sqiervisory Appraisal 
System
k. Suggestions
1. Promotion Evaluation Patterns 
m. Contracting Out
n. Grievance Heeuring
o. Annual Classification 
Survey Critique
Dse of Official Time
a. Stewards
(1) Meeting with Management, 
Preparing for Management 
Meeting
First Agreement
Tvo weeks advance notice if 
change required by mission
Second Agreement
Copy to union in case of dispute
Copy to union in case of dispute
Notify union ASAP if affect at 
least ten enployees
Union observer present
Unlimited time
Copy to union 
Copy to union
Copy to union, monthly 
Notify prior to change
Notify union prior to notifying 
employees of termination of 
employment
Third Agreement
Notify union of change due 
to emergency; otherwse, 
consultation with union 
required prior to change
Notify ASAP
Copy to union
Copy to union
Notify union prior to con­
tracting out unless inaediate 
action required
Notify union prior to 
hearing
W
Description of Right First Agreement Second Agreement Diird Agreement
(2) Representation of 
Eac>loyees
(a) Preparation
(b) Representation
(3) Orientation on Executive 
Order
(4) Orientation on Base Wide 
Agreement (Includes ten 
other union members}
7. Administrative Leave
8. Use of Official Facilities
a. Bulletin Boards
b. Distribute Onion Newspaper
c. Reserved Parking Spaces
(1) onion President
(2) Onion Vice-President
(3) Directorate Chief 
Stewards
(4) Division Chief Stewards
d. Facilities For Union Meetings 
and Elections
e. Bqiloyee Publish Union Itans 
in Base Newspaper
f. Office Space
g. Lockers
Eight hours 
Unlimited time 
Eight hours
For union positions or 
activities
Post union material 
Distribute paper on base
Authorized
*
Authorized, if justified
During non-duty hours
Eight hours
If denied, notify union in 
writing
Remove after thirty days W
o i
Authorized
Authorized
Consider
Items about AFGE health 
plan
If available, furnish for 
stewards
Provide for branch and 
directorate chief stewards
Description of Right First Agreement Second Agreement Third Agreement
9. aployee Services Provided by
Employer
a. Advise aployees of Health 
Benefit Plans
b. Safety Instructions
c. Kiviae Employees that Union 
Member could Represent them 
in Job Classification Dispute
d. Advise Biployees of Nature 
and Procedures of Dues 
Withholding
e. Advise Employees of Right to 
Join or Refredu from Joining 
union
10. Training
a. Training Prior to Assignment 
to Job or Machines
b. Select for Training by 
Using Merit Promotion System:
c. Off-Duty Education or Training
11. Working Conditions
a. Hours of Work
(1) Shift Assignments
(2) Snap Shifts
(3) Assignment of Overtime
Advise employees
Instruct employees 
Advise Oployees
Train esployee 
Select by Merit
Return at end of two-week 
shift
Assign volunteers who are
(1) performing job
(2) best qualified
Advise employees Union advise employees
Advise employees
Attempt to arrange employee 
work schedule
Assign volunteers by seniority 
Return at end of ninety days Return at end of two-week 
shift
Description of Right
(4) Notification of Overtime
(a) General Overtime
(b) Weekend Overtime
b. Assignment to Details
(1) Reason for Detail
(2) Type of Detail
c. Promotions
(1) Tests
(2) Publish List of 
Bigloyees Promoted
(3) Temporary Promotion
d. Perfornuunce Appraisal
(1) Ratings
(2) Level of Performance
e. Holiday Work
(1) Assignment
First Agreement
As far in advance as possible 
By noon Thursday
Explain reeison for detail to 
employee
Second Agreement Third Agreement
NO local tests
No demeaning work
Monthly
If detailed to job for sixty days 
or more
Mark ratings in ink in 
employee's presence
Sixty days written notice 
prior to withholding pay 
increase
Select volunteers if possible
Deleted requirement to 
explain reason— rotate 
equitability unless detail 
resulted in temporary 
promotion
Deleted reference to 
demeaning work— usually 
work would be related to 
requirements and qualifica­
tions of position
If no written notice sixty 
days prior to withholding 
pay increase, reevaluate 
sixty days after withholding
Description of Right
(2) Notice
f. Annual Leave
g. Sick Leave Abuse
h. Rest Periods
i. Contracting Out
j. Additional Entrances 
k. Retirement Counseling
1. Awards
m. Ate>nishment 
n. Time Clocks
12. Grievances
a. Negotiated Procedure
b. Mx> Can File Grievance
c. Biployee Representative in 
Negotiated Procedure
d. Grievance on Promotion
First Agreement
Determine on seniority
Second Agreement 
Advance notice of one week
Supervisors must document that 
employee has not corrected abuse
Open during shift change
Bgployer will counsel one 
year prior to retirement—  
ei^loyee attendance mandatory
Grievance to arbitration 
with union consent
Btployee only
Esployee's choice
Process under negotiated or 
Air Force procedure
Notify employee prior to his 
termination
Employees with twenty-five 
years service were exempt 
from clocking in or out
Third Agreement
Only first t m  weeks based 
on seniority
Authorized; no time limits 
specified
Employee attendance voluntary
Sipervisor post names of 
recipients on bulletin 
board
Conducted in privacy 
Impasse
Union can file also; right 
to appeal decision to FLRC
Union representative only
Process under negotiated 
procedure only
W
00
Description of Right
13. Arbitration
a. Grievance
b. Interpretation or 
Application of Agreement
14. Procedures for Resolving 
Impasses
15. Disciplinary Action
16. Distribution of Base-Wide 
Agreement
a. Union
b. Supervisors
c. a^loyees
17. Duration of Agreement
a. Modify Agreement
b. Heuciimmi Life, With Renewal
First Agreement
Advisory arbitration
Use of fact-finding technique 
and mediation optional— if use, 
results reviewed by higher 
headquarters
Right to reopen negotiations 
in one year from date of con­
tract approval
Two years
Second Agreement
Advisory arbitration
Discipline eiq>loyees who dis­
criminate against union members 
or tiho defame union or its 
officers
800 copies 
One copy each
Supervisors make copy available 
to each employee
Third Agreement
Binding arbitration 
Binding arbitration
Fact-finding techniques 
optional— if use and still 
unresolved, must use media­
tion— if still unresolved, 
can request FSIP action
3,500 copies
W ! M : 
VO.
Four years
NOTE: "Dashes" meem "no change" and an "asterisk" means "not in the agreement"
SOURCE: Base-wide Agreements
First Agreement
TABLE II
UNION OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BASE-WIDE AGREEMENTS 
Second Agreement
1. Encourage eng>loyees to participate in 
off duty education and training pro­
grams for self-in@)rov«Dent purposes
2. improve productivity
3. Insure mission accomplishment
4. Promote health and welfare of the 
employees
5. Represent all unit employees
6. Guard against abuse of official time 
for stewards
7. Refrain from publishing or posting 
material which violates a law or is 
scurrilous, libelous, or unlawful
8. Support voluntary payroll plan for 
united States Savings Bonds
9. Promote and abide by Air Force safety 
standards
10. Refrain from releasing unauthorized 
wage survey information
11. Share cost of eudaitration
12. Share cost of mediation
13. *
14.
Third Agreement
wto
o
Union representatives to be tenperate and 
gentlemanly in labor-management relations
Penalize union members for intaaperate 
or defamatory acts against supervisors
NOTE: "Dashes” mean "no change" and an "asterisk" means "not in the agreement."
First Agreement Second Agreement Third Agreement
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Nominate managers «fith technical qualifi­
cations for Suggestion Committee
Steweurds advise sqpervisors before con­
tacting employees
Advise employees of dues withholding 
procedures
Cannot change dues withholding more than 
once a year
Recognise authority of srgervisors to main­
tain proper conduct and discipline among 
oaployees
Encourage employees to familiarise thsmselves 
with regulations and rules of conduct
Recognise the desirability of resolving 
cooplaints against esployees in the interest 
of justice and equi^
Rraove union material from official bulletin 
boards after it has been posted thirty days
w
to
H*
SOURCE> Base-wide Agreements
NOTE: "Dashes" mean "no change" and «m "asterisk" means "not in the agreement."
APPENDIX 5 
THE RESEARCH MODEL
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Figure 1. The Research Model to Determine the Iiqact of Collective Bargaining on Management Practices at the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center
